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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on the ideal of objectivity in science. My aim is to understand 
and situate how objectivity has been conceptualized in the philosophy of science, and to 
question whether these conceptualizations are consistent with the actual ways in which 
objectivity has been sought in scientific practice. I examine the dominant views of 
objectivity in mainstream philosophy of science and feminist reactions to them. 
Ultimately, I argue that Helen Longino’s understanding of objectivity, complemented by 
some aspects of Sandra Harding’s “strong objectivity”, provides a more comprehensive 
and practical ideal to guide scientific practice than the received view’s conception where 
objectivity is sought by adopting an impersonal methodology.  
One of the main criticisms against feminist epistemologies, which argue for the 
gender specificity of knowledge, is that they lead to epistemic relativism. And hence it is 
argued that feminist epistemologies undermine “scientific objectivity”. In arguing for the 
fruitfulness and consistency of a feminist account of objectivity, I examine in what ways 
claims about the gender specificity of knowledge could be understood without rendering 
the notion of objectivity redundant.  
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Introduction 
 
In 1995 Karen Keegan, mother of three, was told that she needed an immediate kidney 
transplant. (RadioLab, 2008) In the search for a suitable donor, her husband and her two 
sons underwent DNA testing. The results were shocking: her two sons’ DNA did not 
match hers. From a medical point of view this meant that she was not their mother. She 
insisted that the test be repeated since they were “obviously” wrong. She had given birth 
to her babies and had experienced the pain of delivery. However, the new tests confirmed 
the previous results. Clearly there had been no laboratory mistake. This was quite a 
puzzling situation, for although a mismatch between a father’s DNA and a child’s DNA 
is not unheard of, there had never been a case where a mother’s DNA did not match her 
children’s. Doctors initially thought that there was some sort of a mix up, such as 
switching of babies at the hospital, but then dismissed this possibility because the father’s 
DNA matched his sons'. Since for medical doctors “DNA is never wrong” they suspected 
that Karen was hiding something. Some of the doctors even went as far as to suggest that 
she had implanted her womb with another woman’s baby and lied about it. After 
investigating hospital records and so forth, the doctors decided to test some other tissues 
in her body, such as her thyroid, bladder and skin. The results of these tests were 
perplexing for they identified two sets of DNA, and two sets of DNA meant the existence 
of two different people. In other words, the tests indicated that there was another person 
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inside Karen. Furthermore, this other person was the mother of her two boys. Eventually, 
the doctors concluded that Karen is a twin.1  
This remarkable story provides us philosophers with a broad range of material for 
thinking about science, how it works and how it affects our daily lives. This story can be 
read as an exemplary case of science as a puzzle-solving activity at work. It can also be 
read as supporting the idea that focusing on rare events in nature helps in revealing the 
structure of the world. Yet another way of approaching this story is to take it as a story 
about the authority of science, the ways in which scientific authority is at play in real life 
situations, and how its impacts can be devastating and unjustified.   Perhaps Karen’s case 
is not strong enough to make this last point. After all, although she had gone through 
stressful times, in the end science succeeded in giving them a reasonable explanation of 
the whole situation. This is not always so.  
The case of Lydia Fairchild is illuminating in a different and more troubling way. 
It begins when Fairchild, a single mother, applied for welfare support for her children. 
She and her family were tested in order to prove that they were all related. (ABC News, 
2006) Fairchild received a similar call from the authorities as did Karen, but this time 
from The Department of Social Services. The Department told her that she was not the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This strange case is an outcome of a very rare event in nature. The scientific explanation 
is as follows: in Karen’s mother’s womb initially there were two fertilized eggs (twin 
girls) developing in their separate sacs. Then an anomaly occurred and somehow two 
embryos bumped into each other, merged and formed Karen. However, the embryos did 
not blend, they claimed different tissues from Karen. One of the twin’s DNA formed her 
blood and the other her thyroids, bladder and so on. The scientific term for this rare 
situation is “chimerism”. In Greek mythology “chimera” means a monster: part goat, part 
lion and part snake. 
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mother of her three children. Like Karen, Fairchild knew that she had carried the babies 
and delivered them at birth. Yet, she was being treated as a criminal suspect. When she 
resisted, she was told by a social worker that “DNA is 100 percent foolproof and it 
doesn’t lie.” Now Fairchild was not only denied public assistance but she was also 
“suspected of possibly acting as a paid surrogate mother and committing welfare fraud.” 
State authorities told Fairchild that the children could be taken away from her 
permanently. In her defense, Fairchild had to fight the charges in court “to prove the 
children born from her own body were her own.” (ABC News, 2006) But because DNA 
tests were considered a gold standard in court, and infallible, the attorneys Fairchild 
approached did not want to fight DNA evidence.  
 Fairchild’s story provides a compelling illustration of the extensive authority 
“scientific evidence” claims. This case also shows us how dogmatically clinging to this 
authority could lead to unreasonable and unjustified practices. Faith in DNA testing was 
so firm and deemed so credible that even when Fairchild gave birth to another baby under 
the surveillance of a court officer (who immediately collected DNA samples from the 
newborn), authorities still did not believe her. These tests also revealed that there was a 
mismatch between the mother Fairchild and her newborn. “Even though they’d witnessed 
the birth, officials believed she was acting as a surrogate, possibly bearing a child for 
money.” (ABC News, 2006) Eventually, the story of Karen Keegan provided the key to 
solving the mystery in Fairchild’s case. Further tests proved that Fairchild was also her 
own twin, leading to the dismissal of her case. Yet the despair, fear and panic she 
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suffered through during her struggle to prove that she was not a fraud reveals to us how 
maintaining an unwavering faith in science can become unruly and irresponsible. 
Perhaps these contemporary individual cases are not of the same scale of harm as 
those produced by the unquestioned authority of science in the past. Some systemic cases 
that come to mind include “establishing” the inferiority of certain groups of people to the 
white population in order to “justify” their inhumane treatment. Nonetheless, these 
contemporary cases are good indicators that dogmatically clinging to “established 
scientific facts” still persists. These cases also suggest that similar historical cases, often 
thought to be merely examples of bad science, cannot be lightly dismissed as 
representative of an immature stage in the development of science. 
  The existence and persistence of such injustice urges us to question the 
(authoritative) grounds on which science continues to rest.2 There is no straightforward 
answer to this question. Constructing an answer demands both an analysis of the 
characteristics of science, which have shifted and evolved throughout history, and an 
examination of the societal features within which Western science has emerged. Therein, 
one of the key features of Western science, buttressing its privileged and protected status, 
is its acclaimed adherence to “objectivity”.  
 This dissertation focuses on the ideal of objectivity in science.3 My aim is to 
understand and situate how objectivity has been conceptualized in the philosophy of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Admittedly, not all scientific disciplines have the same extent of authority. The 
authoritative status of science varies across different domains.  
3 In this dissertation I focus largely on the natural sciences. However, my discussion of 
objectivity is not limited to the natural sciences. In the end I argue for a feminist 
	   5	  
science. Ultimately, I argue that a feminist conceptualization of objectivity provides a 
more comprehensive and practical ideal to guide scientific practice than the received 
view’s conception, where objectivity is sought by adopting an impersonal methodology. 
This methodology is believed to insure the removal of subjective elements, which are 
seen as impediments to neutrality, in scientific thinking. Nevertheless different schools of 
thought, feminist among them, successfully show that this so-called impersonal 
methodology does not succeed in completely eliminating bias and prejudice in scientific 
thinking. 
Objectivity is one of the chief regulatory epistemic notions that vindicates inquiry, 
observation or method, and which provides authority to whoever can claim it. As such the 
notion of objectivity has been at the center of discussion for different groups of 
philosophers of science. Specifically, in the early twentieth century a vast amount of 
literature on the nature of scientific observation, explanation and method was produced in 
accounting for scientific objectivity.  In this period, the methodology of the natural 
sciences was regarded as providing the model for “objectivity” by the predominant 
Western worldview of the time, namely positivism. However, objectivity itself is a 
complicated and a contested notion. Objectivity has been variously attributed to 
descriptions or judgments where ontological considerations come into play, and/or to 
methods of inquiry where epistemological considerations come into play. Furthermore, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
understanding of objectivity where which norms to follow in achieving objectivity is 
influenced by the local, pragmatic and material circumstances of the inquiry at hand.  
Hence, this new conception of objectivity is applicable to any inquiry regardless of its 
content.  
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these two attributions are often conjoined by the belief that objective descriptions of the 
world are attained through a unique methodology. Here, the gap between an inquiring—
yet fallible—mind and an independent world is filled by the assumption that following an 
impersonal and value-free methodology will yield “objective” truths about the world. 
Hence, the objectivity of scientific methodology means that the results of scientific 
inquiry provide the last word about matters of fact. The authority of science, then, is 
closely related to claims about the integrity of science. That is, attributing objectivity to 
scientific method means that the results of scientific inquiry are not tainted by any 
subjective elements—be they individual prejudices or social and political values and 
situations. Throughout this dissertation, I will examine how this belief in the integrity of 
science has been maintained by those who adhere to the received view of objectivity, and 
will question whether this view is consistent with the actual ways in which objectivity has 
been sought in scientific practice.  
In questioning the authority of science, perhaps the first thing to note is that 
scientific authority has historically been and continues to be reinforced by the linguistic 
style of scientific discourse. According to Ruth Hubbard, “[t]he way language is used in 
scientific writing implicitly denies the relevance of time, place, social context, 
authorship, and personal responsibility.” (Hubbard 1979, xv) For instance, expressing 
scientific writing in the passive voice, that is, in the form of ‘it has been observed that’, 
deletes the scientist as an agent and his/her activity. This makes it possible for science to 
be treated as though it were as real as nature. For Hubbard “a further degree of 
reification, and consequently alienation, is introduced by removing all verb forms, even 
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passive ones.” Hence, even the impersonal agent of the passive voice is erased. Hubbard 
explains the process of reification with an example taken from the book Sociobiology: 
The New Synthesis written by E. O Wilson, wherein Wilson claims, “Human beings are 
absurdly easy to indoctrinate.”4 For Hubbard what is important in this claim is that “the 
activity of one person, who has the power and desire to indoctrinate others, who 
presumably are not in positions to reciprocate, is turned into a pseudo-objective 
statement—a fictitious description of ‘human nature’.” Further, Hubbard warns us about 
the consequences of such grammatical tricks: different programmes with drastically 
different effects on the natural and social world can be followed, depending on how 
reality is described.5  
This im-personalization is also at work when a “philosophical” examination of 
science is restricted to an inquiry into the logic of scientific knowledge, such as was 
carried out by the logical positivists.  Here scientific knowledge is identified with 
theoretical knowledge comprised of propositional, that is, impersonal statements. In this 
understanding the practical knowledge, or, know-how, of the majority of practicing 
scientists (such as how to sketch phenomena or what to do in a laboratory) is overlooked. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The quotation is taken from Hubbard (1979, xv). 
5 Hubbard writes, “if our description of reality is that ‘human beings are absurdly easy to 
indoctrinate,’ then it seems entirely proper to ask what makes them so and to look for 
reasons why they (of course, meaning “we”) might have evolved genes for 
‘indoctrinability,’ which is what Wilson goes on to do. However, if we described the 
situation as one in which some people are in position to indoctrinate others, we might, 
think about how to change that. A very different program!” And she goes on to note that 
“the grammar of active participation is conducive to action, whereas the grammar of 
depersonalized description tricks one into submission to “facts of nature” or at best 
encourages their further exploration.” (1979, xv) 
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This approach to science is fed by a certain prior understanding of science. In truth, what 
constitutes science remains an open question, and how we define science has direct 
effects on how we conceptualize or pursue its fundamental norms. If we define science 
strictly as “a logically coherent body of knowledge deduced from a limited number of 
principles”6, then the work of scientists indeed becomes invisible. We end up with a 
certain conceptualization of objectivity that identifies it with impersonality and neutrality. 
However, reducing science to scientific knowledge—if it is not wrong—at best will 
provide an inadequate account of science and its governing ideals. It will also leave 
important philosophical questions regarding science unanswered.  
Another way of defining science is to take it as “the system of behavior by which 
man [sic] acquires mastery of his environment.”7 Sexist terminology aside, this 
understanding conceptualizes science as a practice. However, some would be disturbed 
by the implication of the manipulation of nature, for it reflects a masculine aspiration.8 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This definition belongs to French historian of science Arnold Reymond. The quotation 
is taken from Farrington (1944, 11).   
7 This definition belongs to James Gerald Crowther, a scientific journalist and a 
pioneering advocate of the social relations of science. The quotation is taken from 
Farrington (1944, 14). 
8In her book Reflections on Gender and Science (1985) Evelyn Fox Keller explains how 
masculinity is attributed to science. I have a detailed discussion of her position in Chapter 
Four. Broadly put, according the object relations theory in psychoanalysis, boys and girls 
go through different sexual and emotional development that results in different cognitive 
styles. In forming their sense of self boys have to separate themselves from (disidentify 
with) their mothers (who are the primary objects for their infants.) Keller claims that 
scientific ideology rests on a rigid distinction between the knower (mind) and the known 
(nature). In this ideology the knower should have autonomy, separation and distance from 
his/her subject matter in order to have a grasp on nature. Furthermore, here the 
relationship between the knower and the known is one of control and dominance rather 
than an emphatic understanding which, in her view, is typically marked as a feminine 
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Yet, I believe this somewhat crude understanding is a good reminder of the sacrifices 
made in order to control the world, and the price we human beings, or other beings in 
nature, pay for the success of science. If this characterization of science is accepted 
openly, it is more likely that the methods of manipulation, as well as its consequences, 
will become more visible. It is also more likely that there will be more initiatives to take 
action against, and responsibility for, the wrong doings of science. Of course not all 
science is harmful; nor am I suggesting that it does not have any positive impact in our 
lives. In truth, we human beings need science and its achievements in order to survive. 
That is why it is of great importance to cultivate more responsible science. If it is not 
hidden that science comes with a price, then there can be room for negotiation to stop 
certain harmful research programmes and commence with certain others.  
These two definitions of science are by no means the only way to understand 
science. For instance, we can argue for the intrinsic value of science, and define science 
as an activity of seeking knowledge for its own sake. The opening sentence of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, namely “All men by nature desire to know” may confer an intrinsic value 
on science. But could the struggle to understand and explain phenomena so far be 
accounted for by appealing to curiosity alone? The way knowledge is pursued has 
changed from the times of Plato and Aristotle. In today’s neo-liberal world, I think it 
would be naïve to think that the foundations of big-scale laboratories, formations of 
complex organizations, training of millions of people and so forth are due to the intrinsic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
trait. Autonomy and separation, on the other hand, reflect a masculine cognitive style. As 
a result, scientific thought, for Keller, is identified with male thought. 
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value of scientific knowledge. Having said this, I do not contest the claim that science has 
intrinsic value. My claim is that defining science merely in terms of its intrinsic value 
neither helps us to understand what science amounts to today nor helps us to cope with its 
problems and successes. 
 One point that needs to be stressed is that defining science as an activity devoted 
to controlling our environment goes hand in hand with emphasizing its use-value. In 
other words, the knowledge that science produces should be relevant to human needs and 
values. Although the question of needs and values itself is controversial (for example, 
defining whose needs and which values), given the circumstances in which scientific 
knowledge is produced it is urgent to underline the role of science in our lives. In today’s 
neo-liberal societies, scientists, located both in universities and private research 
institutions, increasingly produce science for purposes of accumulation and exchange.9 
The process of creating exchange value for scientific knowledge results in alienation 
from and the mystification of science in people’s lives.10 Insisting on the use-value of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “Its value is not in the use of the knowledge that is generated, but in its power to realize 
exchange value in the form of fellowships, publications, jobs, research funds, positions 
on the committees that allocate funds, scientific honors, prized, etc.”  (Hubbard 1979, 
xxi) 
10 I should emphasize that my claim is not that today’s scientific environment reflects an 
intrinsic character of scientific practice. Historically, there have been and still are 
scientists who approach their subject matter out of sheer curiosity or amazement. 
However, the current structure of the scientific industry is such that these idealists, so to 
speak, are marginalized.  Almost all research programmes, to a lesser or greater extent, 
need funds to be carried out. Broadly put, today which programmes get funded and which 
are set aside is often based on decisions that follow a vicious cycle: publications help 
scientists to become known and attract more funds and job offers such as building new 
laboratories that carry out more research and produce new publications and attract even 
more funds. This cycle pushes more and more scientists into focusing on subject matters 
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science, on the other hand, may make it easy for “people to involve themselves in the 
decision-making process because the connections between “scientific decisions” and our 
daily lives would be obvious.” (Hubbard 1979, xxii) Such transparency may also help 
generate discussions about for what and for whom science is or should be useful.  
It should be admitted, however, that defining science as a practice is not sufficient 
to demarcate it from other forms of behavior intended to cope with the world.11 Yet, the 
main point in this view is to emphasize that, for many theorists and practitioners, science 
has its origin in technique. According to Farrington  “Science arises in contact with 
things, it is dependent on the evidence of the senses, and however far it seems to move 
from them, must always come back to them. It requires logic and the elaboration of 
theory, but its strictest logic and choicest theory must be proven in practice. Science in 
the practical sense is the necessary basis for abstract and speculative science.” 
(Farrington 1944, 14) It is important to note that this understanding reinstalls agency in 
science, and hence reveals the problems and limitations of an impersonal method. It also 
makes space for questions about responsibility in scientific practice.  
Many empirical and historical studies of science support a conceptualization of 
science as practice. These studies reveal that since its early beginnings in the Western 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that could potentially generate more interest and publications and eventually bring fame.  
Hence scientists increasingly move toward profit making research topics rather than what 
they are genuinely interested in. For more information on this cycle see Hubbard (1979).  
11 In Israel Scheffler’s (1982) terms, what demarcates science from other forms of 
knowledge acquisition is that (i) it rests on empirical data acquired by observation of 
phenomena; (ii) it relies on rational evaluations by appealing to general principles; and 
(iii) it is open to criticism. Note that set of criteria—even if incomplete—is not 
incompatible with an understanding of science as practice. 	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world science has rarely been an entirely solitary activity. Rather, science has evolved as 
an essentially social practice that both affects and is affected by nature as well as by 
social institutions such as politics, economics, the academy, the military and other such 
public institutions and practices. Internally, science also has a complex structure with its 
different compartments and divisions of labour, each of which stands in different and 
dependent relations with one another. Thus, we need to reconceptualize objectivity in 
science today in a way that is compatible with and applicable to this practical 
understanding. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that one cannot effectively 
reconceptualize one of the main regulatory notions in science without shifting the other 
major ideals that constitute it. Any such shift would likely result in a new epistemology 
and philosophy of science. 
Nevertheless, the value and use of empirical studies in the philosophy of science 
has been contested by such philosophers as Philip Kitcher, on the grounds that the actual 
(or historical) structure of science and how it works (or has worked) is a separate issue 
from how it should work. Hence, a strict distinction has been drawn between a 
descriptive and a normative understanding of science. Similarly, according to this line of 
thought, inquiring how scientific norms are actually pursued is not relevant to how they 
should be conceptualized and prescribed. However, the question of how the norms that 
guide scientific practice can be determined, without taking into consideration how these 
norms work and to what use they are put, remains open. I think our lack of evidence 
about the nature of concepts suggests that faith in an a priori understanding of a concept 
is unjustified. Admittedly, the grounds on which concepts stand are big questions, and I 
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do not tackle this issue in this dissertation. But my conviction is that an a priori analysis 
of a concept is often inadequate in capturing the subtleties and complexities in the actual 
usage of the term which, in my Wittgensteinian opinion, is the seat of the meaning of a 
term. Hence looking at actual practices of objectivity helps us understand and appreciate 
the intricate applications of the term.  
Following this contention, I begin my examination in the first chapter by looking 
at how objectivity has been historically understood and pursued within scientific practice. 
Since such inquiry requires considering historical cases, I appeal to the works of 
prominent historians of science such as Peter Dear, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison. 
These historians demonstrate that “objectivity” in science has been historically conceived 
in various ways. Objectivity has taken different forms depending on the currently 
dominant projects in science and depending on predominant ontologies and assumptions. 
Hence, my discussion in the first chapter aims to establish the components and ideals of 
objectivity and to show how different aspects of scientific practice focus on different 
components in their search for objectivity. Throughout the thesis I point out the 
continuities as well as the discrepancies between the historical practices of objectivity 
and its philosophical conceptualizations. I argue that some problems within certain 
understandings of objectivity in philosophy result from a dismissal of or confusion over 
the multiple meanings embedded in the notion of objectivity itself. 
In the second chapter I turn my attention to the historically dominant schools of 
thought in the philosophy of science. I examine their most common principles in an 
attempt to understand and formalize their understandings of objectivity. The comparison 
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between different schools of thought shows that each school emphasizes distinct 
components of objectivity, leading to conflicting prescriptions regarding how to achieve 
scientific objectivity. Apart from disagreements over specific scientific principles, one of 
the main reasons behind these discrepancies is the difference in their understandings of 
what science amounts to. In mainstream Western philosophy of science, for example 
among logical empiricists and scientific realists, the dominant approach to science as a 
subject of philosophical investigation is to focus on the logic of scientific knowledge 
(while dismissing other aspects of scientific practice as philosophically irrelevant). I 
believe this is a narrow and mistaken approach. As I discuss above, science is neither a 
monolithic enterprise nor a solitary activity. I find the resources for a more 
comprehensive account of science and its ideals in feminist literature on science and 
objectivity.  
Hence, in the third and fourth chapters, I examine feminist epistemology and 
philosophy of science. The third chapter focuses on feminist standpoint theory and 
particularly on Sandra Harding’s conception of “strong objectivity”. I examine its 
strengths and weaknesses. In the fourth chapter, I focus on Helen Longino’s 
understanding of objectivity. I examine her belief in the sociality of knowledge (and 
science), which stems from her engagement with contextual empiricism, and I seek to 
defend her position against certain criticisms. I argue that while Longino’s conception of 
objectivity has certain advantages over Harding’s conception (such as an ability i) to 
maintain a dialog with “the mainstream” and ii) to account for the normative aspects of 
	   15	  
objectivity), her conception should be complemented by some features of Harding’s 
“strong objectivity.”   
 The fifth chapter focuses specifically on charges of relativism against feminist 
philosophy of science. I examine two specific charges. The first criticism I discuss is the 
general claim that feminists endorse the/a gender specificity of knowledge, which leads 
to a form of relativism that undermines knowledge. I examine in what ways the gender 
specificity of knowledge could be understood, and address the forms of relativism that 
would follow from them. I argue that feminists need not endorse a universal claim about 
the gender specificity of knowledge. The second criticism I discuss is Sharon Crasnow’s 
criticism brought specifically against Longino’s account of objectivity. Briefly, Crasnow 
claims that Longino’s position does not go any further than affirming intersubjectivity 
and hence does not provide a firm ground from which to constrain our beliefs. My 
response to this criticism involves an opposition to a clear-cut distinction between 
ontological and epistemological objectivity, which Crasnow presupposes. I argue that 
although distinguishing things that are represented (which fall under ontological 
objectivity) and the processes used to represent them (which fall under epistemological 
objectivity) may be conceptually helpful, in practicing science, it is unintelligible to talk 
of the things that are represented apart from the representation process itself. 
  I suggest that adopting a naturalistic approach to objectivity enables us, who seek 
a comprehensive understanding of scientific objectivity, to situate conceptions of 
objectivity in specific times and circumstances. In this understanding there can be no 
absolute conception of objectivity, and no claims of objectivity can be absolute. Hence, I 
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do not argue that a feminist conception of objectivity is conclusively better than any other 
conception. Rather, I argue that a feminist conception of scientific objectivity is more 
directly applicable (and morally responsible) than the received view’s conception. The 
historical fluidity of objectivity means that my analysis in this dissertation is also not 
conclusive. It should be expanded as new conceptualizations of objectivity emerge as a 
result of historical contingencies.
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Chapter One 
 
Scientific Objectivity: Historical Transformations and Philosophical Distinctions 
 
 
 
'Objectivity' is an ambiguous term. It is associated with distinct yet often complementary 
ideas such as truth, rationality, empirical reliability, procedural correctness, emotional 
detachment and so forth. The confusion around objectivity is often a result of neglecting 
its diverse and layered character. The works of historians of science have shown that the 
meaning and value attributed to objectivity have transformed as the concerns, the ideals 
and practices of western societies in general and science in particular have changed in 
response to the ethos of the time. In order to understand today's claims of objectivity, 
authority attributed to it and criticisms against those claims, we need to have a clear grasp 
of the diverse components of objectivity.  In the following, I will briefly explain how 
these components have emerged and merged historically. I will also examine how they 
relate to one another and form specific conceptions of objectivity. As such this chapter 
will constitute a base for the discussions of the different conceptualizations of objectivity 
operative within different schools of thought that I will examine in the coming chapters. 
One of the remarkable indicators of the non-monolithic character of objectivity is 
its changing meaning throughout history. The Oxford Dictionary defines 'objective' as 
what is external to the mind; actually existing; real. ‘Subjective’, on the other hand, is 
defined as belonging to the individual consciousness or perception; imaginary.1 In 
contrast to the modern opposition between 'objective' and 'subjective', in scholastic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, ed. Della Thompson, 1995. 
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philosophy the word 'objective' referred to the existence or nature of a thing as an object 
of consciousness while  'subjective' referred to the existing of a thing as 'in itself'.2 
Accordingly, what belonged to things subjectively were things as they are 'in themselves' 
where there is no reference to mind or consciousness, whereas, what belonged to things 
objectively pointed to the way they are presented to consciousness. It is curious how this 
striking contrast between the scholastic usage and the modern usage of ‘objective’ and 
‘subjective’ took place. Yet tracking this change lies beyond the purpose of the present 
thesis. Instead, I want to explore the philosophical and historical elements behind the 
modern association of objectivity with ideals such as impersonality, impartiality, 
disinterestedness or neutrality through examining some of the points of view in the history 
of philosophy and the transformations that took place within scientific practice.  
 
1.1    Ideals of Objectivity and the External World 
Let me start by examining how ideals of impersonality, disinterestedness and impartiality 
relate to what is external to mind. In what ways, for instance, does speaking of what is 
external to mind make our judgments impartial or disinterested? A close consideration 
would reveal that what is common to all of these ideals is their separation from some form 
of subjectivity. This separation, for some historical reasons, is believed to make these 
ideals positive attributes. However, 'subjective' is also a layered concept. That is why it is 
important to ask which forms of subjectivity these ideals deny. Does each deny a different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Oxford English Dictionary, (2nd ed.) prepared by J. A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, 
Volume X, 1989. 
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form of subjectivity, or do all deny the same kind of subjectivity? Before answering these 
questions we need to discern different usages of ‘subjective’.  
 
1.1.1    Subjectivity 
The denunciation of subjectivity can be traced as far back as to Plato for whom anything 
bodily is a hindrance in acquiring knowledge. According to him the real world is the 
world of Ideas and true knowledge is knowledge of these Ideas. The world we live in, in 
contrast, is the world of appearances where knowledge is not possible. The only way for 
us human beings to acquire knowledge is by escaping our bodies, i.e. through death.3 
What is important here is the hierarchical dualism between the real world and the world of 
appearances. To put it another way, it is between the objective world and the subjective 
world in the modern sense, where the latter is an obstacle to knowledge. As such, this 
dualism, which is a function of a peculiar ontology, may explain the negativity that 
attaches to what is subjective. 
  However, the persistent denouncing of subjectivity even after Platonism signals 
that there are other components to subjectivity than ontology. In Descartes's philosophy, 
for instance, the senses are also an obstacle to knowledge as they are deceptive. Although 
the dualism between reality and appearance prevails in Descartes, the emphasis is not on 
ontology but on methodology, i.e. not on what exists, but on the way we come to know 
things. Accordingly, what is problematic about the subjectivity of the senses is that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This is Plato’s view in the dialogue Phaedo. In the Republic Plato seems to allow for 
some sort of knowledge in this world, but this controversy is not central to my discussion. 
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block knowledge. It should be noted, however, that although underlying Descartes's 
methodology there is a concern that everything we perceive may be in our minds, the 
problem of subjectivity has yet to be construed in terms of the modern coupling between 
subjectivity and mind-dependence.  Both in Plato’s and in Descartes’s philosophy the 
proper way to truth is through rational deliberation, which requires detachment from the 
body and senses (and in Descartes’s case also a detachment from custom and what has 
been taught to us) as they obstruct knowledge. It is reasonable to claim that for both 
philosophers dependence on mind was not a hindrance to objectivity; hence subjectivity 
was not construed as mind-dependence. How then should we understand the relation 
between objectivity as detachment and ideals such as impersonality, impartiality and 
disinterestedness? Since impersonality requires not being influenced by personal or 
individual feelings, and disinterestedness requires bypassing considerations of personal 
advantage, it might be relatively easy to associate them with detachment, as desires of the 
body (and inclinations attained from previous experiences) might blur one’s judgments. 
Yet, where does impartiality, which involves a reference to equality and fairness, stand in 
this relation? It can be claimed that once one’s judgments are not blurred by senses and 
desires, one can have a more fair judgment about a given topic. This means that one can 
approach the topic from different angles and perspectives. But surely this does not apply 
to all cases, as not all perspectives start off being investigated at the same distance from 
the investigator. In other words, some perspectives might not be heard or understood 
properly by the investigator for reasons other than confusions brought about by the 
weaknesses of the body and senses. Social and cultural factors, for instance, not only 
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affect personal feelings but also personal (or collective) thinking.4 One might insist that 
detachment must include detachment from the effects of social and cultural factors in our 
thinking, as they are examples of inclinations learned from previous experiences. Yet, 
since we human beings are social beings, it is clearly very difficult (if ever possible) to 
achieve such detachment. Perhaps a philosophically more challenging problem here is that 
the relationship between objectivity as detachment and impersonality, disinterestedness 
and impartiality is premised on the idea that if, say, a judgment is personal (subjective), 
partial or reflects someone’s interest, then it suggests that judgment is less than rational, 
and is influenced by the body and senses. However, this is a problematic premise. First, 
there is the problem that in certain cases pertaining to subjective conditions, in order to 
have a fair judgment the “rational” thing to do is to include the related subjective 
perspective.5 Second, the aforementioned premise implies that if a judgment is not blurred 
by the workings of the body and senses, i.e. (given dualism) rationally achieved, then it is 
not prone to partiality or personal advantages. If this is so, what do we do with cases 
where I attempt to rationally demonstrate, say, the existence of God because I have a 
vested interest in it? Would my judgment about the existence of God be disinterested? 
This question is ultimately a question about the disinterestedness and impartiality of the 
insistence on rational deliberation in acquiring objective knowledge. In short, it is a 
question about where reason gets its privileged status.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This understanding is more or less the main line of thinking that many feminists adopt. 
There will be further discussions on this issue in the coming chapters.   
5 This point will be discussed further later in this chapter in relation to the ideal of 
aperspectivity. 
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So far I have examined objectivity as opposed to the subjectivity of the body and 
the senses where the relationship between subjectivity and mind-dependence has not 
come up. The dualism between objectivity as referring to external reality and subjectivity 
as referring to the workings of the mind is mainly derived from Kant's philosophy. His 
dualism between noumena and phenomena is not so much about the real world versus 
deceptive appearances registered by unreliable senses, but more about the raw materials 
that are not intelligible to us as human beings before they are processed by forms of 
intuition and categories of the mind which make perception and understanding possible. 
Accordingly, our judgments about the world are mediated by our faculties and to claim 
otherwise would be implausible. Here modern concerns regarding the mediation of the 
mind and its categories in understanding the world as an obstacle to objectivity have not 
yet been conceived. In Kant’s philosophy the mind-independent world (the noumenon) is 
not accessible to us, but our judgments can be about things that exist independently of our 
thinking about them. (Kant 1998) For Kant, although what we perceive or think depends 
on subjective conditions, our judgments may still count as “objective” because the 
categories of the mind (and forms of intuition) are universal. It is important to note, 
however, that this later form of ‘objectivity’ is not directly derived from objective reality. 
It could be speculated that the objectivity of judgments in Kant is related to their being 
impersonal rather than to objective (external) reality. This is because the universality of 
the categories of the mind (and forms of intuition) assures that judgments are subject to 
intersubjective assessments. The emphasis on universality here signals that this 
impersonality does not deny the subjectivity of, say, a judgment because it refers to 
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something in the mind, but it denies any claims of randomness or contingency attached to 
the influences of personal (subjective) feelings and thinking.  
Those who identify objective reality with external reality can argue that 
impersonality is linked to objective reality, for what impersonal knowledge represents is 
external reality. Yet, this cannot be true in Kant's philosophy, because if we agree that 
noumena are inaccessible, then we cannot intelligibly claim that impersonal knowledge 
represents the external world. In order to confirm or deny that a representation relation 
holds between our knowledge and the external world, we have to assume that we have 
some access to the external world. 
On what grounds, then, can the link be established between impersonal 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge achieved through impersonal means, and objective reality. 
There are many interesting and complex questions that could be asked here: What does 
“external world” amount to?; if objective reality merely means external reality, what is the 
use of invoking the term ‘objective’?; how could we tell that our impersonal method 
indeed guides us in achieving knowledge of the external world? Answers to these 
questions depend on certain epistemological and ontological considerations. Discussion of 
objectivity, then, revolves around issues about the ways we achieve knowledge and issues 
about the object (or nature of the object) of our knowledge. I think a good deal of 
confusion about objectivity will be resolved if we examine how these two aspects of 
objectivity are connected. I will have detailed discussion on the relationship between 
epistemological objectivity and ontological objectivity in Chapter Five.  
So far I have discussed the claim that in the history of philosophy understandings 
	   24	  
of objectivity varied depending on the forms of subjectivity that were believed to obstruct 
knowledge. Yet, my examination did not include an empiricist uptake of objectivity. This 
is because, first, I will have a whole chapter (second chapter) on positivist understandings 
of objectivity and its critiques. And second, keeping in mind the empiricist contention that 
all knowledge (including any knowledge about objectivity) stems from experience, I 
believe any empiricist examination of objectivity should start from an inquiry into the 
actual pursuit of objectivity. Since I am interested in the notion of objectivity in the 
sciences, in order to have a consistent empiricist understanding of objectivity, I shall 
proceed with examining the historical pursuit of objectivity in the sciences.  
 
1.2    The Historical Pursuit of Objectivity in the Sciences 
Looking at how objectivity was pursued historically in the sciences helps us understand 
the links between different components of objectivity as well as the reasons why certain 
components were more salient in certain periods of time than others. This inquiry shows 
us that there has not been a uniform conceptualization of objectivity throughout the 
history of science. There are important implications of this non-uniformity. First, the 
authority attributed to science (and its claim to objectivity) becomes questionable. This is 
because if there are many forms of achieving objectivity—not all of which are consistent 
with one another—due to which form(s) science attains its authority becomes 
problematic. Second, the historical variety in achieving different forms of objectivity 
shows us that any a priori conceptualization of objectivity will be doomed to fail in 
explaining and understanding how objectivity is sought and how claims of objectivity 
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operate. An empirical investigation, on the other hand, will not result in a uniform theory 
of objectivity. Yet, it will provide a more comprehensive understanding of objectivity.  
Let’s then start our investigation with Peter Dear’s account of the shift in the meaning of 
objectivity that occurred in the seventeenth century.  
 
1.2.1    Peter Dear: From Truth to Disinterestedness 
In tracing the shifts in the meanings of 'objective', Peter Dear, a prominent historian of 
science, argues in “From Truth to Disinterestedness”, that construing objectivity as 
disinterestedness was due to a shift in the understanding of 'objective knowledge' in the 
seventeenth century with the rise of the scientific revolution. Until then criteria for 
knowledge claims were tied to 'objective truth'. Dear claims that, in the seventeenth 
century, following transformations in the ways of making knowledge, the criteria for 
knowledge claims shifted from 'objective truth' to 'trustworthiness' and 'disinterestedness'. 
In other words, justification for knowledge-claims shifted from the truth of the 
propositions to the trustworthiness and disinterestedness of the claimant. What this meant 
was that in assessing and accepting knowledge claims certain characteristics of natural 
philosophers began to be taken into consideration, in ways that they were not before. The 
significance of this shift for our discussion, I believe, is that it expands the possibility of 
objective knowledge beyond mere correspondence between judgments and external reality 
(or the holy scripture for the scholastics). Now the assessment of objective knowledge 
involves considering how concrete specificities of the knower and the known (as well as 
the general environment) affect knowledge relations. If Dear’s account is plausible, it is 
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reasonable to claim that current theories in epistemology such as contextualism or theories 
emphasizing the situatedness of knowledge relations found their practical applications 
well before twentieth century. One important question that demands an answer is why 
mainstream epistemology neglected this line of thinking for so long. A reasonable 
response to this question would lend support to the idea that prevailing commitments 
(philosophical or otherwise) do influence our conceptualizations.  
Before reflecting on the implications this shift may convey for the contrast 
between objective and subjective that I have been discussing, it is worth looking at Dear’s 
historical explanation of how disinterestedness arose as an ideal. What initially brought 
about the change from truth to disinterestedness according to Dear is a focus on degrees 
of certainty in the seventeenth century, which had never appeared before. In fact, it is 
interesting to track how the talk of certainty among natural philosophers of the time 
gradually shifts. (Dear 1992, 622) In the first half of the century, Roderigo de Arriaga, for 
instance, distinguishes three kinds of certainty: moral, physical and metaphysical. 
According to him, moral certainty is the kind of certainty we rely on for practical 
purposes. Arriaga’s example that Dear mentions is that his belief in the existence of 
Naples rests on the testimony of ‘prudent and truthful men’. That is, “although it is 
physically possible that these witnesses are lying, the existence of Naples is still morally 
certain—that is, it is safe to act on the assumption that Naples exists.” (622) Physical 
certainty, on the other hand, rests on physical principles of cause and effect. Arriaga could 
be physically certain that Peter is running when he sees Peter is running. This form of 
certainty does not “rely on the testimony but on the regular physical behavior of things, in 
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this case related to vision.” (622) Since, however, we could be deceived by God and 
perceive an object as moving even though it stands still, physical certainty is not the 
highest degree of certainty. It is metaphysical certainty that ranks highest. This is because 
it applies to cases where it is not possible in any ordinary way for something to be 
otherwise, e.g. axioms such as ‘Everything either is or is not’.6 (622) Arriaga’s 
contemporary, Honoré Fabri makes a further distinction between objective certainty and 
formal certainty where the former depends on the nature of the thing in question and the 
latter depends on the act of the intellect by which it assents to a proposition. A similar 
dualism was defended by Rudolph Goclenius who distinguished between the certainty of 
the object and the certainty of the subject. According to his distinction, unlike objective 
certainty which is derived from the object itself, subjective (formal) certainty is possessed 
by the knower. (622-623) However, what is important for Dear’s argument and our 
discussion is the shift that happened in the latter half of the seventeenth century: certainty 
possessed by the subject started to be compared with the objectivity of evidence rather 
than objective certainty. 
Although Dear does not elaborate on this issue, my understanding is that the 
certainty a subject has regarding a judgment about the world began to be assessed against 
the evidence he or she had rather than the certainty attributed to the part of the world that 
the judgment was about. To clarify we can think of approaches to certainty in talk of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A similar distinction seems to be implied in Descartes’ Meditations. He clearly states in 
Seventh Set of Objections with the Author’s Replies that he is dealing with “metaphysical 
doubt” to reach highest certainty, but not doubts about practical life. (Descartes 1984, 
306-310) 
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primary and secondary qualities of objects. For example, certainty about “primary 
qualities” of an object such as its size, shape, motion and so forth was due to the belief 
that these qualities are present in things themselves. In contrast, “secondary qualities” 
which are believed to be effects of objects on people did not carry such certainty. Now the 
switch Dear points out presumably entails, for instance, that one’s certainty about primary 
qualities of an object started to be assessed against the evidence, that is, the reasons why 
the subject came to think that the object has such and such primary qualities rather than a 
reference to things in themselves. Once this switch happened, it is no surprise that 
questions regarding the nature and reliability of evidence became a matter of assessing 
objectivity.   According to Dear, this switch signals that from then on certainty was placed 
in the realm of the mind. He notes that during scholasticism ‘subjective certainty’, which 
came from the Holy Ghost, overrode objective evidence. But the problem of how human 
knowers could attain reliable knowledge became a pressing issue in late seventeenth 
century English philosophy. (625) It is in this context that disinterestedness as a value 
began to be praised especially in the areas of inquiry where individual testimony mattered.  
Dear illustrates this shift by a striking example of Galileo's book Sidereal 
Messenger where Galileo reports his discovery of four moons circling Jupiter. His book 
reported observations that no one at the time was able to confirm, as nobody had as good 
a telescope as Galileo.  After the publication of the book, Kepler, who did not have the 
proper equipment to repeat Galileo's observations, stated his reasons for believing 
Galileo's claims: Galileo's occupation, his character, and his social relations all validate 
the judgments in the book. Moreover Galileo's very style in expressing his judgments, i.e. 
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publishing a book, and inviting others to use his equipment for testing, proves his 
disinterestedness. Dear takes this event as an important indication of the shift from truth 
to disinterestedness, because in this case, the thing itself did not have any role in the 
evidence upon which certainty was built. Accordingly, Dear claims “the 'objective' as a 
dimension of knowledge rooted in things and their knowability thus came to be replaced 
in the seventeenth century by a negative category characterized by the absence of features 
deemed to be inappropriate to valid knowledge.” (627) In short, reliability became an 
important condition for knowledge (based on testimony) which paved the way for an 
understanding that takes into consideration the characteristics and limitations of human 
knowers.  
If objective knowledge rests on objective evidence, then we need to ask what the 
criteria for objective evidence are. In cases where testing a judgment empirically is not 
possible, validity is sought in the reliability of the scientist. The indicators of such 
reliability are found in the scientist’s personal traits and social relations. While some 
characteristics and virtues that scientists possess (as well as prevailing social values) mark 
the objectivity of a judgment, some others undermine it. As such, the objectivity of 
evidence here is not tied to neutrality or to not being influenced by personal feelings or 
values.7 The importance of this discussion is that it indicates that in this frame of thought 
impersonality and disinterestedness are not inextricably connected to one another. If 
disinterestedness is the governing ideal for objectivity, and if it is measured against the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is important to note that emphasis on values (social, political, contextual) as a 
detriment to scientific objectivity is a post-Marxian conceptualization.  
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characteristics and virtues that a scientist possesses, then the objectivity of a judgment is 
not secured by impersonality.  
The connection between the personal traits of scientists and objectivity is also 
picked up by Lorraine Daston who does extensive work on the history of objectivity. But 
before examining her views let me note that we should approach Dear’s claim about truth 
to disinterestedness with caution. For one thing, he does not claim that disinterestedness 
entails truth. Surely, observations (and /or predictions) of “disinterested” scientists can 
(and do) sometimes turn out to be false. Dear’s example is about assessing the objectivity 
of evidence in a particular case where further observation is not possible at the time. This 
limitation, however, does not indicate that disinterestedness is a false ideal or that it is not 
important. What it shows is that there is more to objectivity than disinterestedness.  
In this section I have argued that different ideals of objectivity are not intrinsically 
related. If we consider objectivity as a mixed bundle of ideals without acknowledging the 
subtleties that each ideal contributes to objectivity, then we face the following 
complication. The judgment about the disinterestedness of Galileo’s observations 
discussed above will be deemed objective even though it fails to be impersonal. Hence we 
will have a judgment that is both objective and not objective depending on which criteria 
we favor. This complication can easily be overcome by an understanding of objectivity 
where it is accepted that standards of objectivity emerge out of diverse epistemic practices 
and concerns. Daston’s and Galison’s discussion in the next section will illuminate this 
point further.  
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 1.2.2    Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison: Ontological, Mechanical and  
            Aperspectival Objectivity 
 
Daston distinguishes three forms of objectivity each of which reflects distinct social and 
historical ideals and concerns. While ontological objectivity seeks the ultimate structure of 
reality, mechanical objectivity prescribes avoidance of judgment and interpretation in 
reporting and illustrating scientific results. Aperspectival objectivity, on the other hand, is 
about eliminating individual and group idiosyncrasies.8 (Daston 1992, 599)  At first 
glance, the avoidance of intervention and judgment might seem to entail the avoidance of 
individual idiosyncrasies. Yet a careful investigation shows that although they might 
coexist, they are conceptually distinct, for they attack different subjectivities. This 
difference becomes more apparent in “The Image of Objectivity” (1992) which Daston 
co-authored with Peter Galison. Their central claim is that gradual mechanization in 
scientific practice brings about a novel approach to objectivity in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries which has led to the moralization of objectivity by means of a new 
ethos –the ethos of self-denial. We shall see in detail below that this ethos prescribes the 
control of certain characteristics of researchers that would possibly distort the results of 
the representation process. 
In tracing the emergence of this ethos, Daston and Galison focus on atlas making 
from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, where changes in the conceptions of 
objectivity can be clearly followed as new techniques of mapping nature have developed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Rebecca Kukla in her article “Naturalizing Objectivity” (2008) reports that Daston and 
Galison modify this distinction in their book Objectivity (2007).  My discussion here is 
based on the aforementioned articles in the text. 
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Scientific atlases of diverse fields aim not only to document but also to organize and 
stabilize the aspects of nature that they focus on, providing the working objects that 
scientists base their inquiry on.  To that end, scientific image making lies at the heart of 
scientific practice.  
  Central to scientific image making is the issue of human intervention in 
representing nature. Yet, the idea of representation is understood rather differently 
throughout the history of objectivity as the governing norms that dominated the 
representation process changed. Each representation project demanded different kinds of 
personalities from their practitioners, with specific ethical virtues. While seventeenth 
century scientists were concerned primarily about a mismatch between nature and 
representations, for nineteenth century scientists the primary concern was the inner 
temptations of individual scientists. In other words, while seventeenth century scientists 
sought objectivity in the products of representation projects, nineteenth century scientists 
sought objectivity in the process of representation itself by controlling and limiting the 
involvement of scientists in it. With this shift, skeptical attitudes towards attaining 
objective knowledge in the seventeenth century were abandoned in favor of optimism 
about the possibility of securing objectivity in the nineteenth century, as it was believed 
that scientists could be objective as long as they carried certain traits. Here we again see 
the abandonment of the idea that “truth” (in the sense of correspondence) is the only 
governing ideal in the search for objectivity.  What is also important to realize I think is 
that these developments brought about significant changes in underlying assumptions 
about the assessments of objective knowledge. When the concern is a mismatch between 
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nature and representation, the assessment of objectivity requires a special point of view 
which already has a grasp of how nature is so that whether the representation fits nature or 
not can be evaluated. Hence, the assessor presupposes the possibility of attaining such a 
viewpoint, i.e. a God’s eye point of view. Whereas, when the focus is not on the end result 
of representation, but on the process itself, no such God’s eye point of view is necessary. 
Here what the assessor needs is an apprehension of the governing norms for 
representation projects. Since different aspects of nature can be represented in different 
ways, the assessor has to specify which norms are used in the assessment of each 
representation project. This last point will become clearer as we follow Daston and 
Galison’s account of how the governing norms have changed in the history of atlas 
making.  
  Daston and Galison note that from the sixteenth century on the dominant ideal in 
science has been to be “true to nature”. In order to illustrate “what truly is” atlas makers 
were compelled to make ontological and aesthetic judgments. (Daston and Galison 1992, 
84) The primary aim of the atlas maker was to reduce the variety and multiplicity of 
nature into manageable pieces (e.g. specimens) which required decisions about the 
selection of what phenomena to observe, and from which point of view to observe them. 
In doing so, both the observing subjects and the observed objects were to be standardized 
in order to preclude any idiosyncrasies. (84-5) From today’s point of view such 
standardization and the ideal of representing things as they truly are might seem to be in 
tension, but Daston and Galison argue that “truth to nature” in standardization was 
construed in different ways. Some atlas makers focused on illustrating “types” and 
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“ideals” while others on “characteristic individuals” or “individuals”. Daston and Galison 
have an elaborate discussion of the differences of these interpretations in representing 
nature, which there is no room to discuss here.  The important thing to note is that, 
according to the advocates of illustrating ideals, “what truly is” could be captured by 
depicting the ideal type as the best pattern or model of nature. The task of the image-
maker is to find the essential properties that underlie and unify contingent particulars. 
Accordingly, monstrous or idiosyncratic particulars that deviate from “normal” instances 
were left outside science. Daston and Galison note that in addition to reducing the 
plurality of nature to standard types, idealization also provided greater precision, since the 
process of idealization required intense study of nature from all view points as well as the 
critical expertise of scientists in selective judgment. As such, the ideal image was not 
necessarily restricted to a specific viewpoint. In the process of idealization there was room 
for the competent “interpretation” of the scientist, which was not as a hindrance to 
objectivity. In fact, interpretive depictions of phenomena were something to be proud of, 
for the ontological and aesthetic judgments involved in creating working objects were 
essential to the merit of atlases. (87) The main reason why judgments in attaining ideals 
were no obstacle to objectivity was related to the metaphysics of the day where it was 
believed that universals exist just as particulars do. Therefore, although they are not 
actually embodied in a specific particular, i.e. no particular is ideal, they can be 
represented. (91) This view contrasted with late nineteenth century metaphysics which 
attributed existence only to particulars.  
According to scientists who believed that “true” images consist in representing 
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particulars with their differences, such images were true to nature because they were 
almost exact copies of particulars as they are seen. As imaging techniques progressed, the 
practice of imaging individuals rather than ideal types has gradually prevailed in science, 
and for Daston and Galison this progression marked the transition to mechanical 
objectivity which I will discuss shortly. Underlying the insistence on illustrating 
particulars was the contention that idealizations produce distortions, because they serve 
the interests of theories. (91) In other words, the talk of ideals rests on decisions as to 
what feature of a particular constitutes its essential property. Such decisions, on the other 
hand, are products of previous systems of ideas. Hence, they are not “neutral” decisions. 
A well-known proponent of this line of thought is Francis Bacon. Although he did not 
specifically write on image making, his views might be helpful in understanding how 
idealization can yield distortion.  
 
1.2.2.1    Francis Bacon and the Emphasis on Differences 
In the philosophical background of the insistence on illustrating particulars with all their 
imperfections was a shift of focus from knowledge derived by argument to knowledge of 
matters of fact. While the knowledge of matters of fact is gained by observation and 
employing induction, the knowledge derived from arguments is achieved by deducing 
conclusions from premises (regardless of their content) by following logical principles. 
Following the Aristotelian tradition in philosophy, which had prevailed well into the 
seventeenth century, the primary concern had been that of attaining universal truths and 
discerning regularities in nature. Hence, mere collections of observational reports of 
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various phenomena were not regarded as scientific knowledge. In the Aristotelian school 
of thought, scientific knowledge rests on logical demonstrations (syllogisms). In the 
Posterior Analytics, Aristotle states, “the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be 
true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further 
related to them as effect to cause.” (Aristotle 1947, 11) So we need to “know” the 
premises of the demonstration that scientific knowledge rests on, but this knowledge 
cannot itself be demonstrative knowledge.  According to Aristotle, our knowledge of the 
premises primarily rests on sense-perception. In order for sense-perception to transform 
into knowledge, a sense-impression has to be retained in the soul. Some animals develop a 
power of systematizing sense-impressions when these impressions persist. As a result of 
this process memories are formed. An experience is developed when the memory of the 
same thing is frequently repeated. (107) In other words, when we perceive a phenomenon 
over and over again, we form an experience of it. Aristotle states “From experience 
again—i.e. from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside 
the many which is a single identity within them all—originate the skill of the craftsman 
and the knowledge of the man of science…” (107-108). In sum, for Aristotle we get to 
know the primary premises by induction. According to him, however, although “the act of 
sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal.” (108) That is, from singular 
experiences, we arrive at universals. When the idea is applied to image making, it can be 
said that these experiences of regularities were illustrated in ideal images which 
manifested the essential natural form of each particular.  However, philosophers such as 
Robert Boyle and Francis Bacon opposed the Aristotelian contention that experience 
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which comes directly from the senses, automatically represents things as they are. Hence, 
they rejected the claims to scientific status of Aristotelian generalizations achieved 
through the experience of regularities. They insisted on the importance of paying attention 
to particular matters of fact, specifically rare events, such as monstrous births, in 
understanding the regularities of nature.  This approach shifted the focus from the general 
to the particular and singular. (Daston 1994, 40-41) Bacon, specifically, fiercely opposed 
claims for the importance and immutability of knowledge that relied on logical 
demonstrations. Pointing to the inadequacy of abstracting from a limited number of 
particulars in order to arrive at universals, he rejected the Aristotelian conception of 
“experience”. In contrast, he advised not only compiling accounts of “normal” 
phenomena but also of the errors and monstrosities of nature. (44) This insistence 
coincides with the contentions of those image-makers who advocated illustrating 
individuals with all their imperfections on the assumption that their images reveal the true 
nature of what is being depicted.9 
Now, what does this debate about illustrating ideals and particulars indicate for 
our discussion of objectivity and its relation to impersonality, disinterestedness or 
impartiality? Since for illustrating ideals the selective judgment of the scientist is 
essential, we can reasonably claim that it does not rest on the ideal of impersonality. What 
about the belief that proper idealization requires a careful study of nature from all 
viewpoints? Could this belief be led by the ideal of impersonality?  A close examination 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Note that Bacon was writing in the seventeenth century when the practice of 
idealization was still prominent. This situation is a good indication of the fact that the 
transitions in ideals were never clear-cut, and that they often co-existed. 
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reveals that the faith in such idealization is premised on the experiences and capacities of 
scientists. Obviously, the premise that scientists can (or should) study nature from all 
points of views is problematic. But the very fact of demanding this implausible capacity 
from scientists gives us important clues about the conception of objectivity underlying the 
contention about illustrating ideals (i.e. essential properties common to all members of a 
species) as representing the true patterns of nature. For one thing, the demand for a 
comprehensive study of nature brings to mind the ideal of impartiality which asks for 
equal treatment of all perspectives. In this understanding, true patterns of nature can be 
captured only if all perspectives are taken into account. Yet it is quite doubtful that this 
requirement demands an impersonal method.  It is important to note here again that the 
ideal of impersonality is premised on interchangeable subjects (or in this case 
perspectives). In this context, there seems to be a tension between the ideal of impartiality 
and the ideal of impersonality. This is because the very idea about interchangeable 
perspectives renders redundant the call for a study of all perspectives, which implies that 
there are fundamentally different, perspectives.  
The relationship between the ideal of impartiality and the ideal of 
disinterestedness is also interesting. I have mentioned above that the demand about the 
impartial study of all perspectives is problematic.  Bacon’s objections point out how an 
Aristotelian treatment of phenomena is unequal, as it leaves aside what is abnormal.  
Idealization not only favors what is “normal” or “usual”, but also favors the ontological 
and aesthetic commitments of the scientists. Presumably, it is because of the influences of 
these commitments that idealization serves the interest of theories (insofar as they 
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organize and explain phenomena). In this sense, the process of imaging ideals is not a 
disinterested enterprise.    
To summarize, in the pursuit of capturing the true patterns of nature the project of 
illustrating “ideals” cannot accommodate the ideals of impersonality, impartiality and 
disinterestedness all at once. Should we then simply conclude that those advocating the 
project of illustrating “ideals” failed to achieve objectivity?  I think it would be too strong 
(or even an impossible) a condition for objectivity to demand conformity to all these 
ideals. As we shall see, the project of representing nature –even when the focus is shifted 
from ideals to particulars— has to overlook some aspects of phenomena in order to 
manage the multiplicity of nature. This necessary practice of overlooking, however, is in 
certain ways in tension with the ideals of disinterestedness and impartiality, for it involves 
a decision as to which aspects of a phenomenon to depict or from which perspective to 
depict it. In other words, it is a decision about which aspects or perspectives should be 
favored over others, which in turn fails to pay due respect to all aspects or viewpoints of 
nature. This dilemma is likely to occur regardless of how representation is pursued as long 
as it rests on the project of representing nature in its totality. Accordingly, we are faced 
with two options: (i) we can accept that disinterestedness, neutrality and impartiality are 
not suitable norms for achieving objective representations of nature (in its totality), or (ii) 
we can accept that representation of nature is bound to be incomplete (because we human 
beings can only have partial access to nature) but nonetheless strive for meaningful 
applications of norms of objectivity that may vary across different practices and contexts 
in science. The aim of this thesis is to explore the second option. 
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1.2.2.2    Mechanical Objectivity 
In order to understand the different ways in which the norms of objectivity have been 
pursued, let’s turn back to the opposition between the two groups of atlas makers.  The 
clash between them can be construed as a dispute about which form of subjectivity is 
dangerous and which form is to be tolerated. 10  For the advocates of the “ideal” image, 
the judgments of expertise and the control of the scientist were necessary for preventing 
distortions that an incompetent observer (the illustrator) might carelessly have brought 
about.  As scientists started to realize that their tendencies (in addition to the illustrators') 
might also cause distortions, and as imaging technologies improved, the once-praised 
insights of scientists became an obstacle to achieving precise images. With the gradual 
arrival of a new form of objectivity, namely mechanical objectivity, the characteristics 
expected of scientists if they were to achieve objectivity also changed. Daston and 
Galison distinguish positive and negative characteristics that were required for mechanical 
objectivity, both of which put intense pressure on the individual scientist. Acute care, 
exactitude, patience, perseverance and endless appetite for work were required as positive 
traits. Negative traits, on the other hand, consisted in eliminating the mediating presence 
of the observer. This latter ideal could take different forms such as the elimination of 
judgments in the selection of phenomena, the replacement of sense perceptions with 
machines, and the elimination of theories and hypotheses that organize (and distort) the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 It should be noted that tendencies in atlas making were not limited to these two groups. 
Nor were the boundaries of groups as sharp as I make them sound for the purposes of 
clarification. For a detailed explanation see Daston and Galison (1992).  	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phenomena. (Daston and Galison, 1992, 82-3) All aspects of mechanical objectivity 
supported the morality of self-discipline that is built upon self-restraint and self-
abnegation. Now the accuracy of images was secured by mechanical means such as 
photographic depictions, x-rays, lithographs, photo-engravings, camera obscura drawings, 
ground glass tracings. As new instruments and machines were built to aid in producing 
accurate visual representations, it became clearer that what was required by the morality 
of self-discipline was better accomplished by machines than by scientists and illustrators. 
Hence, selfless, soulless, steadily working, mechanical machines gradually became the 
symbols of objectivity. 
  Although in the pursuit of being 'true to nature' photographic reproductions were 
praised for copying phenomena precisely, not all mechanical techniques supplied the 
perfect similarity that was sought. According to Daston and Galison “What the 
photograph (along with tracings, smoked glass, camera lucida, and other mechanical 
devices) offered was a path to truthful depiction of a different sort, one that led not by 
precision but by automation—by the exclusion of the scientist's will from the field of 
discourse.” (117) Hence, the primary concern in mechanical objectivity was not accuracy 
or resemblance but nonintervention. Nevertheless, Daston and Galison note that even after 
the invention of photography at the beginning of nineteenth century, which came to be the 
emblem of mechanical objectivity, the debate surrounding objectivity was not over. 
Mechanical reproduction, although it increased accuracy by automatizing the 
representation process, failed to “fully” remove human intervention between object and 
representation. (98) The accountability of photographic evidence—both in science and in 
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the court room—for instance was brought into question since photographic images are 
susceptible to the locations of the instruments as well as the duration of exposures, and 
therefore subject to distortion. (110) Moreover, the issue of demarcating the normal from 
the pathological phenomena in nature was a big challenge for those who advocated the 
mechanical registration of images of individuals. The question was “how would one 
distinguish between variations within the bounds of the ‘normal’ and variations that 
transgressed normalcy and entered into the territory of the pathological.” (107) For some, 
the solution to this problem was to emphasize the importance of rare deviations in 
delineating what is normal. Hence it was argued that phenomena should be illustrated 
with all their imperfections. Yet, many atlas makers, such as Rudolf Grashey, argued that 
a single representation could not depict the great variations in nature. They suggested the 
need for illustrating multiple instances of the same phenomenon. Each individual 
instance, it was hoped, “would evoke a class of patterns in the mind of the reader”. For 
instance, Grashey published a series of skull X-rays that illustrate “the far reaches of the 
normal and thereby demarcate the normal from the pathological.” (105) By doing so, he 
shifted the responsibility of classification from the author to the audience. Daston and 
Galison write “while in the early nineteenth century, the burden of representation was 
supposed to lie in the picture itself, now it fell to the audience. The psychology of pattern 
recognition in the audience had replaced the metaphysical claims of the author. 
Mistrusting themselves, they assuaged their fear of subjectivity by transferring the 
necessity of judgment to the audience.” (107) But this move merely replaced the 
subjectivity of the scientists with the subjectivity of the audience. It could not do away 
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with subjectivity all together. This point is important for our discussion as it constitutes an 
early example of an attempt to include the audience as an active participant in both 
making and assessing knowledge, which has often been overlooked by mainstream 
epistemological projects, yet is underlined by many feminist theorists. I shall revisit this 
issue in the following chapters.  
  Although shifting the responsibility to the audience in depicting phenomena was a 
novel idea, it was ineffective in the face of mechanical reproductions such as x-rays, 
apprehension of which required the trained eye of an expert to detect relevant 
information. It was also true of the mechanical production of mathematical pictures such 
as graphs which came to be widely celebrated in the late nineteenth century in the name of 
objectivity. Graphical expression was judged universal as it transcended the limits of 
natural language and it could “cut across disciplinary boundaries to capture phenomena as 
diverse as the pulse of a hearth and the downturn of an economy.” (116) Yet reading such 
graphs also demanded trained judgment.11 The emphasis on the universal applicability of 
these representations also signaled the emergence of a new ideal, the ideal of 
aperspectivity, in achieving objectivity.     
  In distinguishing mechanical objectivity from aperspectival objectivity, 
photography as an emblem of mechanical objectivity can help us appreciate the subtle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Kukla notes that in Objectivity Daston and Galison distinguish “trained judgment” as 
the governing norm that dominated the project of representation in the twentieth century. 
Yet this can be seen as a recurrence of the ideal of “truth to nature” sought in idealization 
where insights of scientists were crucial. However, as Kukla quotes from Objectivity, 
“the sage revealed the true image of nature, and the trained expert possessed and 
conveyed to apprentices the means to classify and manipulate.” (Daston and Galison 
2007, 332) 
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differences between them. In aperspectival objectivity, not only the inner temptations of 
individual scientists but also the physical, social, biological and cognitive structure and 
limitations are seen as impediments to objectivity. A photograph, on the other hand, 
although it produces almost an exact copy of what is captured is not without  perspective. 
In fact, perspective is vital for photography. Hence, the sort of non-intervention achieved 
by mechanization does not guarantee aperspectivity, which would demand transcendence 
of all idiosyncrasies and locations of subjects.  
  Daston and Galison are careful to note that the aim of acquiring universal 
knowledge through such de-individualization and emotional distance in the nineteenth 
century was not a novel attempt; it was also pursued in the eighteenth century. But, 
according to Daston and Galison the objects of concern were different in each century.  In 
the eighteenth century, discussions about the transcendence of individual perspectives 
were not about understanding or describing the natural world, but occurred mostly in 
moral philosophy and aesthetics. “Subjective” (meaning private) perspectives started to be 
denounced in these realms, not in the ontological realm. Moreover, they claim that it was 
in these domains that values such as detachment, impartiality, disinterestedness, self-
effacement made their way into our conceptualization of objectivity (Daston 1992, 603). 
Eighteenth century moralists deemed transcendence of individual viewpoints necessary 
for a just society, whereas such transcendence was deemed necessary for a coherent 
scientific community in the nineteenth century. The existence of a coherent scientific 
community, for some philosophers of the period, was a precondition for attaining truth. 
(607) Now, if this historical account is plausible, it constitutes a problem for the modern 
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coupling of aperspectivity with the natural sciences.  That is, if aperspectival objectivity, 
which is the prevailing understanding of objectivity today, first appeared in moral 
philosophy and aesthetics, only then to be transferred to the natural sciences, then the 
authoritative status attributed to the natural sciences on the grounds that they are the only 
domains which are (or which sought to be) governed by the ideals of disinterestedness, 
detachment or impartiality is highly questionable.12 In other words, it is a significant 
challenge for the worldview in which the natural sciences constitute the paradigm of 
knowledge. 
 
1.2.2.3   Aperspectivity and Communicability 
Daston and Galison’s discussions of aperspectivity as a governing norm in scientific 
practice does not address philosophical questions regarding aperspectivity as a view from 
nowhere which is believed to yield absolute objectivity. Their inquiry into aperspectivity 
is not concerned with such questions as whether transcending all perspectives is possible. 
Yet they take communicability as a condition for achieving aperspectivity. According to 
Daston and Galison, since one of the essential requisites for a coherent scientific 
community is communicability, what the ideal of aperspectivity in science serves is 
primarily to maintain this communicability. Communicability became a primary concern 
in science in the nineteenth century as society in general and scientific practice in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It should be noted that the challenges from historicists, sociologists of knowledge, 
feminists and post-colonial theorists started to shake this understanding of objectivity 
which confines it to aperspecitivity.   
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particular went through rapid changes.13 For example, changes due to technological 
innovations led to refined divisions of labor within science and to technologies such as 
postal systems and railways which helped ideas to travel across national boundaries. 
Communicability became an issue as scientists from different parts of the world and 
disciplines started to share their views more and more widely. Hence, in Daston’s words 
aperspectivity “became a scientific value when science came to consist in large part of 
communications that crossed boundaries of nationality, training and skill. Indeed, the 
essence of aperspectival objectivity is communicability, narrowing the range of genuine 
knowledge to coincide with that of public knowledge.” (Daston 1992, 600) This 
relationship between communicability and public knowledge is quite important for our 
discussion of objectivity and deserves further deliberation. In so far as public knowledge 
is knowledge that is open to comprehension or examination by all, it seems to convey a 
claim to universality. For instance, in my earlier discussion of Kant I have claimed that 
his conceptualization of objectivity rested on impersonal knowledge secured by the 
universal capacities of the mind. Yet here, although communicability requires certain 
capacities, there is no reference to categories of the mind. Instead, there is reference to 
impersonal communication which is presumably secured by following the established 
procedures or standards in testing, measuring, reading graphs and so forth. In other words, 
it rests on the standardization of data. Hence, it is reasonable to claim that the 
impersonality attached to public knowledge here is not a function of the inner capacities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This view is challenged by Jennifer Tannoch-Bland (1997) who claims that the ideal of 
communicability was important since the time of Bacon. I will examine this objection in 
detail in Chapter Four.  
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of subjects, which according to Kant, are universal, but a function of the universal 
application of procedures shaped through social and historical developments. The idea 
about the universal application of procedures that yield knowledge has important 
consequences for the status of scientists. What the impersonalization of communication 
enables is that any observer can reach the same results by following the universally 
accepted procedures which render the individual qualities of scientists redundant. Hence 
Daston writes “aperspectival objectivity was the ethos of the interchangeable and 
therefore featureless observer—unmarked by nationality, by sensory dullness or acuity, by 
training or tradition; by quirky apparatus, by colorful writing style, or by any other 
idiosyncrasies that might interfere with the communication, comparison and accumulation 
of results.” (609) Note how the idea of interchangeable observers contrasts sharply with 
the earlier practices where observational reports were evaluated in terms of the skill and 
integrity of the observer. As we saw in Dear’s discussion, the skill and character 
(trustworthiness) of the individual scientist or reporter (as well as their social status) 
provided warrant for the content of the report.  After the appearance of the ideal of 
interchangeable observers, disinterestedness secured by the personal traits of scientists 
was no longer a sufficient measure to vindicate the content of an observation. Moreover, 
although perspectival distortions prompted by self-interest might be prevented by, say, the 
application of the ideal of disinterestedness, it still does not secure aperspectivity, for 
there might be distortion with no self-gain, say because of mere prejudices.  
The emphasis on interchangeable subjects also gives us clues about the insistence 
of avoiding subjectivity in the mainstream epistemological project, where necessary and 
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sufficient conditions for knowledge are sought by abstracting subjects from the analysis.14 
However, this historical account should remind us that the ideal of aperspectivity that is 
premised on interchangeable subjects is just one form of objectivity which came about as 
a result of particular social and historical developments and needs. It is also worth noting 
that adopting this aperspectivity was not without cost.  For instance, although the ideal of 
aperspectivity contributed to the accessibility to and mobility of knowledge, it also led to 
the loss of practices that yield valuable information. Practices that were once an integral 
part of observation reports but could not be communicated were dismissed, as they did not 
conform to the ideal of aperspectivity. Daston’s example of the favoring of sphygmometer 
over the human pulse reader is a good indicator of a case where an old practice, i.e. 
human pulse reading, is abandoned in favor of a new practice which exhibits results that 
the human pulse reader cannot communicate. Another similar example would be replacing 
midwives with doctors and technological apparatuses. Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff 
in their article “Are ‘Old Wives’ Tales’ Justified?” (1993) have an elaborate account of 
how (practical) “knowledge” of midwives was left outside the domain of “proper” 
knowledge which is “propositional”. Modern instruments display the uterus in detail and 
detect any (possible or actual) problems, yet midwives could spot these problems and fix 
most of them without these tools. For example, they could turn the baby in the womb to 
avoid breached deliveries; they could perform abortions; hasten prolonged labor; reduce 
the pain of childbirth and cure breast infections. (Alcoff and Potter 1993, 222) Midwives’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For a detailed analysis of the mainstream epistemological project and abstract subjects 
see Code (1993).  
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knowledge rested mainly on their direct personal experience of childbirth as well as their 
experience of delivering babies from a young age on. Another important source for their 
knowledge is the shared information and stories of difficult births among themselves. In 
other words, “hearsay” played a crucial role in midwives’ knowledge accumulation. This 
factor indicates that midwives often communicated with each other, but this form of 
communication did not fulfill the standards for the modern ideal of “communicability” 
which rested on the impersonality of data.  The very factors, such as being oral, practical 
and experiential, which made midwives’ knowledge possible were also the reasons why 
their knowledge could not be communicated (or could not be communicated in the form 
of propositional knowledge). However, one might argue that the practical knowledge of 
midwives could be transferred into propositional knowledge as instructions provided in 
manuals of certain instruments. Yet this argument can be dismissed simply by pointing 
out the difference between knowing how, say, a bicycle works and how to ride a bike. 
Dalmiya and Alcoff are careful to note that, this claim about the incommunicability of 
midwives’ knowledge is not merely a report of the illiteracy of most midwives and their 
failure to codify their skills. (224) They write: “a crucial aspect of a midwife’s skill was 
her capacity to be empathetic and sensitive to the situation of her patients as well as to 
allay their fears and inspire them to have forbearance and hope.” (225) In other words, 
midwives could identify with the expectant mother, and this experiential knowledge could 
not be transmitted through impersonal propositions. (225) Dalmiya and Alcoff argue that 
because midwives’ knowledge cannot be forced into “the S knows p schema”, it was 
dismissed from “real” epistemology. Hence, if we turn back to Daston’s and Galison’s 
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historical account, in the ethos of aperspectivity (which is prominent in mainstream 
epistemology), mechanically produced statistical reports that are immediately accessible 
to others replaced skills, intuitions, inspirations which are intangible, hence could not be 
totally explained and communicated. (Daston 1992, 612) 
  In sum, according to Daston’s and Galison’s historical account, aperspectivity in 
science as an ideal for achieving objectivity was sought by impersonalizing the 
procedures and standards for establishing communicability in order to preserve 
continuous dialogue among scientists. It should be noted however that here there is no 
direct reference to truth in the sense of correspondence to nature. In a-historical 
philosophical discussions, on the other hand, it is often assumed that the 
impersonalization of scientific method (including the procedures and standards that are 
followed) leads to true representations of phenomena. We shall see examples of such 
philosophical positions in detail in the next chapter. Moreover, there is a line of thought 
which associates aperspectivity with a view from nowhere that demands 
impersonalization through self-effacement to attain absolute objectivity where the world 
is represented as it is in its totality. Whether and how such impersonalization could be 
achieved prompted lively discussions among philosophers in the twentieth century. One 
of the leading contributors to these discussions, who made famous the phrase “the view 
from nowhere”, is Thomas Nagel.  
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1.3   Thomas Nagel and the View from Nowhere 
Although Nagel clearly rejects the possibility of attaining absolute objectivity, he retains 
the idea that objectivity is a method for understanding the world that involves self-
effacement. His main idea is that an objective view of the world has to include everything 
about the world including the perspective of the viewer.  Nagel explains this method of 
objectivity as follows: 
To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of life or the world, we 
step back from our initial view of it and form a new conception which has that 
view and its relation to the world as its object. In other words, we place ourselves 
in the world that is to be understood. The old view then comes to be regarded as 
an appearance, more subjective than the new view, and correctable or confirmable 
by reference to it. The process can be repeated, yielding a still more objective 
conception. (Nagel 1986, 4) 
  
In this picture objectivity comes in degrees, because the objectivity of a view is achieved 
through the gradual elimination of subjective specificities such as an individual’s 
character or position in the world. In other words, the more impersonal a view is, the more 
objective it becomes.  Nagel acknowledges that we cannot have an absolute picture of the 
world since we are limited beings. Moreover, he accepts that there are certain aspects of 
the world of which a subjective view provides better understanding than an objective 
view. I suppose what he means is that since appearances and perspectives are also part of 
the world and since an objective view is attained by detaching oneself from one's 
specificities as much as one could, in trying to understand the part of the world that is 
about our appearances and perspectives themselves, we are better off with a subjective 
view than an objective one.  
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However, there is no reference to the possibility or the extent of such detachment, 
in Nagel’s discussion. We supposedly acquire a more objective view when we reflect on 
our perspectives and their relation to the world. But surely, mere reflection does not 
automatically yield objectivity. One needs to have a certain disposition for a “fair” inquiry 
into one's views. That is, one needs to have the patience to examine one's view from every 
possible angle to the extent that one can. Moreover, one needs to have the courage to 
follow up the consequences of one's views as well as an openness to modify them if need 
be, and the appropriate training to do it well. Nagel might respond that all of these 
requirements are in principle possible within the method of objectivity he is defending. It 
might be plausible, in fact, to think that one can transcend one's specifities and come to 
understand the world which includes other perspectives and the relationship between one's 
views and the world within a rationalistic tradition which is reinforced by a commitment 
to autonomous individual reasoning. But how could we make sense of this method within 
an empirical tradition where not only the limitation of human faculties but also the 
fallibility of reasoning, sense perceptions and so forth are pressing issues? Nagel claims 
that our new conception of the world (or an aspect of it), which also includes our old 
conception, is more objective. But he does not discuss how reliable this method is. What 
reason do we have to believe that our (individual) reasoning, i.e. stepping back 
(detachment) and thinking about our own view, will yield an objective view? Surely our 
faculties are limited, hence we cannot get the whole picture, but accepting this fact is not 
the same as accepting that our reasoning might be faulty. In the case of faulty reasoning 
which leads not just to a limited conception of the world but to a distorted one, what is it 
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in this method that would correct our conception?  In the case of distorted conceptions or 
representations, could we still talk about the objectivity of our view of the world? Nagel 
could claim that even in the case of distorted views we can talk about objectivity since it 
is the method that counts, not what it produces. Yet, the idea of an objective method that 
could yield a distorted conception of the world contradicts “objectivity” as an ideal. A 
method is basically a means to acquire a certain end. If the end that the method produces 
is undesirable, the method is discarded as either faulty or useless. A distorted conception 
of the world is obviously not a desirable end. Hence, a method that could produce a 
distorted conception of the world is far from being an ideal. Reducing objectivity to a 
methodology which rests on an ungrounded optimism about (individual) reasoning results 
in such contradictions.15 
Furthermore, in presenting this method as the method of objectivity, Nagel 
overlooks the different uses of ideals of objectivity that I have been discussing. However, 
I do not wish to claim that this method of self-effacement is futile altogether, as it would 
also be overlooking important tasks that are carried out in scientific practice by following 
it. It is not contradictory to maintain that certain ideals might contribute to the objectivity 
of science when applied to certain aspects of scientific practice while they are not 
sufficient to secure objectivity when applied throughout the practice. In fact, they might 
even hinder objectivity when they are not applied in appropriate places. For instance, as I 
discuss above, self-effacement is the guiding principle in achieving mechanical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 I will revisit Nagel’s views when discussing feminist attacks on individualist 
epistemologies in Chapter Four.  
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objectivity. In “The Scope and Limits of Scientific Objectivity” (2004) Joseph F. Hanna 
argues “[s]cience makes objective progress when decision procedures requiring subjective 
human input are replaced by decision procedures that are automatic or mechanical.” 
(Hanna 2004, 341) However, he adds that this understanding of objectivity does not imply 
that human reason or human communicative discourse have no role in objective science. 
According to him communicative discourse involves conscious reflection, application of 
epistemic and social values, creative elaboration of analogies and metaphors, hence it 
reflects human interests, values, perceptions and intuitions. Hanna argues that scientific 
progress is not simply about the elimination of communicative discourse, but in raising 
the level of that discourse. (341) It is in this higher level that judgments of i) whether 
artefacts (products of automation such as meter readings, digital outputs of recording 
instruments, photographic plates) count as evidence for or against a given theory; ii) 
whether or how the experimental context that has produced those artefacts ought to be 
modified is discussed.  In this understanding the automation (objectification) of lower 
level decision processes makes possible more complex communicative discourse at a 
higher level. (342) Obviously we can question the “objectivity” of higher-level discourse: 
to what extent the assessments of evidence are (can be/ ought to be) disinterested or 
impartial? The point is, though, although we can claim objectivity in lower level decision 
processes by invoking self-effacement guaranteed by automation, this lower level 
objectivity is not sufficient to generate objectivity throughout scientific practice where 
higher-level communicative discourse is an essential part. In other words, specific ideals 
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that guide lower level discussion processes are often inappropriate and/or not efficient in 
guiding higher-level communicative discourse.  
 
1.4   Conclusion 
In this chapter my aim has been to understand how distinct governing norms of scientific 
practice, which have changed throughout history, accommodate different ideals of 
objectivity such as impersonality, disinterestedness and impartiality. We have seen that as 
the needs, the focus of concerns, and the means of research changed in science, these 
ideals took on different meanings and were directed at different aspects of scientific 
practice. Moreover, objectivity has been discussed in terms of the ways in which objective 
judgments are reached as well as what those judgments are about. Hence objectivity has 
been attributed sometimes to the methodology and sometimes to the object of a study.  As 
a result, different forms of objectivity occurred. However, the relationship between 
different forms of objectivity has often been left obscure and/or rested on unexamined 
assumptions. I believe a comprehensive account of objectivity should not leave these 
assumptions unexamined. Moreover, such an account should take the diverse applications 
of ideals of objectivity throughout science. Perhaps this approach is easier to follow in a 
position where science is viewed as a practice rather than interrelated cluster of theories. 
In the next chapter we will see how some of the dominant schools of thought in the 
philosophy of science have ended up with limited conceptions of objectivity because they 
have viewed science in a certain way which caused them to disregard the diverse 
character of objectivity. As a result their theories have failed properly to address the real 
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questions that occur in actual scientific practice, and concerns regarding the relationship 
between science and everyday life. Ultimately, in this dissertation, I will argue that a 
feminist understanding of objectivity (and science) can both accommodate the diverse 
character of objectivity and provide substantial guidance for scientific community.
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Chapter Two 
The Received View of Scientific Objectivity 
 
The examination of the historical development of ideals such as impersonality, 
disinterestedness and impartiality in the previous chapter led us to the conclusion that 
these ideals were pursued and manifested in different ways throughout the history of 
science depending on the prevailing concerns and projects in representing and 
understanding nature at the time. In this chapter I turn to the philosophy of science to look 
at how these ideals operate in the philosophies of the dominant schools of thought. I want, 
for instance, to examine what elements in their philosophy have generated the ideal 
objectivity which in post-positivist times has come to mean a detached, neutral and 
disinterested approach to a subject matter that exists in a publicly observable space, 
separate from knowers/observers and making no personal claims on them. As we shall 
see, these schools of thought often overlooked the layered character of objectivity and 
thus failed to provide a sufficiently comprehensive account of it. It is important to note 
that this shortcoming is not merely a conceptual failure but has important consequences in 
our daily life since scientific conceptualizations inform future research programs that 
form public opinion. 
The philosophy of science as a distinct sub-discipline of philosophy emerged in 
the nineteenth century, mainly with the rise of positivism.1 Among other schools of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This claim, however, needs to be qualified. Historically, philosophy and science have 
gone hand in hand, at least up to the eighteenth century.  Many of the major figures in 
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thought with positivist tendencies, logical positivists and logical empiricists stand out as 
major sources of influence in the philosophy of science. The boundaries of the discipline, 
that is, the concerns and questions about science that are worthy of a “philosophical” 
investigation were delineated mostly by members of this school of thought. However, it is 
hard to talk of positivism as a doctrine with strict boundaries and set principles. It can be 
better understood as a frame of mind or spirit with a certain humanistic turn away from 
the dogmatism of preceding theology and metaphysics. In fact, as a legacy of the 
Enlightenment, positivism was a progressive movement.  The key idea of positivism can 
be summarized very broadly as 'seeing is believing'. That is, we can only know or claim to 
know things that we can observe. It is this key idea that underlies the positivistic attitude 
towards epistemology, metaphysics and semantics. Yet, this attitude is manifested in 
diverse ways within different schools of thought.  
  Initially, “the philosophy of science” as a distinct discipline was not comprised of 
a comprehensive critical examination of “science”, as its name would suggest. Rather it 
was an investigation of “scientific knowledge”. Establishing the philosophy of science as 
a study of scientific knowledge reflects the positivistic tendency of reducing science to its 
product, i.e. to scientific knowledge, where the focus is on the method of validating such 
knowledge. This tendency is clearly manifested in the distinction between the context of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
philosophy, such as Descartes, Pascal and most of the Enlightenment	  thinkers	  were	  also	  
scientists. Those ancient Greeks who inquired into nature were also called natural 
philosophers. Moreover, concerns about the aims and methods of inquiry into nature go 
as far back as Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. In the eighteenth century science and 
philosophy started to move apart, and came to be regarded as distinct enterprises. 
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discovery and the context of justification.2 Although it has often been ambiguous which 
features of scientific practice constitute the context of discovery and which features 
constitute the context of justification, it can be claimed that the main aim of this 
distinction was to separate practices that involve subjective elements such as personal 
backgrounds, characteristics, decisions, values and inspirations in constructing the 
theories from the objective relations between hypotheses and evidence that validate them.  
It was argued that a philosophical inquiry into science should be concerned with the 
context of justification since the context of discovery was not an appropriate subject for a 
logical investigation. One consequence of this approach was to reinforce the view that the 
only knowledge worthy of the name is knowledge achieved by scientific methods: a view 
which narrowed the scope of epistemological investigations to a great extent. 
  The general purpose of this chapter is to show how different approaches to 
science inform i) subject matters and concerns of “the philosophy of science”, and ii) the 
meanings attributed to fundamental scientific concepts, especially 'objectivity'. I will 
examine the basic ideas of certain different traditions in the philosophy of science in an 
attempt to understand how these ideas affect (or could affect) their conceptualizations of 
objectivity in science. I will start off with what I perceive to be the received view and its 
understanding of objectivity, and then will proceed to its critique. 3 
In order to have a clear grasp of some of the ideas that have a bearing on 
objectivity, a chronological exploration is useful. Yet the development of the ideas that I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This distinction was first introduced by Hans Reichenbach. 
3 I will focus on feminist critiques in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. 	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shall examine should not be seen as linear. Although the importance attributed to specific 
themes changes from time to time, the ongoing literature continues to contribute to the 
development of these themes. Since thematic discussions in the philosophy of science 
(like many other philosophical inquiries) are not conclusive, it is often difficult to set 
sharp boundaries among various philosophical positions.4 That is why it would be 
misleading to talk of a static received view established by a certain philosophical school. 
Rather, I shall try to formulate the received view in a dialogical fashion, where I will 
examine one philosophical position in comparison to another. I shall start off with logical 
positivism and logical empiricism.5 
 
2.1 Logical Positivism, Logical Empiricism and Objectivity 
Logical positivism, which dominated philosophy of science in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, was initially founded by members of the Vienna Circle, who included 
Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Otto Neurath, as a reaction to the unsolvable riddles 
and metaphysical excesses of traditional philosophy.6 It quickly drew the attention of 
philosophers from other parts of Europe (and later from the USA) such as, Hans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Even if the basic principles of a position can be distinguished for practical purposes, 
labeling one philosopher as an advocate or an opponent of a certain position is not easy, 
as thinkers rarely subscribe to a position in its entirety, i.e. they agree with some aspects 
of a position while rejecting some other aspects of it. Or they may not subscribe officially 
or consciously to any position at all, but are assigned to such and such a position by their 
readers/colleagues/other associates. 
5 In my discussion of logical positivism and logical empiricism I focus on a standard 
history of these positions. I do not consider the more recent distinction between “The 
First Vienna Circle” and the “Left Vienna Circle.”  
6 Other members of the circle included Hans Hahn, Karl Menger, Frederich Waismann, 
Kurt Godel and Herbert Feigl. 
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Reichenbach, Alfred Jules Ayer, Carl G. Hempel and Karl Popper, who became involved 
in the critical exchanges the circle had generated.  
  Before proceeding further, let me clarify an important point in delineating this 
influential philosophy. Logical positivism and logical empiricism are often treated as 
alternative names for a single position. However, for some philosophers logical 
empiricism marks a distinct turning point in the logical positivist programme.7  For 
instance, Gary Hardcastle argues that logical empiricism was developed out of critical 
discussions of many logical positivist themes, leading to the rejection and dismissal of 
some principles while promoting the refinement of others, as in the transition from the 
verifiability criterion of cognitive meaning to the confirmability criterion.8 (Hardcastle 
2006) Constant exchanges and adjustments of ideas sometimes resulted in new 
approaches to the same problems and sometimes to a complete shift of focus onto 
different problems. Accordingly, it is difficult to pinpoint when exactly logical positivism 
ceased and logical empiricism started.  
  In their search for clarity, logical positivists argued for a scientific worldview that 
should prevail in every area of philosophy.9 Their insistence on such a scientific 
worldview enabled them to take a dismissive stance towards any subject matter that could 
not be subjected to observation and verification. The clarification of traditional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There is also a distinction between early and late logical empiricism in this literature.  
8 Another philosopher who marks the beginning of logical empiricism with the inquiry on 
confirmation theories is Wesley Salmon.  
9  They also had a social and political agenda in their appraisal of the scientific 
worldview, which is often overlooked. Hence they did not merely pursue a negative task 
of dismissing metaphysics. 
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philosophical problems was pursued either by attempts to transform them into empirical 
problems or, when such transformation was not possible, by discarding them as pseudo-
problems. As a result, metaphysics and its problems were brushed aside.  
  In following this programme, logical positivists were motivated by developments 
in both science and logic. Positivist convictions grew stronger, as earlier metaphysical 
speculations about empirical matters were gradually proved wrong by physics and 
biology. The birth of theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, for instance, called 
Newtonian mechanics and its metaphysics into question. Yet, as science became more and 
more abstract, a formal systematization came to be required in order to clarify theoretical 
concepts and to establish their connection with observation. Some positivists found the 
resources for this project in the quantificational logic developed by Gottlob Frege, Alfred 
NorthWhitehead and Bertrand Russell.10 
  Logical positivists were committed to the empiricist conviction that experience 
and observation are the only ways to learn anything about the world. Yet, unlike classical 
empiricists, they were not interested in the questions of how we come to know things. 
They were rather concerned with the formal processes by which knowledge claims are 
validated. Hence, they combined the mathematical method of demonstration championed 
by rationalists and the experimental method supported by empiricists. While the 
mathematical method of demonstration (i.e. logical deduction) provided the form of 
reasoning, experimental investigations provided the content. In the following we will see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 They were also greatly influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus. 
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that these two methods presupposed different forms of objectivity. The method of 
demonstration aimed at a form of objectivity that is secured by an impersonal method. 
The objectivity of the content, on the other hand, was assessed with respect to truth, 
relevance and testability. As we shall see, the ideal of impersonality that assists the 
method of demonstration failed to guide assessments of truth, relevance and testability 
which required experimental investigations. I will argue that overlooking this point leads 
to a misleading conception of objectivity which ties it to impersonality, disinterestedness, 
neutrality and impartiality all at once. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, these  
are distinct ideals and their simultaneous application  sometimes yields  contradictions. 
The best way to elaborate on the two forms of objectivity guided by different ideals is to 
examine the main areas of concern for logical positivists such as the principle of 
verification, scientific explanations and confirmation.  
 
2.1.1   The Verifiability Theory of Meaning 11  
In distinguishing science from pseudo-science and discarding metaphysics from 
philosophical inquiry, logical positivists sought a formal criterion to distinguish 
cognitively significant statements from meaningless ones. To that end they appealed to 
the idea of empirical significance as well as the idea of analyticity that separated analytic 
statements from synthetic ones. Although there are different definitions of analyticity, 
basically analytic statements are statements that are true by virtue of the meaning of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In the literature, this theory is also referred as the “verification theory of meaning”. 
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words contained in them.12 Hence, they can be known a priori. Understood as such, 
adopting analyticity enabled logical positivists to make room for the knowledge of certain 
truths such as mathematical truths or logical theorems in an empiricist tradition. The 
empirical significance of non-analytic statements, on the other hand, was determined by 
verification.13 
  Although the idea of verifiability can be found in Hume's philosophy, the search 
for a formal criterion was one of the major concerns for logical positivists. There have 
been different formulations of the verifiability principle of meaning, all of which have run 
into various problems.14 However, the basic idea underlying the principle was to confine 
cognitive meaning to the statements which can be empirically verified, thereby marking 
every other statement as literally meaningless.  
  Among the problems with this principle were questions about the status of the 
principle itself (i.e. whether it is an empirical claim or not), and the adequacy of the 
principle as a means of distinguishing meaningful statements from meaningless ones. 
Specifically, when statements of general laws are considered, the principle was doomed to 
fail. Statements of generalizations were not verifiable because it was impossible to 
observe phenomena in their generality. In other words, one cannot observe each and every 
instance of any phenomenon. Some philosophers, such as Ayer, tried to overcome this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Immanuel Kant, Bernard Bolzano (1973), Gottlob Frege (1974) and Rudolph Carnap 
(1937, 1956) provided different definitions for ‘analyticity’. 
13 Analytical propositions are devoid of content and they owe their validity to linguistic 
conventions associated with the meaning ascribed to the terms involved in them.  
14 Carnap (1967), Schlick (1936), Ayer (1936), Carl Hempel (1950) devoted attention to 
developing a criterion of cognitive significance. 
	   65	  
problem by distinguishing ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ senses of ‘verifiable’. According to this 
distinction, a proposition is verifiable in the strong sense if and only if it could be 
conclusively shown to be true by experience. Whereas, a proposition is verifiable in the 
weak sense if experience could render it probable. Ayer argues that conclusive 
verifiability would set too strong a standard for empirical significance. (Ayer 1990, 18) It 
was adopting this strong sense of verifiability that rendered the statements of general laws 
(as well as statements about the past) meaningless, as their truth could not be established 
conclusively. In contrast, Ayer was convinced that a weaker principle should be adopted. 
Yet, formulating this weak sense proved to be difficult. For instance, one formulation 
Ayer suggested for a “weak” verifiability principle was that a statement is verifiable if an 
observation-statement, which expresses an actual or possible experience, “can be deduced 
from it in conjunction with certain other premises, without being deducible from those 
other premises alone.” (179) Here, a statement itself need not be an observational 
statement in order to be meaningful or empirically significant. Under this version of the 
principle neither statements of general laws nor statements about the past are denied 
significance. For example, a general statement such as ‘All men are mortal’ can be shown 
to be meaningful, because an observation statement such as ‘Socrates is mortal’ can be 
deduced from it together with ‘Socrates is a man’.15 However, Ayer admitted that this 
weak formulation of the principle is too flexible since it could be applied to any statement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Here of course we assume that being mortal is not contained in the concept of a man. If 
it were, ‘Socrates is mortal’ could be deduced from ‘Socrates is a man’ by itself, which 
would reduce the application of the verifiability principle to the general statement ‘All 
men are mortal’.  
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whatsoever, thereby rendering the principle redundant. For instance, according to this 
formulation a general statement such as ‘All beings have souls’ should be granted 
empirical significance since an observation statement such as ‘It is sunny’ can be derived 
from ‘All beings have souls’ in conjunction with the premise that ‘If all beings have souls, 
then it is sunny’. The difficulty in formulating a verifiability principle which is neither too 
strong to undermine the meaning of general statements that are significant in science, nor 
too loose to grant meaning to any metaphysical statement, is one of the reasons why the 
logical positivists turned away from this project.16  
  Other important factors that undermined the verification criterion of meaning 
were Willard Van Orman Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction, and 
Hempel's challenges to the sharp distinction between cognitively significant sentences and 
those that are not significant in this sense. Following these developments, both the rigid 
verification principle of cognitive meaning and the positivists’ strict opposition to 
metaphysics were gradually abandoned. The positivist programme took a different turn 
and the topics of concern changed. For instance, philosophers such as Hempel (1965), 
Ernest Nagel (1961) and Richard B. Braithwaite (1953) turned to concentrate on the logic 
of scientific explanation. The status of theoretical entities and the question about the aims 
of theories later became central issues.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For other difficulties Ayer mentions about formulations of verifiability principle see 
Ayer (1990, 176-185). Also for detailed discussion of these formulations and criticisms, 
see Carnap (1967), Schlick (1936), Hempel (1950), Reichenbach (1938), Alonzo Church 
(1949), Isaiah Berlin (1939). 
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2.1.2   Scientific Explanations and Objectivity 
The earlier positivists had observed that in the earlier philosophical literature, exploring 
'why' a phenomenon occurs required a metaphysical or theological explanation. Such 
explanations, however, rested on assumptions about vital forces and purposes embedded 
in objects, or divine will in occurrences of events, none of which can be investigated by 
empirical means. They endorsed Hume's rejection of causality where he claims that when 
we assign a causal relation between two events we do not see causality, what we actually 
observe is one event following another. Since the idea of causality rests on the existence 
of some unobservable occult powers, the rejection of causality by positivists followed 
from the verification principle. Hence, in the positivist tradition statements about causes 
of events came to express observed regularities that took place in the world rather than 
metaphysical relations.  Accordingly, the laws of nature, which were previously believed 
to reveal the causes of events, became mere descriptions of events. However, since not all 
descriptions of phenomena constituted scientific explanations, an inquiry into the 
characteristics of acceptable scientific explanation increasingly occupied such 
philosophers as Popper (1965), Hempel (1948), Nagel (1961) and Braithwaite (1953). 
  The logical empiricist approach to scientific explanations was to regard them as 
arguments. Before examining the relationship between this approach to scientific 
explanations and objectivity, I should note that in their discussions of scientific thinking, 
the logical empiricists do not explicitly state how they conceptualize objectivity. Given 
their rejection of talking about the world as it really is independent of human observation, 
it is fair to claim that they did not adopt an understanding of objectivity where scientific 
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statements represent the world as it is. Their emphasis on methodology, on the other hand, 
is an indication that objectivity, in their view, is mainly a matter of method. But it is often 
left vague what features of the method secure or yield objectivity. Moreover, it is not 
always clear which form of objectivity they sought. 
Typically an explanation consists of two parts: the explanandum and the 
explanans. The explanandum is a particular (an event) or a general fact (a law of nature) 
that is to be explained. The explanans, on the other hand, is or are particular or general 
facts that do the explaining. In the terminology of logic, while the explanans constitutes 
the premises, the explanandum is the conclusion. For instance, Hempel’s and Paul 
Oppenheim's (1948) once highly influential model of scientific explanation, namely the 
deductive-nomological (D-N) model, suggested that explanations of phenomena are 
possible when the facts to be explained can be subsumed under a universal law. 
According to this model, a particular fact is explained when it is logically deduced from a 
universal law.17 If, on the other hand, the explanandum is an observed regularity in nature 
(or a law of nature), then it is deduced from laws of a broader scope. The D-N model, 
however, is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine whether an explanation is 
scientific or not, as there are other forms of law such as probabilistic laws that many 
scientific explanations rest on. In an explanation that makes use of a probabilistic law, the 
explanans does not deductively imply an explanandum statement; hence an explanans 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 It should be noted that not all statements of universal form are universal laws. Among 
other characteristics, for a statement to be a universal law it should be true (or there 
should be good reasons to believe that it is true), it should support counterfactual 
conditionals, and so forth. For a detailed discussion of this issue see Hempel (1966). 
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does not yield “deductive certainty” but only high probability. In other words, in the case 
of probabilistic laws, contrary to the D-N model, if the explanans is true, the explanandum 
is not invariably true.18 However, the matter of what constitutes a probabilistic law is 
complicated. Simply put, while a statement of a universal law expresses that “in all cases 
where conditions of kind F are realized, conditions of kind G are realized as well”; a law 
of probabilistic form asserts, basically that “under certain conditions, constituting the 
performance of a random experiment R, a certain outcome will occur in a specific 
percentage of cases.” (Hempel 1966, 66) Hence, testing a statement that expresses a 
probability becomes a matter of examining the “relative frequency” of the expected 
outcome in long series of repetitions. As mentioned above probabilistic explanations are 
not logically conclusive. That is to say, although the explanans is true, the explandum 
might still be false. Now, if observed frequency is crucial for accepting or rejecting a 
probabilistic statement, then the question of the criteria on which such decisions are based 
becomes a pressing issue. In fact, Hempel stresses that the following questions should be 
answered in assessing statements of probability: a) what deviations of observed 
frequencies from the probability stated by a hypothesis are to count as grounds for 
rejecting the hypothesis?  b) how close an agreement between observed frequencies and 
hypothetical probability is to be required as a condition for accepting the hypothesis? 
Hempel claims that the answers to these questions will be of a contextual sort, that is, they 
will depend on what is at stake. (65) This view undoubtedly has important implications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a detailed discussion of scientific explanations see Wesley C. Salmon (1990). 
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for our discussion of objectivity and I will return to it in my discussion of the requirement 
of relevance for scientific explanations. 
  Now let me remark on the relationship between the positivist emphasis on the 
form of scientific explanations and objectivity. In the history of science, mathematical and 
logical thinking have long constituted the domain of impersonal and disinterested 
knowledge. Hence, it can be claimed that approaching scientific explanations as 
arguments is closely related to the objectivity of explanations. However, the so-called 
disinterestedness of logicians that is being aspired to is essentially a result of the subject 
matter that they deal with, which is the form of thinking. Scientific explanations however 
are intrinsically related to content and should therefore go beyond mere form. After all, 
not all deductively valid arguments provide scientific explanations. Furthermore, some 
biased conclusions can be validly deduced from biased premises.  The logical form of a 
scientific explanation by itself is not sufficient to yield objectivity (at least the kind of 
objectivity we seek in science). That is to say, we need to look beyond the impersonality 
of logic for the objectivity of explanations. If the empirical content of the explanans has 
an important bearing on objectivity, then we are urged to ask what guarantees the 
objectivity of the content of scientific explanations (which is a question of semantics but 
not syntax). The empirical (semantic) aspect of the D-N model, however, is confined to 
the truth of the premises. In other words, in order for the D-N model to be an adequate 
explanation, among other things, the sentences constituting the explanans must be true (or 
highly probable). In thinking about objectivity, since the form of explanations is 
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insufficient to guarantee objectivity, this condition of truth might be the vehicle for 
arriving at the objectivity of scientific explanations.  
  This interpretation, however, is problematic. For one thing, true premises of a 
valid argument do not suffice to provide a scientific explanation (let alone an objective 
one). For instance, the conclusion that John does not get pregnant can be deduced from 
the premises that i) he has regularly been taking birth control pills, and ii) anyone who 
regularly takes oral contraceptives will avoid getting pregnant. Yet this derivation—
although it is valid—does not constitute a scientific explanation.19 But more importantly, 
there might be cases where true premises could entail some widely accepted (or even 
“true”) conclusions, yet the resulting explanation can hardly be accepted as “objective”. 
For instance, the failure of a certain group of people to accomplish a task might be 
explained by appealing to a statistical regularity between a certain biological constitution 
common to that group of people and certain behaviors. Sometimes in such cases even if 
the numbers are correct, it is hard to claim that they provide an “objective” explanation 
for the incompetency of the group of people under investigation. This is because, it is 
always possible that some information may have been neglected either because of mere 
ignorance or because of some bias i) for a worldview or ii) against the group of people 
being investigated. For instance, the relevant effects of social circumstances on one’s 
biological constitution might be overlooked because of a commitment to biological 
determinism and/or liberalism coupled with underlying racist, ethnicist or sexist 
assumptions.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This example is taken from Salmon (1999). 
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  Hempel distinguishes two requirements which are significant for our discussion of 
the objectivity of scientific explanations. They are the requirement of explanatory 
relevance and the requirement of testability for scientific explanations. The requirement 
of explanatory relevance is meant to assure that the explanatory information offered is 
relevant to the phenomenon under consideration, so that it could provide good reasons for 
expecting that the phenomenon will actually occur. The requirement of testability, on the 
other hand, assures that the information provided has objective explanatory power. An 
explanation can have no explanatory power if the information provided could not be 
subjected to empirical testing, i.e. if it is devoid of empirical content. (Hempel, 1966, 48-
49) Hempel’s emphasis on “objective” explanatory power is interesting. Here we can ask 
whether possessing objective explanatory power is enough for attaining objective 
explanations. If it is enough, what role, if any, does the requirement of relevance play in 
the objectivity of scientific explanations? According to Hempel, the two requirements are 
interrelated in the following way: if an explanation fulfills the criterion of relevance it also 
fulfills the criterion of testability, but not vice versa (49). He argues that the logical form 
of an explanation secures this interrelation. Now, if it is true that fulfilling the requirement 
of relevance always entails testability, then any explanation that conveys relevant 
information will have objective explanatory power.  But recall the previous explanation 
which relates the biological makeup of a group of people to their failure in accomplishing 
a certain task. In such cases the data provided might be relevant and in some ways 
testable, yet might fail to yield an objective explanation as a result of ignoring some other 
relevant data which might have a bearing on the explanation. Clearly, then, having 
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“objective” explanatory power does not guarantee an objective explanation. We can argue 
that ‘objective’ is understood in a specific way when it is attached to testability, where it 
is about bringing the information to the public sphere so that it can be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by others. In other words, it is about dismissing what is personal (or 
private), as it is not testable. With this understanding, testability is associated with 
impersonality. On the other hand, when we are bothered by the idea that any relevant 
information could yield objectivity, we are attributing a different meaning to ‘objective’ 
than mere testability.20 This difference indicates that the relationship between relevant 
information and objective explanations goes far beyond the criterion of public testability. 
We are left with the question of what ideals assist us in fulfilling the requirement 
of relevance. A scientific explanation cannot (and should not) include all possible facts. It 
necessarily ignores some facts and focuses on others. In some cases, it is easy to draw a 
line between relevant and irrelevant facts. But sometimes it is not. The case of John's 
failure to get pregnant is comparatively easy to respond to: it is not a scientific 
explanation because the explanans is not relevant to the explanandum. Even if John had 
not taken pills, he would not have become pregnant. Yet, the second case, which is about 
the failure of a certain group to accomplish a task, is more challenging. As a matter of 
fact, the question of what constitutes relevant information is always at the heart of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Here one might argue that testability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
objectivity. Yet even the necessity of testability for objectivity can become obscure in 
cases where an explanation requires reports of subjective experiences which are not 
always testable. In saying this I do not mean to claim that testability (or relevance) has 
nothing to do with objectivity. But I believe they are not applicable for assessing the 
objectivity of explanations regarding certain phenomena. Which is to say, they cannot be 
accepted as universal criteria for objectivity of explanations.   
	   74	  
problem in such cases.  What is included in or excluded from the explanans has a direct 
impact on the objectivity of the explanation. Recall that Hempel appealed to context in 
deciding on the standards that would determine which observations to include and which 
ones to set aside. In his words, “The stringency of the chosen standards will normally vary 
with the context and the objectives of the research in question. Broadly speaking, it will 
depend on the importance that is attached, in a given context, to avoiding two kinds of 
error that might be made: rejecting the hypothesis under test although it is true, and 
accepting it although it is false. The importance of this point is particularly clear when 
acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis is to serve as a basis for practical action.” (1966, 
65) In short, the decision about which standards to employ will depend on what is at stake 
in accepting or rejecting a hypothesis. However, taking the context into account 
contradicts certain positivist principles. For one, it clashes with the ideal of 
disinterestedness that is praised by positivists, because the determination of what is at 
stake will inevitably favor one perspective or set of values over others. What this implies 
is that if the importance of the context is acknowledged, then we are compelled to admit 
that the ideal of disinterestedness is not always an appropriate guide to objectivity. 
Moreover, there seems to be a tension between consideration of features such as what is at 
stake in deciding on hypotheses where social values are likely to interfere, and emphasis 
on the logic of scientific knowledge which is supposed to erase the impact of social values 
in scientific practice. Yet without such considerations, logical empiricist formulations fall 
short of providing meaningful criteria for establishing relevance. This means that however 
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impersonal the validating processes become, in certain cases the positivist method cannot 
decisively sweep away biases or interests in the content of scientific explanations.  
 
2.1.3   Confirmation and Objectivity 
As I have discussed, establishing the meaning and truth of generalizations was 
problematic for the logical positivists because the verification principle denied cognitive 
meaning to general statements. As each version of the verifiability criterion failed in 
certain respects, philosophers such as Carnap, Neurath and Hahn came to recognize the 
need for a weaker criterion of meaning. An important shift occurred for the logical 
positivist programme when Carnap turned his attention away from verifiability to 
confirmability in establishing cognitive significance.21 Unlike verifiability where the 
focus is on whether what a statement expresses can be verified by observation or not, in 
the confirmation relation the focus is on the observational consequences of statements. 
This shift enabled logical empiricists to account for statements about future occurrences 
as well as statements about the past.22 It also helped them to account for the 
epistemological status of general laws. In this section my task is to understand how the 
issue of confirmation is related to objectivity, and which forms of objectivity can be 
captured by the confirmation theories of logical empiricists. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This shift, for Salmon, marks the transition from logical positivism to a more ramified 
logical empiricism. 
22 One objection to verifiability was that it rendered statements expressing events in the 
past meaningless, as we cannot observe the past. This objection was responded to by the 
claim that verification is not about actual experience but possible experience. But this 
response also raised questions about the nature of this possibility, that is, about whether it 
is a logical possibility or an empirical one.  
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  The logical empiricists' approach to confirmation was along the same lines as 
their approach to scientific explanation. The confirmation relation was also a matter of the 
logical relations between sentences, where the focus was on the status of the evidential 
support that observations provide for hypotheses (either about a particular event or a 
general law). Logical empiricists believed that there is a single relationship between 
evidence and hypotheses that applies to all sciences regardless of their subject matter.23 
Hence, philosophers such as Hempel (1965) and Popper devoted their attention to 
inquiring into the logic of confirmation in science.  
  According to Hempel's formulation of the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method of 
confirmation, for instance, if the observational consequences drawn from a scientific 
statement (hypothesis) together with the initial conditions and auxiliary hypotheses that 
inform it fit our observations, then the scientific statement (hypothesis) is confirmed. Such 
confirmation, however, does not prove the truth of the hypothesis. What the occurrence of 
observational consequences at best yields is inductive support. Similarly, the failure of 
observational consequences does not necessarily refute the hypothesis. In the case of false 
auxiliary hypotheses, the observational consequence would also be false even if the 
hypothesis tested were true. For instance, testing certain hypotheses requires the use of 
complex instruments. In using these instruments scientists tacitly adhere to auxiliary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This conviction was a result of their commitment to the ideal of the unity of science. 
This ideal guided logical empiricists in their project of demarcating science from pseudo-
science. Logical empiricists sought this ideal in various ways. Among others, unity in 
method across all of the sciences (social and natural) was argued for. Perhaps, a stronger 
form of this ideal concerned the language of sciences. Unity of language in sciences was 
sought by appealing to logical constructions of scientific statements out of basic 
concepts. For more on this issue see Carnap (1928). 
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assumptions regarding the reliability of these instruments (i.e. readings of the instruments 
are precise or the principles upon which these instruments are constructed are accurate, 
etc.). However these assumptions might be wrong. That is to say the failure of the main 
hypothesis that is being tested might be due to instrumental error. Accordingly, the failure 
of observational consequences cannot conclusively refute a hypothesis.  
One complication for this model is that the same observational consequence, such 
as the prediction of a future occurrence, can be drawn from two different hypotheses. If 
the prediction were observed to be true, it would support both hypotheses. For example, 
suppose that in predicting the occurrence of an earthquake hypothesis A states ‘When 
there is a sudden release of energy in the earth’s crust an earthquake occurs’, and 
hypothesis B states ‘Anytime certain specific behaviors of ants are observed right before 
the earthquake an earthquake occurs’. Now, a statement that expresses an observational 
consequence such as ‘There will be an earthquake’ can be derived both from hypothesis A 
and hypothesis B, in conjunction with the premises ‘There is a sudden release of energy in 
the earth’s crust’ and ‘Ants are moving in a specific way’ respectively. In this case, the 
occurrence of an earthquake would confirm both hypothesis A and hypothesis B.   This 
situation has been referred as the underdetermination of theory by evidence; and it 
constitutes a compelling problem in the philosophy of science, as it implies that the 
decision between two rival theories could not be empirically grounded. This consequence 
led philosophers such as Pierre Duhem, Jules Henri Poincaré and Édouard L. E. J. LeRoy 
to argue that our choice between two hypotheses, both supported by the same evidence, is 
a matter of convention. As we shall see below this conventionalist line of thought has 
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significant import for the logical empiricist programme and its conception of objectivity, 
but first let me elaborate on conventionalism.  
  There are various formulations of conventionalism that address different aspects 
of the scientific method, the details of which I will not discuss here. One formulation, 
which is important for our discussion of objectivity, relies on the idea that descriptions of 
the world require a suitable conceptual apparatus (e.g. a geometry or a metric).  In some 
cases—both in empirical sciences such as physics and in non-empirical sciences such as 
mathematics and logic—the choice of which conceptual apparatus to adopt is the function 
of a convention. Consequently, a hypothesis' conformity to observable facts, by itself, 
does not provide warrant for accepting the hypothesis. That is to say, pragmatic or 
instrumental considerations may have a role in determining which conceptual apparatus 
will be employed. This line of thought, although it helped logical empiricists to deal with 
problems such as the synthetic a priori, also challenged some of their convictions. 
Following the development of non-Euclidean geometries, Poincaré argued that the axioms 
of geometry are conventional and no empirical testing can determine the selection of one 
geometry over the other.  As a result, we cannot talk about one geometry being a better fit 
than another.24 The discovery of new geometries undermined the Kantian idea that 
geometrical axioms are synthetic a priori, the very existence of which contradicted the 
anti-metaphysics of positivism. Hence, it was in conventionalism that the logical 
empiricists found the resources to dismiss synthetic a priori statements. They regarded all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Poincaré maintains that the world described by scientific theories does not exist apart 
from the human mind and the term 'objective', if it is to be meaningful at all, stands for 
'intersubjective'. (Leszek Kolakowski 1968, 172)  
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analytic statements as conveying logical or linguistic conventions that are established a 
priori through stipulation. Positivists such as Schlick, Hahn and Carnap applied 
Poincaré’s views of geometry to mathematics and logic. Schlick, for instance, claimed 
that laws of logic such as the excluded middle or the principle of identity do not say 
anything about reality, but only help to regulate it. Similarly, Carnap maintained that the 
choice of a conceptual apparatus (a linguistic framework) in science is conventional, a 
claim which implied that there could be other legitimate linguistic frameworks.   
While the possibility of accounting for logical truths by appealing to conventions 
benefited the logical empiricists, the same line of thought also created serious problems 
for the consistency of their position. The arguments drawn from the underdetermination 
of theories by evidence, which reduced theory choice to a convention, clashed with some 
of the basic principles of logical empiricism. For instance, one possible consequence of 
the problem of underdetermination was that certain theological accounts of the world 
could in principle be compatible with scientific theories. Such compatibility, however, 
contradicted the logical empiricist project of distinguishing science from pseudo-science. 
Moreover, since conventions involve pragmatic considerations, and pragmatic 
considerations are likely to be susceptible to personal, social and political values, this 
conventionalist approach to theory choice introduces an accidental feature into scientific 
practice which in turn undermines the positivist idea that there is a universal scientific 
method. In other words, the absence of a criterion other than utility for deciding between 
theories threatened the epistemological privilege that the logical empiricists had attributed 
to scientific knowledge by bringing the objectivity of theory choice into question. After 
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all, if theory choice were a matter of convention, it would no longer be guided by the ideal 
of disinterestedness since such decisions will inevitably favor one convention over 
another.  
  The question of which theory to accept when one is presented with two 
empirically equivalent theories in fact proved to be a compelling one in the philosophy of 
science. According to one line of thought a rational decision-making process would 
resolve the problem. To that end, formulating methodological (epistemic) principles25 that 
would dictate rational decisions became a major concern. Principles most commonly 
proposed included testability, consistency, epistemic adequacy, simplicity and scope. Yet 
their effectiveness has always been open to debate. For example, one criterion that 
generated heated discussions was “simplicity”. One formulation of the principle of 
simplicity recommended accepting those hypotheses with conservative ontologies.26 
However, it was hard to explain why simplicity should matter. After all, the simplest 
explanation for phenomena is that they occur according to God's will and this was not 
acceptable for science-oriented thinking.  
  One logical empiricist attempt to overcome the problem of the 
underdetermination of hypotheses by evidence was to deny that they count as rival 
hypotheses. Some logical empiricists such as Schlick and Reichenbach maintained that 
although the terms used in theories might be different, as long as they have the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In the literature these principles are sometimes referred to as virtues or constitutive 
values. 
26 For an elaborate examination of the cognitive (epistemic) status of these principles see 
Longino (1996). 
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observational consequences, i.e. as long as they are empirically equivalent, they say the 
same thing. This point of view was supported by the logical empiricist contention that 
unobservable components of hypotheses are merely linguistic entities. Since they function 
as shortcuts for otherwise detailed descriptions of experience to help us communicate and 
memorize experimental outcomes, theories should not be taken as literal descriptions of 
the world. Accordingly, there is no genuine rivalry between two empirically equivalent 
theories. This solution, however, was opposed by those who distinguished between the 
meaning of a statement and the occurrences that make it true. According to this latter 
point of view, two alternative theories might have different meanings even though they 
lead to the same observational consequence. Discussions about the ontological status of 
unobservable entities and their impact on the assigned role for theories dominated the 
philosophy of science literature in the late twentieth century. This change of focus from 
the logic of confirmation to the referential character of theories also signals an important 
shift in the conceptualization of objectivity. 
  Before exploring this shift, let me remark on how we should view the logical 
empiricist conceptualization of objectivity, given the conventional aspect of the 
confirmation relation that I have briefly explained. On the one hand, insistence on a single 
method of confirmation for all sciences (as in scientific explanation) can be seen as an 
extension of the logical empiricists’ trust in the impersonal method of logic and the unity 
of science. But if logical principles are matters of convention as some logical empiricists 
argued, then even the impersonality of logical method is jeopardized. Of course it can be 
argued that the fact that the rules are man-made does not prove that the conclusions 
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reached will be distorted. After all the mechanical objectivity that is secured by 
automation, which I have discussed in the first chapter, is not affected by the fact that the 
machines that replace human beings in performing measurements, experiments and so 
forth are man-made artifacts. However, it is important to remember that mechanical 
objectivity is just one form of objectivity among others. Even if we grant this mechanical 
objectivity (in a limited sense of non-intervention) to logical empiricists, relying on so-
called impersonal logical forms is still not sufficient for comprehending the different 
forms of objectivity embedded in scientific knowledge.  
  A similar point can be made by emphasizing an important feature of confirmation: 
since observations are not conclusively veridical, confirmation never yields absolute 
certainty. In other words, since experimental control is never perfect, scientific hypotheses 
are never absolutely infallible. The import of this acceptance of fallibility for 
understanding objectivity will depend on the relationship between impersonal truth and 
objectivity. If truth is a condition for objectivity, i.e. if false scientific statements cannot 
be objective, then we cannot rely merely on the confirmation relation as a firm base for 
attaining objectivity. However, the link between truth and objectivity in logical 
empiricism is not straightforward. An examination of logical empiricist approaches to 
theories will make this point more clearly. 
 
2.1.4   The Status of Theories and Objectivity 
In logical positivism scientific theories were viewed as sets of singular sentences which 
can be represented in a formal language. Descriptions of particular facts obtained by 
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observation were expressed in statements containing observational terms. These 
statements, in turn, presented evidence for generalizations about observable phenomena. 
That is to say, they yielded confirmation (to a certain degree) of general statements. 
However, science does not merely deal with observable phenomena. In the case of general 
statements that involve theoretical terms, the confirmation relation is not as 
straightforward as in the case of observational terms. The issue of how theoretical terms 
acquire their meanings needs to be settled. In the logical empiricist tradition it was argued 
that meaningful theoretical terms in a generalization (or hypothesis) could be logically 
constructed from descriptions of immediate experiences. These constructions involved 
conventions. Positivists such as Carnap offered elaborate explanations about how such 
rational constructions were possible, details of which I will not discuss here. What is 
important to note is that this attitude towards theoretical terms led positivists to the view 
that the task of theories is not to describe the world as it is, but to provide us with the 
cognitive tools to understand phenomena. In other words, theoretical terms help us 
understand the world as we experience it. With this understanding, positivists escape 
committing themselves to a metaphysical entity such as “the world as it is”. 
  Now in light of their instrumentalist approach to scientific theories, we can trace 
the logical empiricists’ conceptualization of objectivity by examining their responses (or 
possible responses, given the principles they adopted) to the following questions: In the 
case of two empirically equivalent theories, i) which one, if any, provides an objective 
understanding or description of the world? ii) is there an objective way of choosing one 
theory over the other? These questions, although closely related, are in principle 
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concerned with two separate issues. While the first question is about the representational 
character of theories, the second one is about rationality in science. In this section I will 
be concerned with the first question and will discuss the second one in the next section. 
The logical empiricist response to the problem of underdetermination by 
identifying the empirical equivalence of two theories with their semantic equivalence was 
criticized for making a trivial semantic point about the referring expressions. But 
conventionalism can be construed as making a point about the world beyond referring 
expressions. Let me clarify. It is true that in measuring the length of a stick, whether we 
use the metric system or the imperial system as our unit of measurement does not have a 
bearing on the actual size of the stick. And at the most basic level, our talk of a 2 meter 
stick or a 6.5 foot stick does not create any significant problems for understanding or 
representing the aspect of the world relating to the size of the stick. However, in the case 
of unobservable phenomena things get more complicated, as we do not have the means to 
assess in what ways our conceptual framework affects our understanding of the world. 
Hence the question of what theoretical entities to posit and which theory to adopt becomes 
far more important in describing the world. That is why Pierre Duhem claims that, in the 
absence of empirical testing, propositions of physics are neither true nor false, but 
convenient or inconvenient. This line of thinking, in principle, allows for a theoretical 
system that may contain incompatible hypotheses when it is convenient: a conclusion that 
most logical empiricists would not readily accept. However, according to the logical 
empiricists, linguistic (or logical) constructions belong to the realm of analytic statements; 
they are not about matters of fact. In other words, the conventionality of the describing 
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apparatus did not have any import for the empirical content of statements. This separation 
between analytic and synthetic statements prevented a descent into relativism in such 
matters of facts as conventionalism might yield. Hence, it can be argued that for logical 
empiricists this separation played an important role in maintaining the objectivity of the 
content of theories. However, Quine's attacks on the analytic/synthetic distinction, and on 
reductionism in the empiricist programme showed that the conventionality of the truths of 
logic could extend beyond mere matters of naming. Very briefly, he argued that if no 
genuine distinction can be drawn between analytic and synthetic statements, any synthetic 
statement can be turned into an analytic one by supplementing ad hoc conventions.27 This 
view implied that matters of facts would also become prey to the relativistic consequences 
of conventionalism. In other words, as Quine puts it, any claim—including inconsistent 
claims—can be held to be true come what may. This conclusion undoubtly impaired the 
logical positivist project of merging empirical knowledge with (so-called) firm grounds of 
logic.   
  In order to grasp what is at stake for objectivity in the midst of these relativistic 
consequences of conventionalism, and to explore a possible logical empiricist answer to 
the first question (i.e. which theory provides an objective understanding of the world?), 
we need to clarify what an objective understanding of the world would amount to. In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In his famous passage on this issue Quine writes “The totality of our so-called 
knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the 
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-
made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges…Any statement can be 
held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system 
[of our beliefs].” (Quine 1963, 42-43)  
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first chapter I note that one way of defining objectivity is with reference to an independent 
reality. If what ‘the objective description of the world’ refers to is ‘describing the world as 
it really is’, then logical empiricists do not have an answer to the first question. In fact, 
they would not even be concerned with it, because according to their verifiability 
principle we cannot intelligibly talk about “the world as it really is”. If, on the other hand, 
an objective description of the world were a description that is arrived at through an 
objective method secured by the logic of confirmation, then the logical empiricist 
response to the first question would be along a line such as this: as long as two theories 
have the same evidential relations, then both theories would offer an objective 
understanding of the world. But this conclusion is highly controversial especially when 
the accounts provided by two theories contradict one another. Take for instance the 
following two theories estimating the age of the earth. One theory estimates the age of the 
earth at some billion years by appealing to the fossil evidence, while the other estimates it 
as being less than 6000 years, together with the assumption that God created the world 
complete with the fossils that indicate a longer life span for the earth. The same evidence, 
i.e. fossil samples, could be used to support both of these theories. As long as the 
confirmation relation holds there seems to be no difference between the two theories. So 
should we conclude that these two theories both offer an objective account of the age of 
the world? Of course the immediate positivist reaction to this conclusion would be to deny 
the objectivity and the scientific status of the second theory since one of its assumptions is 
not empirically verifiable.  Yet their failure to formulate an adequate criterion for 
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verifiability makes the logical empiricists vulnerable to the counter-arguments of theists 
who claim that theological assumptions are in fact, in one way or another, observable.28  
  An alternative way to contest the objectivity of the second theory is to emphasize 
the ideal of disinterestedness.  Accordingly, a logical empiricist could claim that the 
second theory is not objective because it is invested in religion. Yet since 
disinterestedness is not an empirical principle, for reasons similar to those declaring the 
inadequacy of the principle of simplicity in explaining why a conservative ontology is 
empirically relevant, it is difficult for the logical empiricist to account for why 
disinterestedness alone should yield objectivity. The narrow focus on the logical relations 
among scientific statements, taken together with empiricist convictions, renders the 
logical empiricist programme inadequate for providing satisfactory resolutions of such 
complications.  
  Another reason why it is controversial to attribute objectivity to both of the 
theories discussed above is the common presupposition that there can only be one 
objective description of the world just as there can only be one “true” description of the 
world. Here the objectivity of a theory is tied to its truth. But “truth” is a controversial 
concept and it is not always clear what it means for a theory to be true. Nonetheless, let 
me speculate on how positivists could make sense of the “truth” of a theory, given their 
view that theories are mere conceptual tools.  Positivists are interested in the world as we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For example, those who appeal to teleological arguments (among them William Paley) 
claim that the evident purpose, the ordered structure and complexity of the natural world 
suggest that there is a grand intentional designer behind it all which we call God. Then, 
the observed instances of such features in the natural world are accepted as evidence for 
the existence of God.  
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experience it, so it can be argued that the “truth” of a theory can be construed with 
reference to correspondence to our experiences. There are two problems that positivists 
face here. First, if we experience the world in different ways, then there will be multiple 
“true” descriptions of the world which correspond to different experiences of it. If 
objectivity is tied to truth, then it will be possible to talk of distinct “objective” 
understandings of the world. Accordingly, if positivists want to deny this conclusion, they 
have to show that we do not experience the world differently from one another. But what 
aspect of positivism could guarantee the uniformity of our experiences? The Kantian 
solution for establishing the uniformity of experiences was to universalize the 
preconditions for experience. That is, since the forms of intuition and the categories of 
understanding are the same in everybody, our experiences of the world cannot differ. 
However, the logical empiricists are not interested in how we come to know or understand 
the world. The proper role for a philosophy of science, for them, is to investigate the 
validation process of knowledge claims by working out formal representations of 
scientific expressions in general. Hence, they shift the focus in assessing the world of 
experience from psychological categories to the logic of science. Yet, nothing in their 
methodology seems to support the uniformity of experience other than an appeal to a 
realist assumption about the uniformity of the world which goes against the grain of their 
phenomenological stance.   
Another problem with the positivists’ phenomenological approach to truth has to 
do with their foundationalist convictions. According to them the positive content of our 
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descriptions comes from our immediate sense perception.29 However, since positivists 
maintain that statements can only be justified by other statements, the attempts to link 
perceptions (mental entities) to statements of descriptions (linguistic entities) are 
problematic. On the basis of these difficulties Karl Popper, for example, claimed that “we 
must distinguish between, on the one hand, our subjective experiences or feelings of 
conviction, which can never justify any statement (though they can be made the subject of 
psychological investigation) and, on the other hand, the objective logical relations 
subsisting among the various systems of scientific statements, and within each of 
them.”(Popper 1965, 44, italics in the original). Yet, the emphasis on objective relations 
fails to equip positivists with solutions to the pressing issues such as theory choice that 
scientists are constantly faced with. Because of these complications the phenomenological 
approach to scientific theories (and truth) was challenged by scientific realists.  
 
2.2    Scientific Realism and Objectivity 
As opposed to the logical empiricists’ instrumental approach, scientific realists such as 
Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Dummett, and Richard Boyd maintain that scientific theories are 
descriptions of what there really is. The main realist conviction is that the universe has a 
structure independent of human minds. Accordingly, scientists discover rather than invent 
reality. What makes scientific statements true or false is the external world, i.e. not our 
sense data or the structure of our language. For example, a statement about atoms refers to 
external entities called atoms. For logical empiricists in general, on the other hand, ‘atom’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The “positive” content was also referred as the “objective” content. 
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does not refer to a real entity but it is a conceptual tool that helps us organize our 
experiences. In this aspect, logical empiricism is an anti-realist position.30 Furthermore, 
unlike logical empiricists, scientific realists do not confine science merely to the 
description and prediction of phenomena. According to scientific realists, the ultimate aim 
of science is to reveal the true story of the world (or represent the underlying structure of 
the world). In this view, the acceptance of a theory is not a matter of convenience but a 
matter of belief in its truth.31  
In arguing for this position, philosophers such as John C. Smart, Gilbert Harman, 
and Charles S. Peirce took the explanatory power of realism as a good indication that it is 
true. For them, the trajectory of progress in the history of science gives us good reason to 
believe that the world has a uniform structure. In Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Hilary 
Putnam argued that if realism is not accepted, then the systematically observed 
regularities in the world should be regarded as cosmic coincidences or miracles which are 
opposed to the scientific worldview.32 Scientific realists maintain that the continuous 
predictive success of theories shows that these theories provide us with accurate pictures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 There are anti-realist positions other than logical empiricism. Among those, Bas C. 
Van Fraasen’s constructive empiricism is highly influential. According to him, scientific 
statements should be construed literally, i.e. atoms are real entities, but good theories 
need not be assessed with reference to truth. Constructive empiricism is basically the 
view that science aims at empirical adequacy (as opposed to truth) and acceptance of a 
theory is a matter of believing in its empirical adequacy (not its truth). An empirically 
adequate theory is a theory that fits the observable phenomena, i.e. that saves the 
phenomena.  
31 Scientific realism, however, should not be construed as a totally separate position from 
logical empiricism. Rather, it is a position that developed out of logical empiricism in 
reaction to some of its troublesome contentions while preserving most of its principles. 
Some construe it as simply a different strand—a realist strand—of logical empiricism.  
32 For a detailed discussion of inference to the best explanation, see Van Fraassen (1991). 
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of the world.  It also indicates that the theoretical entities posited in these theories must 
exist. Given these convictions, in this view, an objective theory becomes a theory that 
describes objective reality, i.e. reality as independent of the human mind or conceptual 
intervention.  This understanding overlaps with the metaphysical sense of objectivity that 
I have distinguished in the first chapter, which aims at revealing the ultimate structure of 
the world. However, as we shall see, this form of objectivity is not only conceptually 
difficult to maintain, but is also not an effective ideal to follow throughout complex 
scientific practices.  
Now, given their commitment to metaphysical objectivity, scientific realists’ 
response to our question about the objectivity of two empirically equivalent theories 
would be different from logical empiricists’ responses. Above I have argued that if 
objective descriptions are confined to descriptions of the world as it really is, then the 
logical positivists do not have an answer to our question because their anti-metaphysical 
attitude forbids them to talk of “the world as it is”. In fact, according to the logical 
positivists, any claim about the ultimate structure of the world is meaningless, as it is not 
verifiable. For a scientific realist, on the other hand, there is no inconsistency in claiming 
that an objective description of the world is a description that represents the world as it is. 
According to the conviction in the uniformity of the world, not only is any inconsistency 
within a theory unacceptable, but there cannot be two empirically equivalent theories both 
of which describe the world objectively.33 Furthermore, on this view the problem of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Note that realism as the view that we can have descriptions of the way(s) the world is 
does not necessarily lead to this conclusion. It is the assumption about the uniformity of 
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which theory to accept becomes comparatively easier to resolve: between the two 
theories, the one that is believed to be true (i.e. believed to correspond to reality as it is) 
will be accepted. Of course our beliefs are fallible, but as long as science aims at “truth”, 
erroneous descriptions will eventually be corrected. Then the problem that remains to be 
solved is to establish the conditions under which our beliefs about the truth of theories are 
warranted. However, this proves to be a difficult problem to solve. 
Although scientific realism resolves certain complexities that logical empiricism 
fails to overcome, and avoids the kind of relativism that a conventionalist position might 
yield to, its ontological commitments render it vulnerable to skeptical arguments about 
evil demons or brains in vats: given the possibility that we might be brains in vats in a 
crazy scientist’s laboratory (or continuously being deceived by an evil demon) how can 
we ever be justified in believing that our theories in fact correspond to the reality as it is? 
Unless scientific realists provide satisfactory answers to such questions their conviction 
regarding the uniform structure of the world as well as the existence of theoretical entities 
upon which their conception of ontological objectivity rests will be unfounded. In the face 
of such strong skeptical challenges, the predictive success of theories that scientific 
realists appeal to in arguing for the truth of theories is too loose a criterion for grounding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the world that undermines the possibility of multiple objective theories of the world.	  For 
instance, if we assume that some of the aspects of the world are so structured that they 
allow for different descriptions, realism and the possibility of multiple descriptions of the 
world would not be inconsistent. I will revisit this issue in Chapter Four with reference to 
Longino’s views.  
	   93	  
these assumptions.34 After all, as Larry Laudan has pointed out there have been many 
theories in the history of science which have successfully predicted phenomena such as 
phlogiston theory and the caloric theory of heat, yet later proved to be false. (Laudan 
1991) 
One conclusion that we can draw from this discussion is that scientific realists fail 
to provide sufficient ground for the form of objectivity, i.e. ontological objectivity, that 
they rely on in theory choice. Yet a more charitable conclusion would be to claim that, 
although ontological objectivity is not attainable (or cannot be shown that it has been 
attained), it could still be sought as an ideal to be achieved through methodology. This is 
where the two questions I have raised about the objectivity of two empirically equivalent 
theories intersect. It is often believed that knowledge of the objective world is attainable 
by following an objective method. That is why the question about features that concede 
objectivity to a methodology becomes highly important.35 Accordingly, many realists 
such as Popper, adhered to the logical empiricist emphasis on the validating processes in 
scientific knowledge and to the so-called distinction between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 It might be difficult to see how predictive success could be affected by brain in vat or 
evil demon hypotheses. The point is that we do not/cannot have good enough reason to 
distinguish whether the predictions that a theory provides are made true by the world out	  
there, i.e. whether our theory correctly depicts the structure of the external world, or 
whether the predictions are realized by, say an evil demon.  In short, since “we” cannot 
“know” the cause of “successful” predictions, “we” cannot tell that our theories indeed 
correspond to reality as it is.  
35 I will have an elaborate discussion on ontological objectivity and epistemological 
objectivity in Chapter Five.  
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2.2.1   Karl Popper and Objectivity 
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper explains the distinction between the context 
of discovery and the context of justification with reference to the psychology of 
knowledge and the logic of knowledge. While the psychology of knowledge deals with 
empirical facts, the logic of knowledge focuses on logical relations. According to Popper, 
the task of the philosopher of science is to give a logical analysis of scientific discovery 
where scientists construct hypotheses or theories, and test them against observation and 
experiment. The process involved in the act of inventing or constructing a hypothesis, 
however, cannot be a topic for logical investigation. This is because this process reflects 
subjective preferences and values which cannot be logically traced. According to him, 
how an idea occurs in a scientist’s mind, or an examination of the context that inspires the 
scientist to come up with a hypothesis would be of interest for an empirical psychologist 
or a sociologist. Yet, it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge, which 
is concerned with the questions of the validity or justification of statements. Hence, the 
domain of interest for the philosopher of science is the context of justification. It is in this 
context that philosophers investigate the methods by which the validity of scientific 
statements is examined, regardless of their source. One important difference between the 
logical empiricists and Popper is the method they believe to be central in attaining 
scientific knowledge. As I have discussed earlier, the central issue in scientific method for 
the logical empiricists is the theory of confirmation, which rests on inductive logic, 
whereas Popper argues for a deductive method of testing. According to Popper, the 
confirmation relation between theories and evidence supported by the logical empiricists 
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can only temporarily support a theory. However, in the method of falsification, if an 
observational consequence is falsified, then the theory which it is derived from is also 
falsified. Hence, in contrast to confirmation, falsification yields definite results. Yet, it 
should be noted that Popper’s method of falsification is also vulnerable to certain 
problems that the confirmation theory faces: similar to the method of confirmation, 
falsification also cannot yield absolute certainty as to whether the theory under 
investigation is false. That is, if each scientific theory belongs to an interconnected web of 
theories, and operates within a set of background assumptions, then even if the data does 
not agree with what the theory predicts, we cannot claim with certainty that our theory is 
false. This is because the cause of the problem might well lie in the background 
assumptions or in another theory that our theory is related to. I will discuss this issue 
further below, but now let me proceed with examining the forms of objectivity the method 
of falsification could possibly yield.  
Popper’s emphasis on the logic of scientific discovery might suggest that he shares 
the logical empiricist contention that objectivity is secured by the impersonal logical form 
of the method. Yet, in a realist position the inconclusiveness of Popper’s method is an 
obstacle in attaining an objective description of the world: if we do not have a conclusive 
way to accept or dismiss a theory, then we do not have the means to determine whether a 
theory is actually getting us closer to the true story of the world or not. Similarly, in the 
case of two competing theories if we do not have conclusive reasons to discard one theory 
or the other, we cannot decide which theory actually describes the objective world and 
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which does not. In other words, the method of falsification, whether or not it is 
impersonal, fails fully to guide theory choice.  
Yet, Popper’s understanding of objectivity extends beyond the impersonal logical 
aspect of the method. For Popper, although linguistic analysis is important, philosophical 
problems are not mere linguistic puzzles; there are some real philosophical problems such 
as the problem of the growth of knowledge. Even though he thinks that there is no method 
peculiar to philosophy, there is a method that Popper praises for all rational discussions, 
including philosophy. This method involves adopting a critical discourse where 
examinations of clearly posed problems are carried out critically. A critical examination 
consists basically of attempts to refute proposed solutions to a problem. In cases where 
one fails to provide sufficient criticism to disprove one’s solution, other people will 
supply more criticisms. Hence, a critical discourse requires a community. As opposed to 
the foundationalist project of the logical positivists where knowledge is built upon 
immediate sense perception, according to Popper, justification procedures cannot be 
confined to individual convictions (which belong to the realm of the psychological). Any 
scientific statement could, in principle, be tested and understood by anybody.  Any 
experiment that yields a “scientific” finding could be “reproduced by anyone who carries 
out the appropriate experiment in the way prescribed.” (45) Hence, the objectivity of 
scientific statements becomes a matter of intersubjective testing.36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 It should be noted that in a realist position this intersubjective testing is believed to 
pave the way to the “true” description of the world. However, from an anti-realist 
perspective it can be construed as a method of “consensus building”.  
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In so far as critical discourse is crucial for the method of falsification, it plays a 
significant role in attaining objective knowledge. Since the possibility of a critical 
discourse rests on communicability, it is reasonable to conclude that an important part of 
Popper’s conceptualization of objectivity is governed by the ideal of aperspectivity which, 
as Daston argues, is premised on communicability. By bringing the aspect of critical 
discourse into focus, Popper’s understanding opens new avenues for discussing 
objectivity in science. For instance, if what is essential for critical discourse is to consider 
other people’s views and objections, it encourages us to ask questions about the ways in 
which other people’s criticisms matter, as well as questions about the characteristics 
(personal or social such as their sex, race, class and so forth) these other people should 
have in order to contribute well to the critical discourse. However, Popper’s positivist 
tendency of abstracting subjectivities in order to attain a universal account about how 
science works (or should work) prevented him asking such questions. The emphasis on 
the importance of these questions for objectivity had to wait for the feminist critiques of 
science which I will discuss in the next chapter. The intersubjective exchange that Popper 
defends essentially serves to control the rational course of belief formation and 
assessment, the rules and ideals of which are predetermined. It does not deal with the 
ways in which personal or social differences among participating individuals could 
contribute to the critical exchange.  
Another method for solving philosophical problems according to Popper rests on 
the historical aspect of science. Central to this method is a consideration of past 
approaches to and judgments of a specific problem. How the problem was formulated and 
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handled, as well as the situations that brought it about are all important for this approach. 
Although it is frequently overlooked by logical empiricists, this attempt to proceed by 
understanding the history of a problem is valuable for Popper, as it would constitute an 
essential part of critical discourse (or in Popper’s terms, rational discussion). Popper’s 
emphasis on the historical aspect of science is shared by the critics of positivist and 
scientific realist approaches to science whom I will discuss in the next section. What is 
interesting to note is that although for these critics a historical approach to science renders 
the strict distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification 
redundant, for Popper, considering historical features does not undermine the distinction. I 
think it is an indication of the confusion regarding what exactly belongs to the logic of 
science and what does not.  
Another attack, from a somewhat different direction, on the foundationalist ideas 
of logical empiricism came from Duhem and Quine. According to the Quine-Duhem 
thesis, the underdetermination of theories by evidence implied that no single statement 
could carry any evidence for a hypothesis by itself. Consequently, it was argued that 
theoretical systems should be tested as a whole.  This thesis, together with a holist theory 
of meaning where it is claimed that a theoretical term gets its meaning from the entire 
body of scientific beliefs in which it is embedded, led Quine to conclude that any 
scientific claim might be used to justify any other accepted scientific claim. Hence, 
accounting for theory change, which is at the heart of the growth and development of 
science, continued to occupy philosophers of science. The issue of theory change is 
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closely tied to questions about objective (and rational) ways of choosing one theory over 
others.  
 
2.3 Wholism, Theory Change and Objectivity 
Following the challenges raised by such conventionalists as Quine and Duhem, and 
Popper, a new approach to the philosophy of science has emerged. Although proponents 
of this new understanding do not agree with one another in all points of criticism, they are 
united by their emphasis on the actual practice of science as opposed to the logical 
empiricist emphasis on the logic of science.37 It is not possible to do justice to the intricate 
ideas put forward by adherents to this new school of thought here, but for my discussion 
of objectivity a general outline will be sufficient.    
 The general outlook of wholist theorists was in line with Popper’s emphasis on 
the history of science, although the ultimate understandings of science and the philosophy 
of science differ. As opposed to philosophers in the positivist tradition, wholists 
maintained that an examination of the history of science has important philosophical 
import. Similarly to Popper, wholists such as Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, 
and Paul Feyerabend were concerned with problems relating to the growth of knowledge. 
Hence, their work is mainly directed at issues about theory change and development. 
Philosophers who adopted this new approach took issue with the basic distinctions 
and principles of logical empiricism and scientific realism, thereby challenging previous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The proponents of this new understanding have been referred as wholists, historicist or 
globalists. In discussing this new understanding I will focus on Kuhn’s views and refer to 
it as wholist tradition.    
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conceptions of scientific objectivity. For example, they rejected any claims that there 
could be a distinction between theoretical sentences and observational sentences. They 
denied the possibility of pure observations and claimed that observation sentences are 
always infected by theory. This view implied that if observations are theory-laden, then 
immediate sense perceptions cannot provide objective content to scientific descriptions as 
positivists had argued. Hence, the logical empiricist project of founding science on pure 
sense data is undermined. Moreover, they opposed the scientific realist contention that 
there is one true theory which can represent the ultimate structure of the world. In other 
words, they dismissed metaphysical objectivity. Adherents to the wholist tradition also 
denied that there is a single logic to scientific discovery. Hence, they found both the 
method of confirmation and the method of falsification inadequate for assessing theories. 
In emphasizing the history of science and its importance for philosophy, they attacked the 
so-called distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. 
Following these views, they dismissed the idea of a cumulative science where the 
empirical content of the old theory as well as the meanings of the terms contained in it are 
preserved in the new theory. In the dominant view, the growth of knowledge and the 
development of science were taken as simple accumulations of observational statements 
and individual discoveries. Hence, a new theory was conceived as an advancement 
achieved by improving the old theory. That is why it was believed that the new theory 
was more objective than the old one. Yet, wholist attacks on the cumulative picture of 
science challenge this understanding of accelerating objectivity through improvements in 
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theories.38 In thinking about scientific development, Kuhn points out an important 
dilemma about how to distinguish the “scientific” component of past theories in natural 
sciences which are discarded either as wrong or as superstitions. (The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions [SSR] 1970, 2) The first horn of the dilemma is that if we reject 
past theories as “unscientific” as a whole, we will be compelled to accept that the method 
that yields those erroneous theories could now lead to scientific knowledge. This means 
that the method does not guarantee that today’s “scientific knowledge” would not be 
tomorrow’s superstition. The second horn of the dilemma, on the other hand, is that if past 
theories are accepted as ‘scientific’, we have to accept that science consists of 
incompatible theories, as some past theories are incompatible with the accepted theories 
of today. (1970, 2) According to Kuhn, we are better off with the second option than the 
first one. However, the second option requires a new approach to scientific development, 
one which does not view it as cumulative.  
Kuhn’s understanding of objectivity is closely related to his thoughts on how 
science proceeds. Although he has an elaborate account of the complex ways science 
proceeds, the key ideas for Kuhn’s understanding of scientific development are “normal 
science” and “scientific revolutions”. Very briefly, scientific revolutions trace the 
following general course: Normal science operates in a framework (paradigm) where the 
scientific community has firm beliefs about how the world is: the fundamental entities of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 These improvements might be construed as increases in truth as well as in scope or 
accuracy. Accordingly the greater the scope of the theory, i.e. the more phenomena it can 
explain, the more objective it becomes. It is similar to Thomas Nagel’s understanding of 
objectivity that comes in degrees, which I discussed with its problems in the previous 
chapter.  
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which the universe is made, the relationships between these entities and us, the techniques 
that need to be employed or rules to be followed in inquiring into them are some of the 
basic questions, answers to which are agreed upon by the scientific community during the 
period of normal science. The mind-set of the scientific community is formed through the 
education that qualifies students for professional practice. (5) Accordingly, the world is 
confronted by the conceptual apparatus provided by professional education. In normal 
science any attempts to challenge these conceptual apparatuses are initially resisted. Yet, 
when scientists are faced with a problem that cannot be solved by the accepted rules and 
procedures of normal science, the earlier challenges can no longer be suppressed. If the 
problem (anomaly) persists, the old conceptual apparatus together with its commitments 
are gradually abandoned and a new basis for the practice of science is accepted. (6) In this 
conceptualization, scientific activity is viewed as a puzzle-solving activity.  
One of the main points that Kuhn and Popper disagree on is this conceptualization 
of science as essentially a puzzle-solving activity. According to Popper, scientific activity 
is a critical discourse where proponents of rival theories are in constant exchange with one 
another.39 And this exchange is fundamental for attaining objectivity. As I have argued, 
communicability is crucial for critical exchange, yet Kuhn’s ideas about paradigms in 
SSR do not allow for a meaningful exchange among scientists who subscribe to different 
paradigms.  In this work, Kuhn compares scientific revolutions to gestalt switches where 
one cannot see two distinct figures embedded in an image at the same time. Similarly, 
science cannot operate in two different paradigms at the same time. A new paradigm with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For more detail on this disagreement see Kuhn (1970b).  
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its worldview is formed once the old paradigm is abandoned. After this transition, the 
world is never viewed in the same way as it had been viewed under the old paradigm. One 
reason for this incapacity is that scientific revolutions do not occur very often in the 
history of science. Except on rare occasions, most scientists work in one paradigm 
through all of their lives. According to Kuhn, those who witness such a transformation 
could not contemplate the two paradigms at the same time because the questions asked, 
the techniques and standards used to respond to those questions, as well as the meanings 
of the terms in the theories alter during paradigm change. Hence, even a careful historical 
examination would likely fail fully to reconstruct the old paradigm once the scientists 
(and the historians) are exposed to the new paradigm.  
If this analogy between gestalt switch and theory change is accurate, then it has 
important implications regarding the rationality of science. In the famous figure which 
contains both a rabbit and a duck image, for instance, the change in perception is not 
guided by any rational principle; one sees the rabbit image at one time and the duck image 
at another time. If theory change is similar to a gestalt switch, it means that theory choices 
are not based on rational criteria. This is to say, there is no neutral ground on which to 
compare competing theories and choose one over another. This view leads to the criticism 
that Kuhn denies the possibility of any objective course of theory choice.  He rejects this 
criticism on the grounds that it associates objectivity with neutrality. According to Kuhn, 
the absence of a neutral ground does not necessarily mean that theory choice is arbitrary. 
In his later work he argues for the effectiveness of certain principles (or virtues) such as 
accuracy, consistency, broadness of scope, simplicity and fruitfulness in the processes of 
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theory choice. (Kuhn 1977, 321-2) In the absence of a priori criteria, theory choice rests 
on the collective judgment of the scientific community, and objectivity becomes a matter 
of shared criteria. In other words, these principles are not universal, and different sets of 
principles might be emphasized in different paradigms.  For Kuhn, although shared 
principles are the communal bases of theory choice, they are open to interpretation and 
they sometimes contradict one another. Accordingly, two scientists working from these 
principles might reach different conclusions, as they might interpret certain principles 
differently or disagree on their relative importance. (324) For such reasons, these 
principles cannot be taken as the fixed criteria for deciding among theories.  
From Kuhn’s point of view, in explaining why scientists have chosen the theories 
they are committed to, we need to look beyond the shared criteria. Among other factors, 
scientists’ past experiences are influential in their choice. Personal values and inclinations 
also play a part in their decisions. For instance, someone who values originality might 
pick a theory accordingly. (325) According to Kuhn’s opponents, however, these 
subjective factors belong to the context of discovery and they have no philosophical 
import in examining science. In contrast, Kuhn maintains that theory choice depends on a 
mixture of objective (shared criteria) and subjective factors. (325) His insistence on the 
effects of subjective factors in science has led Kuhn’s critics to condemn him for 
relativising theory choice to subjective preferences, and thereby undermining the overall 
objectivity of science. In his response to the critics we find some clues about Kuhn’s 
conceptualization of objectivity. Kuhn distinguishes two senses of ‘subjective’ where one 
is used as the opposite of ‘objective’ and the other is used as the opposite of ‘judgmental’. 
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Kuhn claims that his critics are confused about these two uses when they imply that he 
reduces theory choice to a matter of taste. Matters of taste are ‘subjective’, and similar to 
reports of sensation they cannot be discussed. In contrast, judgments are claims that can 
be grounded and discussed. Take Kuhn’s example: when I state “I like this potboiler 
film”, my sensation of liking the film is not discussible, in the sense that someone who did 
not like the film cannot disagree with my report of my own sensation although they might 
think that I have bad taste. Yet my judgment that the film is a potboiler is open to 
discussion. If somebody disagrees, they can state their reasons as to why they disagree 
while “each revealing, implicitly or explicitly, something about how he judges cinematic 
merit”, and they could try to convince one another by comparing the film to similar ones, 
and so forth. (336-337) Now, Kuhn emphasizes that when he claims that subjective 
preferences play a role in theory choice he does not mean that the decision is not 
discussible. In fact, he thinks it is very important for a scientist to exhibit the bases for 
his/her choices (337).  As long as the bases of decision about theories are discussible they 
are not ‘subjective’ in the sense opposed to ‘judgmental’, hence it is not true that 
“anything goes”. Accordingly, it can be claimed that for Kuhn the effects of subjective 
factors in scientific practice do not undermine the overall objectivity of science as long as 
they do not hinder communicability. Yet there seems to be a tension in Kuhn’s position 
regarding the requirement of communicability.  
Kuhn writes, “my report that I like the film is objective unless I have lied.” (337) 
Here there is a sense of ‘objective’ which is identified or tied with the “truth” of a 
statement (where a matter of fact makes the statement true). It is in this sense that we can 
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understand why theory choice is not “objective”. As discussed above, according to Kuhn, 
because observations are theory-laden, there is no neutral point of view where two 
theories can be compared. That is, there is no single fact of the matter that we could 
appeal to in making an absolute claim about the “truth” of theories. But this situation does 
not undermine the overall objectivity of science. Kuhn claims that the proponents of 
different theories can still discuss the results achieved by the theory they have adopted, 
and try to convince one another. Surely, such attempts rest on the possibility of 
communication between two parties. Yet, as I have mentioned, Kuhn’s philosophical 
position in SSR regarding the incommensurability of different paradigms undermines the 
communicability that is required for a genuine discussion. 
In his later work “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” (1977) 
although he preserves most of his previous thoughts, Kuhn compares the situation that the 
proponents of different theories are in when faced with theory choice to native speakers of 
different languages. Similarly to the case of communication between native speakers of 
different languages which is possible through translation, proponents of different theories 
can achieve communication by means of translation. However, since translation is not 
problem free (both in the case of different languages and of different theories) there will 
be a limit to what is communicated. Moreover, in the case of different theories “the 
vocabulary of the two theories may be identical, and most words function in the same 
ways in both. But some words in the basic as well as in the theoretical vocabularies of the 
two theories—words like “star” and “planet,” “mixture” and “compound,” or “force” and 
“matter”—do function differently. Those differences are unexpected and will be 
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discovered and localized, if at all, only by repeated experience of communication 
breakdown.” (338) Yet, despite the incompleteness of communication, proponents of 
different theories can show the concrete results that their theories achieve in application to 
certain phenomena, and these impressive results might convince a few of the proponents 
who would attempt to translate one theory into another by examining published papers, 
and talking to and observing the scientists who practice the theory. If the new theory 
survives, some of these proponents meanwhile might “find that at some point in the 
language-learning process they have ceased to translate and begun instead to speak the 
language like a native.” (339) Kuhn emphasizes that in these cases no deliberate decision-
making occurs. That is why he is ambivalent about calling this process ‘theory choice’, as 
it is more like a case of conversion. 
  According to Kuhn, one reason for regarding subjective factors as human 
weaknesses that would render science irrational rather than accepting them as natural 
parts of scientific inquiry is the incompleteness of the list of methodological virtues for 
theory choice. Faith in the possibility of a well-articulated list of criteria, which would 
dictate rational choice, reinforces the denunciation of subjective factors. According to this 
point of view, the objectivity of science will be secured in the context of justification by 
means of objective criteria valid throughout the scientific community. (327) However, in 
the face of many failed attempts, such as those I have discussed with respect to 
“simplicity” to formulate the perfect list, “objective criteria” came to be regarded as an 
ideal although it is not attainable. Yet, Kuhn claims that such idealization is a result of a 
misleading scientific pedagogy where crucial experiments in well-known problems in 
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science are presented as exemplary cases of how theory choice works. But these crucial 
experiments, where evidence attained prompted scientists to favor one theory over 
another, do not display the actual processes of decision-making. The crucial experiments 
that are illustrated as exemplary cases of theory choice are always about the theories that 
eventually triumphed. For instance, in the case of the decision between oxygen theory and 
phlogiston theory, we are presented with evidence of the explanatory power of oxygen 
theory for addressing certain phenomena, while nothing is noted about phlogiston theory’s 
power of explaining other phenomena for which oxygen theory fails to account. The 
idealization of instances of theory choice which depend on these simplified examples 
masks the actual problems scientists face during processes of theory choice, and hence 
overlooks an essential part of decision making. In real situations, scientists are almost 
always faced with some good reasons for each possible choice, which is why it is 
especially important to understand the role of subjective factors in theory choice. Once it 
is understood, it becomes clear that “considerations relevant to the context of discovery 
are then relevant to justification as well; scientists who share the concerns and 
sensibilities of the individual who discovers a new theory are ipso facto likely to appear 
disproportionately frequently among that theory’s first supporters.” (328) 
  Consequently, although the five criteria mentioned for theory choice are not 
sufficient to dictate a rational decision, when treated as guiding values for theory choice 
they are useful tools. (330) According to Kuhn, as long as they are left vague in their 
specifications they could account for aspects of scientific practice which have been 
discarded as irrational by proponents of the dominant view. Since the application and 
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significance attributed to these values change in time and according to the topic of 
investigation, it is more plausible to regard them as guiding values that influence 
decisions rather than as strictly fixed rules which determine theory choice. (335) 
In sum, Kuhn’s naturalistic approach to examining science where the focus is not 
on a priori principles but on what scientists actually do when engaged in scientific 
practice led him to depart from the orthodox belief in a unique methodology that secures 
objectivity in science. According to him, subjective factors inevitably contribute to 
scientific practice (including methodology), yet we can still talk about objectivity in 
science, as there are some principles that assist theory evaluations. Although these 
principles are not universal, in so far as the scientific community agrees in endorsing 
them, they guide assessments and decision-making. Here what is achieved is not absolute 
objectivity but a provisional one which I believe is an expected outcome of a naturalistic 
approach to science.  
 
2.4   Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that different approaches to science have a significant 
bearing on understandings of objectivity. My brief discussion of central traditions in the 
philosophy of science shows that the aspects of objectivity that come under scrutiny have 
changed as the concerns and questions have shifted within different philosophical 
traditions. Yet I have recognized that some form of intersubjective examination has 
prevailed one way or another in conceptualizations of objectivity within different 
traditions. For instance, as long as conventions amount to agreements among participating 
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subjects, we can find an element of shared rules or criteria within the conventionalist 
strand of logical empiricism.  In this tradition any idiosyncratic effects of conventions on 
the content of scientific theories were believed to be preventable  (i) by confining their 
use to analytic statements; and (ii) by appealing to the impersonal method of logic. 
However, the first approach proved to be inapplicable after Quine’s challenges to the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. With respect to the second 
approach, on the other hand, the very idea that logical principles are conventions renders 
the impersonality of logic questionable. Yet even if impersonality is granted to logic, as I 
have discussed, it still fails to yield certain forms of objectivity which are sought after in 
scientific practice. Another aspect of positivism where we can trace a form of 
intersubjectivity is contained in the principle of testability. According to this principle, 
any scientific statement could, in principle, be tested and understood by anybody.  In 
other words, scientific results should be reproducible by other people who follow the 
same methodology. What the principle of testability primarily aims to do is to exclude any 
arbitrary results obtained through ways that cannot be observed and controlled publicly. 
Although the applicability of testability requires a community of people, the principle 
itself is not concerned with the particular features of the participating subjects. As long as 
subjects are capable of following the prescribed method they should be able to reproduce 
the same result. Here it can be claimed that objectivity attained through this kind of 
intersubjectivity is premised on the interchangeability of assessing subjects. This is also 
true for Popper’s emphasis on critical exchange in attaining objectivity, which requires 
interaction among multiple subjects. In both cases the differences among participating 
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subjects are at best taken as irrelevant for objectivity, or are seen as obstacles to arriving 
at objective descriptions of the world.   In Kuhn’s philosophy, however, this picture 
changes. Intersubjectivity is embedded in his view that the objective element in scientific 
practice mainly consists in following a set of shared rules adopted by the community of 
scientists for dealing with specific problems. Yet, according to Kuhn, subjective factors 
might and often do have an effect on why certain principles are adopted by certain 
scientists. However, this situation does not jeopardize objectivity as long as subjects can 
communicate their reasons as to why they prefer certain principles to others. So although 
the idea of public accountability still prevails in Kuhn’s understanding of objectivity, it is 
important to note that in his picture, unlike those of the other philosophers I have 
discussed, subjects are not reduced to abstract place-holders; they are concrete individuals 
with specific features which inform their decisions. Yet, although Kuhn maintains that 
these subjective features do not threaten objectivity in science, he does not explicitly 
argue for the idea that they might in fact contribute to it.  In the next chapter, we will see 
that feminist philosophers of science take this next step and claim that subjective values 
are not only present in every aspect of scientific practice, but also important in achieving 
objective understanding of certain phenomena. As we shall see, this approach requires 
certain modifications in our understanding of science and ideals of objectivity.
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Chapter Three 
Feminist Standpoint Theory and Objectivity 
 
In Chapter Two I discussed how science has long been accepted as the paradigm of 
“proper knowledge”. One of the most vigorous reactions to this contention came from 
feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science in the late twentieth century. In this 
chapter, I will start by briefly elucidating the main feminist concerns about the 
mainstream approach to science and its concepts, specifically the notion of objectivity. I 
suggest that feminist standpoint epistemology and contextual empiricism generate two 
noteworthy conceptualizations of objectivity that open up new venues in thinking about 
the interplay between science and values. My focus in this chapter is on feminist 
standpoint epistemology as advocated by Sandra Harding. I examine her notion of “strong 
objectivity” in an attempt to set out its strengths and shortcomings. I conclude that 
although Harding’s conceptualization of objectivity is important, it is not adequate to 
compel those who subscribe to the “received view” to change their views. 
  Chapter Two illustrated that for most of the twentieth century the dominant 
schools of thought in the philosophy of science treated science mainly as a linguistic 
entity, and they focused on semantic analyses in tackling scientific problems. Scientific 
explanations were collections of statements of facts that were logically related to one 
another. Towards the end of the century, however, philosophical groups such as wholists, 
pragmatists, sociologists, feminists and postcolonial critics challenged this picture. 
Although these groups differed in their specific concerns and proposed methodologies, 
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they were united by an emphasis on the significance of the social circumstances in which 
actual science is pursued, in general, and the contexts within which a scientific 
explanation is put forward, in particular. These developments led some philosophers, 
among them those who adhered to the empiricist tradition such as Bas van Fraassen, to 
turn their attention to the study of the pragmatics of scientific explanation.1 According to 
van Fraassen such a study starts first and foremost by clarifying the questions that are 
asked, as the content of a question depends on the context within which it is asked as well 
as on what is highlighted (sometimes tacitly) by the questioner. In order to have a genuine 
explanation, contextual features, such as the interests and background assumptions of the 
person or the group of people posing the question, need to be discerned. Another feature 
that needs attention is the cognitive status of the audience (i.e. receivers of the 
explanation). Accordingly, the background knowledge of the audience also has a bearing 
on what to include in an explanation (e.g. how detailed the explanation should be, what 
should be taken as common knowledge so that it could be excluded from the explanation 
and so forth). Other than background knowledge, the interests of the audience are also an 
important pragmatic feature of an explanation. As I have noted in Chapter Two, a 
scientific explanation is necessarily a selective enterprise. That is, in explaining a 
phenomenon we need to take into consideration not all facts, but only certain relevant 
facts. The question of how to discern which facts are relevant, however, is a challenging 
one. We have seen that the positivist programme does not have a satisfactory answer to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It should be noted, however, that according to van Fraassen, explanation is neither an 
overriding virtue nor the end of scientific inquiry.  He writes, explanation is “less a virtue 
than an anthropocentric pleasure.” (1991b, 326) 
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this question. In fact, it is debatable whether there could ever be any formal satisfactory 
answer. Yet studies of the pragmatics of explanation offer some useful insights. In the 
absence of a definite formal criterion, considering the intentions behind asking certain 
questions and providing certain explanations, as well as the interests and the background 
of the audience, can (and do) play a significant role in deciding which facts are relevant 
and which are not.   
This approach to science is drastically different from the positivist approach. 
Science is not confined to the logic of scientific knowledge but conceived more broadly. 
The study of science here encompasses the practices and the circumstances of a scientific 
community, which is constituted by scientists and practitioners, as well as by the receivers 
of scientific explanations. This conception of science, which acknowledges the dynamic 
character and the diverse features of scientific practice, has been central to feminist 
discussions of science. Various groups of feminists have developed diverse and original 
ideas in thinking about science and its workings. Before discussing two of the most 
prominent feminist theories of science let me first elaborate on some general problems 
with which feminists have taken issue. 
 
3.1   Common Feminist Concerns Regarding Scientific Knowledge 
Although feminist thought and projects were around much earlier, feminist work that 
specifically focused on the philosophy of science first came about in the late 20th century, 
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mainly inspired by the philosophies of Wittgenstein, Quine, and Kuhn.2 Feminists, as in 
all other areas of thought, have not produced a uniform theory of science. Yet despite 
their differences, feminists typically share an epistemological project of situating 
knowledge within networks of social relations of power, specifically those relating to 
gender. In contrast to the mainstream epistemological project of finding universal 
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge where knowing subjects are abstracted 
from their specific circumstances, feminists argue for the significance of taking 
subjectivity into account.3 The contention that the cognitive and the psychological status 
of subjects, as well as the social locations subjects occupy, have epistemological import 
for their knowledge claims (i.e. how those claims are made, assessed and received) are 
central to this feminist response. This conviction has led many feminists to focus on 
actual knowledge-making processes, and to analyse the specificities of the discourses that 
impact the assessments of knowledge claims. This investigation led to the argument that 
Western philosophy has systemically reproduced a discourse that serves male interests. 
Hence, in contrast to the positivist project of examining the universal features of a 
scientific method, feminists have focused on specific sciences, and have successfully 
demonstrated that the ways in which science is theorised and practiced are affected by 
Eurocentric, andocentric, class and race biased values.4 Feminists have argued that ideals 
such as autonomy, objectivity, value-neutrality and universality upon which “proper 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I should note that my discussion of feminist philosophy is confined mostly to analytic 
feminism.  
3 See Code (1993). 
4 Biases against age, sexual orientation, and disabled bodies can also be added to this list. 
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knowledge” is built reflect the characteristics of Western, upper and/or middle class, 
white men. The extent to which this occurs has meant that the results and products of the 
scientific enterprise contribute to the interests of these privileged groups while 
subjugating those  that fall outside of them.5  
Androcentrism in science has been a specific target for feminists. The prevailing 
rigid dichotomies, such as objective/subjective, mind/body, universal/particular, and 
rational/social in Western philosophy are targeted. These dichotomies have contributed to 
the subordination of women both in everyday life and in the intellectual domain. Feminist 
works reveal how the first term in each of these dichotomies has traditionally been 
identified with male characteristics, and believed to constitute a feature of “proper 
knowledge”, while the second part has typically been identified with female 
characteristics, and treated as an unreliable source of knowledge. As a result of this 
stigmatization women have often been left out of scientific practices. Feminists oppose 
this injustice by emphasizing the importance of body, emotions, particular experiences, 
and social values for knowledge production. They also question mainstream 
epistemologists’ tendency to privilege first-hand experience of a small group of subjects 
at the expense of other ways of attaining knowledge, such as testimony.6 Feminists such 
as Naomi Scheman have argued that such a dismissal is mainly a function of ignoring the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For a detailed analysis see Lloyd (1984), Keller (1985), Bordo (1987). 
6 With the development of social epistemology and virtue epistemology there has been a 
growing interest in issues of testimony in mainstream epistemology. See Goldman (1999) 
and Goldman (2001). However, this take is still different from that of many feminists in 
important ways. For instance, it still lacks the ethical and political dimension of 
testimony that feminists are concerned with.  
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epistemic dependency of knowing subjects on one another and on the rest of society. This 
issue of epistemic dependency has raised questions regarding justificatory processes that 
the mainstream has overlooked. For instance, “trustworthiness” has become significant for 
knowledge acquisition.7 
Apart from feminists’ elaborate work in demonstrating inequalities in knowledge 
production, perhaps the most important feminist reaction to mainstream philosophy of 
science is the call for a more responsible epistemology. This call extends to science and to 
a philosophy of science that works within a theoretical framework capable of 
compensating for the hitherto neglected duties of knowers and scientists. Specifically, 
feminists argue for an extension of the responsibility of scientists beyond their liability for 
what counts as evidence in the context of justification to the explicit or implicit practices 
in the context of discovery as well as the technological consequences of the scientific 
enterprise.8 Moreover, feminists emphasize the responsibility of the audience. Mainstream 
philosophy of science has ignored this responsibility, even though it has long been 
discussed among scientists themselves.9 
While sharing these common concerns, nonetheless feminists have not produced a 
monolithic theory. In their struggle for sex and gender equality, different groups of 
feminists have generated diverse points of view depending on their priorities, subject 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For an interesting account of epistemic dependency and trustworthiness see Scheman 
(2001). 
8 See Lambert (1987). 
9 Recall Daston’s example cited in the first chapter. In pursuing objectivity, some 
scientists argued for leaving the decisions to viewers in depicting the diseases exhibited 
in an image.  
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matters, and the specificities of their social locations. Accordingly, we can talk of 
different feminist theories with different epistemological imports. Some aspects of these 
theories can be complementary to one another, while others are not in certain respects.10 
Two of the most prominent feminist theories requiring discussion are feminist standpoint 
theory and contextual empiricism.  
 
3.2    Feminist Standpoint Theory 
One of the first and perhaps most influential feminist reactions to mainstream philosophy 
of science came from feminist standpoint theory (FST). Notably, this theory is elaborated 
in the works of Nancy Hartsock, Sandra Harding, Patricia Hill Collins and Hilary Rose. 
To help understand and oppose women’s subjugation, which extends to all areas of life 
including the intellectual domain, these works of FST drew inspiration from Marxist 
standpoint theory and Marxian epistemology. Nancy Hartsock, for instance, draws 
parallels between Marxian explanations of the differences between the ruling classes’ 
(capitalists’) vision of the world and the ruled (proletariat) vision, and the differences 
between male and female visions. Central to standpoint theories is the idea that society’s 
material conditions (specifically, those material conditions pertaining to the social 
relations of production in Marxist standpoint theory) structure and limit everyone’s vision 
of the world. Accordingly, the social positions and lived realities of the proletariat (and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I will discuss this issue further in the following. 
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women) are structurally different from the ruling classes’ (and men’s) standpoints.11 
Standpoint theorists claim that these differences have important epistemological 
consequences. For instance, to explain the epistemic superiority of a proletariat vision, 
Marx’s labour theory of value demonstrates the differences arising from the perspective of 
exchange and the perspective of production that reflect different social relations of power 
between the buyer and the seller of labour power. (Marx, 1891) From the perspective of 
exchange and the ruling capitalist class, the relation between the seller and the buyer of 
labour power is viewed as one of equals. The worker is seen as a free agent who sells his 
or her labour to the capitalist. However, such an explanation, according to Marx, is 
feasible only at the level of appearance (which is partial and perverse). From the 
perspective of production and labour, on the other hand, the relation between the worker 
and the capitalist is drastically different. The exchange is not one of equals, as all workers 
have to sell their labour power to survive. For Marx, the perspective of production reveals 
the structural inequalities embedded in capitalist social relations and class dynamics. Only 
by revealing the inner workings of capitalism can one understand the real or essential 
nature of the class structure that systematically exploits workers.12 In similar ways, 
feminists have argued that in order to understand sex and gender inequalities embedded in 
social relations, a feminist standpoint is required. Here, a feminist vision does not merely 
reveal the reality of women’s lives, which is often ignored or misrepresented by male 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Of course we should keep in mind that different categories of social identity cut across 
each other. For instance, the ruling classes also include women, to a greater or lesser 
extent.  
12 A detailed account of this analysis can be found in Hartsock (1987).  
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vision, but it also provides the correct vision for understanding social relations. In order to 
grasp how a specific vision could reveal the real nature of things we need to understand 
what a standpoint amounts to.  
A standpoint is not a mere position or perspective. Any group of people who share 
a social location may also have a perspective in common without critically deliberating 
about it. A standpoint, on the other hand, “arises when people occupying a subordinate 
social location engage in political struggle to change the conditions of their lives and so 
engage in an analysis of these conditions in order to change them.” (Potter 2006, 131-2) 
In order to achieve a standpoint people need to first become aware of their social location 
and its relation to the general social, political, economic, and gendered organization of 
society.13 Because the ruling classes (dominant groups) disproportionately structure 
material relations, their collective vision of the world tends to dominate throughout 
society. To the extent that dominant social forces are successful, their social power often 
becomes less visible, more difficult to detect, and harder to oppose. The gendered 
production of scientific knowledge is one such case. As dominant groups tend to shape 
social life to their benefit, they also seek to regulate the production of knowledge. In turn, 
this regulation helps to reinforce the hegemony of the dominant group and its power to 
shape the social world. (Potter 2006, 133) That is why, in order to break or change this 
vicious circle, a standpoint requires perpetual reflection.  It also requires vigorous self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The fact that a standpoint is an achieved position is very important. In the next chapter 
I will argue that Longino’s account of objectivity should incorporate some of FST’s 
ideas. There the idea that a standpoint should be achieved by the marginalized themselves 
will be significant for my argument. 
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reflection. However, one needs to be careful in making this claim as it might be 
misleading to think that individuals are basic epistemic agents for standpoint theory. Of 
course, an individual can (and must) self-reflect on her social location, analyze prevailing 
social conditions, and become aware of the hidden impacts of the dominant vision. 
However, as long as standpoint theory requires a political struggle to change the dominant 
vision, reflection is primarily a communal engagement.14 
The claims of standpoint theory are not only about the social world but also the 
natural world. As Hartsock writes, “A standpoint, however, carries with it the contention 
that some perspectives on society from which, however well-intentioned one may be, the 
real relations of humans with each other and with the natural world are not visible.” 
(Hartsock, 1987, 159) Accordingly, standpoint theory’s assertion that a correct vision of 
the world and of prevailing social relations of dominance are available only from the 
position of the oppressed has important epistemic implications for scientific objectivity. 
For instance, it implies that a female vision, as an oppressed vision, leads to less partial 
and less distorted beliefs than a view that appears to come from nowhere, and hence 
provides more “objective” knowledge of the world. However, incorporating this 
“objectivity” into the idea of socially situated knowledge has proved to be a difficult one. 
Sandra Harding offers a promising attempt to overcome this difficulty.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “Consciousness raising” activities in the 1960s is a good indication of standpoint 
theory’s communal character. 
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3.3   Sandra Harding’s Feminist Standpoint Theory and Strong Objectivity 
In Whose Science, Whose Knowledge (1991) Harding argues that the so-called tension 
between socially situated knowledge and objective knowledge is one of the effects of 
mainstream philosophy of science. In mainstream philosophy of science, objectivity is 
typically associated with impartiality, disinterestedness, impersonality and value-
neutrality.15 These ideals mainly stem from features attributed to the subjects and objects 
of knowledge.  In mainstream empiricist epistemology, knowledge is by definition 
universal. It follows that the subjects of knowledge must also be socially and historically 
disembodied and interchangeable. The objectivity of scientific explanation is accordingly 
premised on formal relations between disembodied subjects and objects that exist out 
there in the world untouched by human intervention. Moreover, since knowledge should 
be consistent and coherent, mainstream empiricists claim that subjects must be 
homogeneous and unitary to the extent that they are interchangeable. In contrast to the 
subjects of knowledge, the objects of knowledge that science describes and explains are 
determinate in space and time, and they are free from social impacts. (Harding, 1993) In 
other words, they have a mind-independent existence.16 Mainstream epistemology 
contends that without these features scientific research cannot produce “proper 
knowledge” as there would not be any reasonable (rational) standard that could 
distinguish knowledge from mere opinion. Adherents to this view argue that the absence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  It is important to recall, however, that when we have a close look at the historical 
practices we see that these ideals of objectivity are often in tension with one another and 
cannot be endorsed simultaneously, as I discussed in the first chapter.   
16 I will have an elaborate discussion of mind-independent facts in Chapter Five.  
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of such standards would lead to epistemic relativism. In other words, if we give up on the 
possibility of a value-free point of view secured by abstract subjects and universal 
standards, then we foreclose all hope of rationally disagreeing with opposing worldviews. 
Since FST is neither impersonal nor disinterested or value-free, mainstream theorists 
charge that it cannot yield objectivity. 
Within the framework of objectivity which is associated with the ideals of 
impartiality, disinterestedness, impersonality and value-neutrality, a standpoint position 
indeed appears to be of no help in producing “objective” knowledge.17 Adherents to FST 
argue that because the subjects of knowledge are in fact embodied, research will always 
convey features of the subjects’ social locations. Knowledge is inevitably and always 
socially and historically situated. Furthermore, the objects of scientific research are never 
“pure” in the sense of being out there in nature and untouched by human intervention. 
Instead they are social objects as they convey “the contemporary general cultural 
meaning” which is often shaped by the conventions among and within scientific 
communities present and past. (1993, 64) Many contributors to FST consequently argue 
that it is communities, instead of primarily individuals, who produce knowledge. The 
argument for communally-generated knowledge is founded on two grounds: First, our 
thoughts reflect the ethos of our time and (cultural and geographical) space. Second, our 
personal beliefs are transformed into knowledge when they are socially legitimated. (65) 
From these contentions, feminists hold that the subjects of knowledge are heterogeneous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Harding identifies this understanding of objectivity tied to impersonality, impartiality, 
disinterestedness and value-neutrality as “objectivism”.  
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and multiple.18 The response of mainstream epistemologists is that this view inhibits 
objectivity as it allows for contradictory and incoherent accounts which undermine the 
universality of knowledge. For Harding, however, the choice between adopting universal 
standards in order to have an objective view or falling into epistemic relativism is a false 
dichotomy. In fact, the objectivism of mainstream philosophy of science itself is 
responsible for this false dichotomy. According to Harding, surrendering universal 
standards does not necessarily lead to a vicious epistemic relativism where there is no 
possibility of judging competing accounts.19 This is a very important point for the 
consistency of feminist conceptions of objectivity and I shall proceed with examining it in 
detail. 
 
3.3.1    Feminist Standpoint Theory and Epistemic Relativism 
FST’s contention that social locations structure beliefs and the norms by which these 
beliefs are assessed leads to the idea that different social locations generate different and 
sometimes contradictory beliefs and/or accounts regarding the same phenomena.20 In 
order to have a sound inquiry into the relationship between FST and epistemic relativism 
we need to have a closer look at what this contention amounts to. At first glance this line 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This point also distances FST from classical Marxism. As Potter puts it, according to 
Marxism a proletarian standpoint yields a disinterested and objective account. Here, 
similar to the traditional empiricist conception of the universal knower, the proletariat is 
the unitary epistemic agent. (Potter 2006, 135) 
19 Interestingly, Harding notes that this false dichotomy has been embraced both by the 
proponents of universal standards and those who tolerate epistemic relativism as the cost 
of their insistence on the situatedness of knowledge. (1991, 139) 
20 Recall the Marxian explanation about diverse accounts given by the ruling class and 
the ruled on the social relations among them.  
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of thought might seemingly lead to “Truth relativism” where each (contradictory) account 
is admitted as equally true. However, at the heart of standpoint theory is the claim that 
some of these accounts (or beliefs) are less distorted than others. All claims, therefore, are 
not equally true. The grounds on which we decide which accounts are less distorted are, 
nonetheless, a challenging question for FST. This problem does not arise in a 
philosophical system that is committed to universal truths. According to this position, 
there could only be one true account of the same phenomenon. This view is an expression 
of a commitment to a correspondence theory of truth and the mind-independent existence 
of an absolute reality. Hence, within such a system evaluating whether a belief is distorted 
or not becomes a function of its correspondence to (absolute) reality.  In other words, 
distorted accounts are merely false accounts. Nevertheless, those who advocate for FST 
do not share these commitments. They often talk of degrees of distortion and “truer” 
accounts. Objectivists find a tension in FST’s insistence on more or less distorted 
accounts. Their objection runs as follows. On the one hand, FST claims that starting off 
research from the point of view and experiences of women provides less partial and less 
distorted stories about the social and natural world than research which reflects men’s 
vision. Yet, this view seems to imply a value-neutral position against which we can decide 
that women’s stories are less partial. On the other hand, FST criticizes claims for the 
existence of one true story generated from a value-neutral point of view. In fact, the 
consistency of FST is difficult to grasp without understanding Marxist ideas of different 
but interrelated levels of reality (the totality). Roughly put, there is a story of the world 
told by the dominant group and another that could be told by the oppressed. The dominant 
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group seeks to structure accounts of the world to their benefit and to have their accounts 
accepted as True. However, these partial accounts produced by the dominant group are 
revealed to be far from true, incomplete, distorting, and mistaken when looked at from the 
lives of the oppressed. Since the account of the oppressed group is more accurate and 
comprehensive than the dominant group’s it is less partial and less distorted. But why not 
just accept that the dominant view is false and the oppressed view true? Because unlike 
orthodox Marxists, feminist standpoint theorists emphasize that social relations cut across 
various complex aspects of life. For FST there can be social locations other than those of 
the proletariat (or of women) that could produce more accurate accounts of certain 
phenomena. Claiming that any specific group produces the true account overlooks the 
heterogeneity and fluidity of networks of domination. For FST claims of less partial 
accounts are made in relation to the dominant view. Hence these claims are supported not 
by the value-neutrality of the views of the oppressed, but by being situated in a certain 
way within systems of domination that generate a critical viewpoint.   
Another form of relativism that FST’s contention could yield is “Judgmental 
relativism” that I discuss in the second chapter with respect to Kuhn’s position. Recall 
that Judgmental relativism inhibits dialog and comparisons of alternative accounts. If all 
beliefs and/or accounts are inevitably functions of social locations as FST maintains, then 
there is no value-free point of view against which these beliefs could be evaluated. What 
this implies is that a claim could be accepted as “reasonable” or “rational” according to 
one point of view (of a social location) while the same claim could be deemed 
“unreasonable” or “irrational” according to another point of view. According to the 
	   127	  
objectivist, in the absence of a value-free point of view there could be no “reasonable” 
standards for evaluating and deciding between competing claims. In other words, FST’s 
contention reinforces claims of “anything goes” and makes rational disagreement among 
different points of view impossible. However, this cannot be true for FST because, as 
Donna Haraway argues, endorsing “anything goes” is as dangerous and problematic as 
defending “a view from nowhere” or a “God’s eye point of view”. Similar to a “God’s eye 
point of view”, “anything goes” amounts to being everywhere at once and nowhere in 
particular. This contradicts hardcore beliefs in the embodiment of subjects, which 
feminists fiercely defend. Although feminist standpoint theorists acknowledge that 
different social groups have different patterns of belief and different standards for judging 
them, FST does not lead to a form of relativism that inhibits genuine dialogue and rational 
disagreement among different worldviews. Nor does it deny that there is a real world out 
there to which theories of knowledge have to respond in some appropriate way. On the 
contrary, the fact that a standpoint is an achieved position makes dialogue and 
disagreement possible, and indeed necessary. Given enough effort and will, any group, 
regardless of its social location, can in principle come to understand (if not agree with) the 
opposed point of view. In order to understand (and reject) the accusation of Judgemental 
relativism against FST we need to examine different conceptions of rationality.   
The objectivist attack on FST can be summarized as follows. Proper knowledge 
requires rational standards that could distinguish knowledge from mere opinion. FST’s 
contention that social locations structure beliefs conflicts with endorsement of rational 
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standards. Hence, FST does not yield proper knowledge. Let’s have a close examination 
of the two premises that this conclusion derives from.  
It is true that knowledge requires standards that distinguish it from mere opinion. 
It is also true that these epistemic standards cannot be random if we can reliably follow 
them in our knowledge ascriptions.  So the problem that needs to be solved is how to 
escape randomness of standards. Often, randomness is avoided by attributing necessity to 
these standards. Of course, there are different forms of necessity such as metaphysical, 
epistemic, moral and so forth, each of which might have different implications for my 
discussion. But let me be content with claiming that in general the necessity of epistemic 
standards is grounded in their universality. But in what sense these standards are universal 
should be clarified. Also we need to examine whether there are other ways of accounting 
for the necessity of epistemic standards without endorsing universalism. Does the 
universality of epistemic standards imply that there is a fixed set of epistemic standards 
that (should) apply to all knowledge claims regardless of their content and context? If so, 
then the criterion of universality is excessively demanding, as the subjects (and objects) of 
knowledge vary to a great extent. Finding a set of standards that applies to all knowledge 
claims with their diversity in nature and content seems to be implausible. Perhaps we do 
not need to endorse the universality of epistemic standards in order to account for the 
necessity of these standards. We can, for instance, argue that certain epistemic standards 
are necessary for certain subject matters in certain circumstances. 21  Hence, although we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For instance the epistemic standards that we operate with in claiming to know, say, 
when the next train departs would not exactly be the same as the standards that we 
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cannot talk of a priori standards waiting to be applied in all epistemic circumstances and 
activities, we can talk of epistemic standards that are fixed by their contingent 
circumstances. In this view, deciding on which epistemic standards to adopt is not a 
random matter, as not all standards can be applied for any specific content and context. 
Now, if there is a way to reconcile the necessity of epistemic standards with the idea that 
contingent factors such as contextual conditions have a bearing on which standards of 
knowledge to adopt, we could conclude that FST does not conflict with the idea that 
knowledge requires “rational” standards. I understand that the relationship between 
rationality and universality is a controversial topic, and I do not intend to resolve long-
lasting disputes regarding this matter in this limited space. However, I believe that the 
connection between rationality and universality is not as straightforward as is often 
accepted.  
The dispute about rationality and universality often revolves around the 
controversy over assessing the rationality of competing accounts of a phenomenon.22 The 
“scientific” explanation of a thunderstorm and ancient people’s explanation of the same 
phenomenon by appealing to the anger of Zeus is one such example. It is often maintained 
that the former is a rational explanation, whereas the latter is an irrational explanation. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
operate with in affirming or denying a relation between certain behaviors and specific 
hormone levels, as the latter is a far more complex phenomenon than the first one. Or as 
contextualists argue, when the stakes are high we tend to appeal to stricter epistemic 
standards and deny having knowledge of a certain phenomenon which otherwise we 
would have claimed to know.  
22 Strangely, the discussion about rationality of competing accounts often involves a 
comparison between drastically different worldviews. See Boghossian (2006); Wilson 
(1974). However, the problem of theory choice is by no means limited to cases where 
two theories are drastically different.    
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examining this view, let’s start with some basics. Very simply put, rationality is what is 
present in the state of being rational and being rational refers to thinking and acting in 
accordance with reason and/or logic. A rational belief, for instance, is a belief that is 
sensible and logical, i.e. consistent with the principles of logic. According to the view that 
the principles of logic are universal, the rationality or irrationality of a belief does not vary 
across different cultures or systems of thought. However, rationality is also a normative 
term and an ascription of rationality implies an achievement. For instance, one’s beliefs 
are rational if they conform to one’s reasons to believe. Hence, they are rational if they are 
self-consistent (or internally consistent). Even with this basic information we can think of 
different ways of approaching the issue of rationality and universality. For example, we 
can claim that explaining thunderstorms as acts of a capricious god is irrational because it 
is not logically consistent. However, we can also reasonably claim that such an 
explanation is rational because it is consistent with the features of the worldview of which 
it is a product. In other words, it is self-consistent. Which principle should “we” appeal to 
in judging the rationality of an account? A problem with the first view is that there are 
compelling arguments about the conventional character of logical principles, as I 
mentioned in the previous chapter. If these arguments are correct, then appealing to 
logical principles in assessing rationality does not provide the universality that the 
objectivist seeks. If the principles of logic are indeed conventions of the western 
worldview, then any judgment based on them cannot go any further than being an 
application of the principle of self-consistency within the Western world. Some might 
claim that this principle of self-consistency is also a principle of logic and even if some 
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principles might be conventional, some others, such as this one, are universal, hence our 
assessments can rest on these principles. But applying the principle of self-consistency in 
assessing rationality would not provide us with a definite answer as to whether an account 
is rational by itself or not (which is what objectivists seem to be after). On the contrary, it 
would compel us to qualify our assessments. Rather than claiming that “the ancient 
explanation for a thunderstorm is irrational”, we should state “according to the Western 
point of view the ancient explanation for a thunderstorm is irrational because it is not 
consistent with Western standards”. This qualification, however, is not compatible with 
the idea that there is one and only one rational explanation for the same phenomenon.  
Does this conclusion imply that we cannot “rationally” compare two competing 
explanations? I think accepting this conclusion would be an extension of a misleading 
belief that there can be a priori assessments about the rationality of an account, decision 
or action. This misleading belief often neglects the sense of rationality that refers to goal-
directedness. Steven Lukes, for instance, identifies different senses of rational action.23 In 
the widest sense, it is simply goal-directed-action.24 This sense of rationality dictates that 
there cannot be a sensible assessment of the rationality of two competing accounts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In talking about the irrationality of a belief or set of beliefs, Lukes notes that beliefs are 
irrational if they are illogical (inconsistent or self-contradictory), partially or wholly false, 
nonsensical, situationally specific or ad hoc, based on insufficient evidence and held 
uncritically. (Lukes 1974, 207) 
24 More elaborate formulations of rationality with respect to goal-directedness are “the 
sense in which an action is said to be (maximally) rational if what is in fact the most 
efficient means is adopted to achieve a given end”;  “the sense in which the means that is 
believed by the agents to be the most efficient is adopted to achieve the agent’s end 
(whatever it may be); “ the sense in which an action is in fact conducive to the agent’s 
(expressed or unexpressed) ‘long-term’ ends”; “the sense in which the agent’s ends are 
the ends he ought to have.” (Lukes 1974, 208) 
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without considering the very goal “we” want to achieve in choosing one explanation over 
the other. In other words, “we” make assessments of rationality against a background of 
beliefs and intentions even if “we” are often not aware of them.  Hence, “we” deem the 
ancient explanation of thunderstorms irrational because it does not suit “our” western 
belief in an orderly universe, and our goal of achieving an account of the universe that 
reflects this order. Some might object to applying this “teleological” sense of rationality in 
deciding between two competing accounts, as this sense concerns actions and belongs to 
the practical domain. However, we have seen in the previous chapter that some of the 
widely accepted epistemic principles for “rational” decisions, such as simplicity or 
fruitfulness, also convey practical concerns. Moreover, whatever it is grounded in, at the 
end of the day decision-making is a form of action.  
Returning to the question of whether “we” can “rationally” compare two 
competing accounts, I suggest that as long as “we” can clearly set out the goals and 
intentions behind each explanation as well as “our” (assessors’) motivations in assessing 
these accounts, “we” can sensibly compare them. Of course, this view is predicated on the 
ideas that i) motivations are discernable and ii) adherents to different worldviews can at 
some level understand one another.  In other words, it assumes that there is some common 
ground among different worldviews that allows for adequate communication.25 Once we 
set out the intention(s) behind an explanation, then we can assess its rationality with 
respect to its success in achieving the intended goal. Accordingly, if two competing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Donald Davidson’s claim that there cannot be drastically different conceptual 
frameworks lends support to this idea. 
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explanations share the same goal that “we” intend to achieve, we can reasonably deem the 
one which achieves (or comes close to achieving) this goal as rational and the other—if it 
fails to achieve the intended goal—as irrational. For example, in assessing the rationality 
of the “scientific” and the ancient explanation of a thunderstorm, “we” need first to clarify 
the intended motive behind these explanations as well as the underlying motive that 
assessors (“us”) want to achieve in choosing one explanation over the other.  Although 
there is no definite answer to the question of what science is, it is fair to claim that science 
aims at systematic understanding, predicting and controlling the world. If the ancient 
explanation shares this aim, then “we” can claim that it is not a “rational” explanation, 
because although it succeeds in giving some sense to phenomena it fails to systematically 
predict and control the world.26 If, on the other hand, the ancient explanation merely aims 
to cope with the world by attributing some sense (whatever it may be) to phenomena then 
it is rational as long as it achieves its end.27  
What this discussion indicates is that we cannot reasonably assess the rationality 
of an account by appealing to the standards endorsed by another account for a specific 
goal, if the account under assessment does not share that goal. The absence of a common 
goal or intention, however, does not altogether prevent comparisons among different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Here I do not suggest that science is the only paradigm for rational thought. What I 
claim is that we can deem the ancient account irrational if we intend to have explanations 
that lead to systematic understanding and controlling of phenomena.  
27 This conclusion is unlikely to be accepted by those who endorse a necessary relation 
between “truth” and “rationality”. According to them a “false” explanation cannot be 
rational. But such a commitment will run into serious problems when we question the 
rational status of falsified theories. For instance, should we conclude that phlogiston 
theory is irrational because it provided a false explanation?  
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accounts, as we can still discuss the worth, morality and/or utility of the pursued goal and 
the underlying intentions of different accounts. But this would be a meta-level discussion 
where social, moral and political considerations come into play. In other words, the 
decision on which explanation to endorse cannot ultimately be grounded on purely 
epistemic grounds. Yet, it is not unreasonable to think of two cultures coming together 
and discussing the grounds (including the intentions) on which their beliefs on, say, 
thunderstorms rest. If one culture manages to convince the other about the efficiency of 
their standards (as well as the worth of the result which their standards aim to achieve), 
then they could agree on which principle(s) to adopt in assessing judgments regarding 
thunderstorms. However, the mutual agreement would not make the principle universal. 
In sum, objectivist reactions to FST mainly stem from its identification of 
objectivity with value freedom. According to objectivists, the ideals of value-neutrality 
and disinterestedness are intrinsically related to rationality because they seemingly 
reinforce the unity and universality of knowledge. But the relation between rationality and 
universality is not beyond doubt. Many feminists, among them Harding, have argued that 
identifying objectivity with value freedom is misleading and dangerous. Objectivism 
prescribes that a value free and impartial objectivity should guide scientific research. In 
doing this, it indiscriminately ignores the historical and social values and interests that in 
practice shape the agendas, contents and results of science. Hence, Harding concludes that 
objectivism yields a partial and distorted explanation of the growth and success of 
science. Let me now elaborate on Harding’s critique of the identification of objectivity 
with value freedom. 
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3.3.2    Harding’s Critique of Objectivity as Value Freedom 
Harding questions the efficiency and plausibility of pursuing absolute value freedom in 
scientific research. She specifies two problems with the objectivist conception of 
objectivity: first, she argues that in certain ways objectivity is conceptualized too 
narrowly, and second, in other ways it is conceptualized too broadly. (Harding 1991, 143-
4)  
According to Harding, objectivity is conceptualized too narrowly, and therefore 
weakly, because although it is supposed to help identify all of the social values embedded 
in scientific practice and eliminate them, what it could at best do is “identify and eliminate 
only those social values and interests that differ among the researchers and critics who are 
regarded by the scientific community as competent to make such judgments.” (143) 
Hence, shared (biased) values of the scientific community are not detected, because when 
values are shared by the whole community, they become invisible.  Since these values 
operate in various parts of scientific practice, from problem selections to data and 
evidence evaluations, they inevitably affect the outcome. A dangerous result, then, is that 
biased outcomes of research pass into “normal science”, i.e. they are accepted as yielding 
“objective” scientific knowledge. Hence, in objectivist conceptualizations, the ideal of 
objectivity fails to achieve what it purports to achieve.  
Objectivity is also conceptualized too broadly by objectivists because of its 
insistence on the elimination of all social values. For Harding, though, not all social 
values and interests are “bad”. In fact, certain social values are often the force behind 
progress in science: social values help to depict problems, to decide on how to proceed 
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with research, and to foster or impede the acceptance of theories. In other words, social 
values are present both in the context of discovery and of justification.   
While this last claim is controversial for objectivists, real examples in the history 
of scientific accomplishments support it. For instance, certain religious and philosophical 
commitments played a role in the acceptance of theories regarding the motions of planets. 
Some led to false models that hindered scientific progress while others contributed to 
adopting better models. Notably, the ancient Greeks’ commitment to ideals of an orderly 
universe, wherein the planets must move in perfectly circular motions with uniform speed, 
influenced subsequent explanations of the planets’ movements. When anomalies 
appeared, these were explained away (or hidden) by incorporating more and more 
epicycles into the model. Although earlier heliocentric models were more accurate in 
certain respects, dominant social forces favoured geocentric models—irrespective of their 
failure to explain certain phenomena—because geocentrism fit better with the other 
prevailing beliefs and structures of social power of the time, such as Aristotelian physics 
and the scriptures that kept man at the centre of the universe. Eventually, Ptolemy’s 
geocentric model which required multiple epicycles, and which embraced circular 
motions for planets, triumphed over other simpler but non-circular models which also fit 
the observed data. Nevertheless, the Ptolemaic model violated the ideal of uniform 
motion. According to this ideal all motion in the heavens is constant and circular. In this 
model basic planetary motions were accounted for by attaching planets to epicycles. Yet, 
this was not enough to explain the detailed motions of planets on the celestial sphere. 
Hence, the model was modified (e.g. epicycles themselves were placed on other 
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epicycles) numerous times. Finally Copernicus’s heliocentric model took over after being 
refined by Kepler who denied that perfect circles and uniform motion could account for 
the motion of planets. It is important to note that although the heliocentric model violated 
traditional ideals, it still conveyed a commitment, a faith in the order of the cosmos that 
has prevailed since the time of Pythagoras.28 It should also be emphasized that the 
acceptance of Copernicus’s model was not due merely to its predictive value or its 
compatibility with data, for the Ptolemaic model also fit the observed data, and produced 
remarkable mathematical accuracy. What this episode in the history of science shows is 
that certain social values affect the choice of a prevailing theory, with sometimes positive 
and sometimes negative effects. While this episode too could be explained away as 
belonging to a time when science was in its infant stages whereas today’s mature science 
is immune to such “external” factors, a careful look at some of the 20th century’s most 
important discoveries again reveals how social values still shape scientific practice.  
The interplay between interests and scientific practice becomes more apparent 
when we consider why certain research programmes commence at certain times and in 
certain places. How research on yellow fever started off is one such example. Yellow 
fever was endemic throughout tropical Africa and Latin America. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, combating this disease became “scientifically” important because the 
US was planning to increase its presence in Latin America. US authorities commissioned 
a research team composed of bacteriologists and physicians to study how yellow fever 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For a detailed explanation of this shift from the Ptolemaic model to the Copernican 
model see Haely (2008).  
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spread. The team concluded that a certain virus, often carried by a particular mosquito 
species (Aedes egypti) that is widespread in subtropical regions, was the cause of the 
disease. Once ways of eradicating the mosquito were discovered, authorities introduced it 
into places such as Panama where the disease was endemic. This process enabled 
American contractors to begin constructing the Panama Canal.29 American interest in 
mitigating the effects of yellow fever are evident, yet its interest also ended up saving 
thousands of lives.30  
An objectivist would likely deny the relevance to scientific methodology of 
interests in commencing certain projects. Such issues, after all, are confined to the context 
of discovery not of justification. However, such an understanding of science is not only 
narrow but also dangerous: dangerous because this view strips the most significant forms 
of responsibility—e.g. responsibility for life—from science and scientists. It generates a 
picture of science and scientists whose responsibility is only to the data. In the event of a 
catastrophe a scientist, with a clear conscience, can claim that s/he did what s/he was 
commissioned to do. This possibility is not unlike the American pilot’s response after 
bombing Hiroshima—it was his patriotic duty to do the right thing. But what justifies 
attributing this “amoral” status to scientists? What gives scientists the ring of Gyges, 
enabling them to do what they will without being seen, i.e. being responsible? These 
questions cannot arise in an understanding of science confined to the so-called context of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This example is taken from Lee (2002). 
30 Of course there are the issues of how the building of the Canal and the American 
presence affected the ecosystem or the lives of people in the region. Hence, discussions 
of the benefits of values in science need to be qualified.  
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justification. An objectivist might claim that these questions do not belong to 
“philosophy” of science, but to the “ethics” of science. However, although a question such 
as whether experimenting on animals is right or wrong is relatively easy to distinguish as 
an ethical question rather than a scientific one, certain moral considerations are so 
intertwined in scientific practice that they become essential parts of the methodology and 
the evaluation. In such cases, the distinction between proper “philosophy” and “ethics” 
becomes blurred. One of the most prominent examples of this collaboration between 
“philosophy” and “ethics” can be found in the works of Barbara McClintock in plant 
genetics.  
Although McClintock’s discovery of genetic transposition changed the course of 
studies in genetics, it was not appreciated at the time. Briefly, her discovery was that not 
all genes are fixed on their chromosomes. That is, there are some parts of DNA that can 
move around from one place to another, and that have a big impact on other genes around 
them. Her insistence on studying inheritance in organisms such as the maize plant, which 
can produce one generation each year, puzzled her contemporaries who were working on 
flies or microbes that reproduce frequently. Yet her work on identifying particular regions 
on a maize plant’s chromosomes led her to be able to spot when a gene had moved. (Lee 
2002, 111) According to Evelyn Fox Keller, who has done extensive work on 
McClintock’s views of nature and science, the initial incomprehension of and dissent 
against her work was due to vast differences between her vision of biological organization 
and that of her colleagues (Keller 1996, 161). Unlike her contemporaries who sought 
unities in nature, McClintock’s methodology rested primarily on “respecting differences 
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in nature”. According to McClintock, nature is far more complex than our human minds 
can fully comprehend. Therefore, fitting everything into a set of dogmatic explanations 
should be resisted. This distinct methodology, which informed the questions she asked as 
well as the explanations she sought, led McClintock to detect phenomena that her 
colleagues failed to see. McClintock’s insistence on respecting individual differences and 
her willingness to explore these differences (rather than discarding them as exceptions or 
aberrations) led to her observing a different pattern of pigmentation on a few kernels of a 
single corn plant. This observation then led to the discovery of genetic transposition. 
(163) 
For McClintock the principle of respecting differences in nature consists in 
“listening to the material” and valuing the uniqueness of each organism. This principle 
was followed by paying due respect to the integrity of one’s subject matter (in 
McClintock’s case, the integrity of each kernel). Here McClintock’s methodology 
intersects with ethics. As long as ethics govern our modes of conduct (including scientific 
conduct) the required intimacy with objects of thought doubles both as a principle of 
thought and a moral consideration. In other words, “listening to nature” is an epistemic 
principle which aims at revealing the nature of the material at hand. Yet it is also an 
ethical principle which guides us in determining how to approach a subject matter. This 
double act suggests that it is through a moral way of approaching nature that we can 
adequately understand its workings.  However, for some this intimacy puts objectivity in 
question. Still, Keller notes that “McClintock can risk the suspension of boundaries 
between subject and object without jeopardy to science precisely because, to her, science 
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is not premised on that division.” (164) Within philosophies that do not rest on a 
subject/object dichotomy the interplay between philosophy and ethics can be seen more 
clearly. It is in these philosophies that we can find new and fruitful ways of 
conceptualizing objectivity.  
Once it is accepted that social values affect science and that some effects are better 
than others for the progress of science, the question that follows is which values are better 
and why. For FST, the standpoints of women and the values associated with those  
standpoints are better because, as a result of historically being an oppressed group, they 
are better situated than men to generate new and critical questions about both women’s 
and men’s lives, and the world around them.31 One compelling problem with this position 
is that there might be cases where the values of the dominant group could help science 
progress more fully than the values of the oppressed group. Harding’s discussion of how 
modern science has historically been led by western, bourgeois, and patriarchal values 
admits that these values have had both positive and negative effects on the development 
of science. Accordingly, we are compelled to accept that starting research from women’s 
standpoints would not have uniform, universally positive results of the kind Harding 
anticipates. This recognition does not necessarily weaken FST. For Harding, FST “wants 
to eliminate dominant group interests and values from the results of research as well as 
the interests and values of successfully colonized minorities—loyalty to femininity as 
well as masculinity is to be eliminated through feminist research.” (Harding 1993, 74) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 It is important to note that the oppression of women varies across class, race, age and 
so forth.  
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The main concern of FST is not merely to replace the male standpoint with an exclusively 
female one, but with a critical vision that reveals invisible biases in dominant thought. 
Except perhaps for a radically exclusionist feminist group, FST’s assertion of the 
advantages of starting research from women’s lives is not grounded on intrinsic features 
of womanhood. Rather, FST focuses on features of the ways in which women are situated 
as a result of social and historical marginalization. Because marginalization often prompts 
a critical stance in relation to established orthodoxies, a feminist standpoint can be more 
prone to detecting gender inequalities within a practice. According to FST, the decision 
about which values could provide better accounts, and help scientific progress requires 
rigorous analysis of the historical and material conditions within which a research study is 
undertaken, alongside a consideration of who benefits from it, and whose interests are 
being served or dismissed. Such analysis constitutes the heart of Harding’s 
conceptualization of “strong objectivity”. 
 
3.3.3   Strong Objectivity 
According to Harding, the existence and role of social values within scientific practice 
calls for a “strong objectivity” which requires “strong reflexivity”, i.e. a critical 
examination of how nature as the object of human knowledge is constituted in social 
thought. Such inquiry includes a broad analysis and a systematic examination of the social 
values that shape scientific community and practice. Since female vision has historically 
been undervalued in the formation of scientific thought, and “normal” assumptions and 
practices of science have generally been structured by male vision, starting off from 
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women’s lives would help shed light on discrepancies within the “normal view” that 
could otherwise remain invisible. This suggestion, however, is by no means definitive. 
There are problems with ascribing epistemic privilege to a particular group, which I will 
discuss in the next section. For this reason I maintain that interpretative and genealogical 
analyses of relations of power and social imagery should complement “strong 
objectivity”. 
  It is true that “strong objectivity”, which requires a rigorous study of the social 
sources of beliefs (including false beliefs), might be too idealistic and as unattainable as 
the objectivist ideal of eliminating all social values within scientific practice. 
Nevertheless, according to Harding, strong objectivity can be accepted as a desirable 
standard, adoption of which could improve science. By contrast, pursuing the mainstream 
ideal of eliminating all social values within science (i.e. value-free objectivity) benefits 
only the interests of dominating classes by reinforcing the illusion that human ideas can 
systematically transcend their specific historical location. This illusion discourages any 
attempt to analyse and show how the ideal of “disinterested” science maximizes the 
interests of the dominant classes. It also offers hope that scientists and scientific 
institutions “can produce claims that will be regarded as objectively valid without having 
to examine critically their own historical commitments from which, intentionally or not, 
they actively construct their scientific research.” (Harding 1993, 71) Thus, as I discuss 
above, one of the most important and dangerous consequences of this misperception is 
that it helps scientists to ignore the origins and consequences of their research programs 
and practices, hence to refuse any liability for them. It can be claimed that by emphasizing 
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this moral aspect, FST brings ethical and political considerations into conceptualizations 
of objectivity, not in the sense that a scientist’s duty is to be value-free, but in the sense 
that a genuinely objective account is a responsible account which is sensitive to possible 
biases it might convey as well as to the contingency of its sources. We will see a similar 
moralization of objectivity in Longino’s account where objectivity serves as social control 
of biases. In the next chapter I will argue that Longino’s conceptualization of objectivity 
should be backed up by “strong objectivity”. Now let me examine some of the 
postmodernist criticisms of FST.  
 
3.4   Postmodernist Criticisms Against FST 
A common criticism of FST is that it assumes a unified nature for women and fails to 
recognize differences among women. Yet most feminist standpoint theorists reject any 
idea that there can be a single privileged position. Obviously, not all women’s experiences 
are the same. Social life is stratified by interconnected layers of race, class, sex, age, 
education and so forth, each of which operates within and across different systems of 
power domination. With which women’s lives, then, should we start research? Given the 
logic of FST, it is reasonable to think that, for example, starting off research from black 
women’s lives would provide less partial claims than research starting from the lives of 
white women.  Yet, this line of thought runs into a problem if we take a couple steps 
further and claim that starting research from the lives of lesbian disabled black women’s 
lives would provide better accounts than the lives of lesbian black women. As we keep 
specifying the least privileged people in society, we could end up with a vast number of 
	   145	  
situated singulars. This would render standpoint theory implausible and jeopardize any 
potential political struggle. If there is a vast number of distinct socially marginalized 
groups, then how are we to distinguish which group is more epistemically privileged? 
Bar-Ami Bar On writes,  
when one among a multiplicity of socially marginalized groups is claimed to have 
more epistemic privilege than the others, the usual criterion for justifying such a 
claim is the extent to which the group in question is peripheralized. Epistemic 
privilege then becomes a function of the distance from the center. Presumably the 
more distant one is from the center, the more advantageous is one’s point of view. 
(Bar On 1993, 89)  
 
She continues by pointing out that this way of thinking rests on the idea that there is a 
single center of power that brings about all sorts of oppression. Today, it is largely 
accepted that different forms of domination, such as racism, sexism, elitism and so forth, 
are institutionally structured in various ways in social life. Yet, it would be wrong to 
claim that FST ignores this multiplicity of power structures. In fact, FST rejects the 
orthodox Marxist idea of attributing epistemic privilege to one socially distinctive group 
of people. According to FST, there is no single, ideal woman’s life from which thought 
should start. Harding emphasizes that different groups of women produce different 
feminisms and “each of these groups of women’s lives is a good place to start in order to 
explain certain aspects of the social order …different feminisms inform each other; we 
can learn from all of them and change our patterns of belief.” (Harding 1993, 60) Still, it 
is true that FST follows the Marxian example of utilizing commonalities among the 
oppressed in order to produce an effective analysis. It is fair to claim that FST has a 
tendency towards generalizations and that these generalizations necessarily ignore certain 
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differences among women. This limitation however, should not be construed as a failure.  
First, given the diversity of groups that utilize the logic of standpoint theory, such as 
African Americans or Third World people, standpoint theory also helps to emphasize their 
differences. And second, the tension between the necessity for generalizations and the 
possible problems they may generate could be turned into a fruitful resource once the 
multiple layers of society and the interactions among them are made visible and 
acknowledged. For one thing, it would compel inquirers to be extra careful.  
However, both Jane Flax and Bar On find this optimistic attitude to standpoint 
theories problematic. Flax argues that the logic of standpoint rests on the ungrounded 
assumption that people act rationally in their own interests and that “the oppressed are not 
in fundamental ways damaged by their social experience.”(Flax 1987) That is to say, 
since both social and natural reality are structured by the dominant groups’ 
conceptualizations and categorizations, oppressed visions are inevitably affected and 
possibly corrupted by these categorizations. Yet the question of how such corruption can 
be assessed is a pressing issue. This criticism seems to assume that there can be a pure 
unsullied point from which a lack of corruption could be judged. 
 According to Bar On, on the other hand, grounding epistemic privilege in the 
practices and identities of socially marginalized groups runs into the following problem: 
In the process of validating the experiences of socially marginalized subjects, there is a 
certain degree of idealization that excludes some practices while including others. 
However, this process presupposes “that there are practices that in one way or another are 
more authentically expressive of something about the oppressed groups.” (Bar On 1993, 
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92) For instance, nurturing and domestic practices become associated with women even 
though women’s practices are not confined to these alone. In addition, nurturing and 
domestic practices are typically related to women’s identity as defined by the system that 
oppresses them. That is why Bar On notes that attempts to reconstruct or reclaim the 
authentic practices of a socially marginalized group are always tainted by oppression as 
their original meanings change through their interactions with the practices of the 
oppressive system. (94) This is a very important point, especially for issues pertaining to 
self-identification and the internalization of stereotypes. However, it does not necessarily 
undermine FST. Bar On’s objection could apply to earlier feminist standpoint theorists 
who privileged feminine traits such as nurturing, caring and so forth in acquiring 
knowledge.32 In Harding’s version of FST, however, the benefit of starting research from 
marginalized lives is that their collective concrete experiences make the marginalized 
more sensitive to biases. The logic of Harding’s FST does not rest on traits (essential or 
not) common to the marginalized group. Bar On could claim that the traits tainted by 
oppressive systems could be collectively internalized by the oppressed to the extent that it 
could affect their experiences and hinder their capacity to notice biases. A woman who 
internalizes an identification with the maternal instinct as essential to being a woman 
provides such an example. In the absence of a maternal instinct, she would think that there 
is something wrong with her, rather than locating this feeling of inadequacy within an 
oppressive system. In such cases, starting research from marginalized lives does not yield 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 One example of the sort is “Maternal Thinking” of Sara Ruddick, and another is 
“Object Relations Theory” of Keller which I will briefly discuss in the next chapter.  
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higher objectivity, as biases also pass unseen by the oppressed. That is why Harding 
insists that her prescription applies to everyone, not just the marginalized.33 In other 
words, everyone should start research from marginalized lives.34 But how could we 
mitigate the discursive damage utilized by oppressive systems? Harding’s elaboration of 
“strong reflexivity”, which focuses on the social and material conditions of biases, seems 
to be insufficient to erase the intricate workings of domination in social imagery. 
Postmodernists and poststructuralists have set out some interesting theoretical tools to 
reveal discursive oppressions that have concrete effects on the ways people experience 
and understand the world.35 If “strong reflexivity” aims to contribute to “strong 
objectivity” it should encompass and make use of these theoretical tools.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 It is also why she insists on the value of consciousness raising. 
34 Harding writes, “…in societies stratified by race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, or 
some other such politics shaping the very structure of a society, the activities of those at 
the top both organize and set limits on what persons who perform such activities can 
understand about themselves and the world around them … In contrast, the activities of 
those at the bottom of such social hierarchies can provide starting points for thought –for 
everyone’s research and scholarship—from which humans’ relations with each other and 
the natural world can become visible. This is because the experience and lives of 
marginalized peoples, as they understand them, provide particularly significant problems 
to be explained or research agendas.” (Harding 1993, 55) 
35 For instance, deconstructivist, interpretive and genealogical projects set out interesting 
strategies. The examination of these projects exceeds the purpose of this thesis. For a 
discussion of the differences between the interpretive and genealogical projects see Code 
(1998). According to Code, postmodern feminism has different strands: Interpretive 
strategies carried out by Linda Alcoff and Susan Hekman focus on the interpretations of 
cultural and historical assumptions underlying the processes that yield knowledge. The 
genealogical strand, on the other hand, “situates knowledge-production within 
historically changing structures of power, maintaining the radical contingency of 
currently hegemonic modes of understanding, legitimating, and establishing knowledge 
claims.” 
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Bar On points to another critical problem about epistemic privilege. According to 
her, attributing epistemic privilege to oppressed groups while they do not have the power 
to actually exercise or benefit from it is very dangerous. Claims of epistemic privilege 
have been used historically to legitimize the voices of marginalized groups and to justify 
the authority of the marginalized to speak for themselves. Nevertheless, Bar On is 
suspicious of authorizing the speech of the marginalized. This is because the practice of 
authorization excludes and silences certain people and commands obedience to the 
authorized. Yet, in reality, oppressed groups do not have the power to exclude, silence or 
command obedience from dominant groups. She maintains that the claims for epistemic 
privilege  
lacking a social power on which to base them, cannot yield the same results as the 
self-authorizing claims of a dominant group and are, therefore, merely normative, 
compelling only to those who are theoretically persuaded by them, usually 
members of the socially marginalized group who find them empowering … by 
claiming an authority based in epistemic privilege the group reinscribes the values 
and practices used to socially marginalize it by excluding its voice and silencing it 
and commanding its obedience to the voice of the dominant group. (Bar On 1993, 
96-97)  
 
By having no real (perceivable) impact on the visions and on the members of dominant 
groups, the epistemic privilege of the oppressed would not only be self-deceptive. It also 
could be used as a theoretical tool to further their oppression by the dominant group. For 
one thing, grounding epistemic privilege on the practices of the oppressed groups confines 
them to speak only for themselves and only on issues that relate to their experiences. It 
also helps the dominant group to dismiss the problems relating to the oppressed groups on 
the grounds that they do not have epistemic access to oppressed groups’ experiences. This 
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oppression is similar to Harding’s discussion about the dangers of judgmental relativism. 
Harding claims that judgemental relativism is a conventional theoretical tool for those 
who acknowledge certain inequalities but are unwilling to change the underlying practices 
that generate them. Claiming, “it is all relative” is an effective and effortless way to 
dismiss real challenges. (Harding 1993, 61)  Bar On writes, “[s]peech needs to be 
authorized only where silence is the rule. This is an oppressive rule. It need not be 
obeyed, and the justification of disobedience in this case is not a special kind of expertise 
guaranteed by epistemic privilege but rather by the demands of justice.” (97) I agree with 
her on this point. However, demands for justice first require an awareness of injustices. 
According to Harding such awareness of the social and material circumstances that 
inquirers are in is possible through strong reflexivity. Yet, as I argue above, “strong 
reflexivity” should also be supported by discursive analyses. But even this is not enough. 
The demands for justice must also be heard and taken seriously. How this could be done 
is crucial. No doubt the marginalized should have an active role. They should analyze and 
reflect on their situations, and persist in voicing their concerns. However, since it is 
always a challenge for the marginalized to find a voice and a venue for speech, it is vital 
to regulate critical discourse diligently so that the marginalized can be heard and 
appropriate changes can be set in motion. Harding does not elaborate on such necessary 
regulations. Longino’s account of objectivity offers an interesting attempt in that 
direction, as I will show in the following chapter. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the strengths and shortcomings of FST. I believe FST has 
played a very important role in opening up new epistemic terrains and showing that 
feminist epistemology is not only possible but also very informative. I also believe that 
starting thought from marginalized lives is a useful and plausible strategy to expose biases 
in certain areas of research. However, as Harding admits, it is necessary but not sufficient 
to guarantee objectivity.  
FST is mostly a general critique of science (and philosophy of science) that does 
not elaborate on the workings of specific sciences.36 As such, it falls short of providing an 
account of objectivity that is applicable to a broad range of scientific concerns. That is, 
although it is very informative, FST does not formulate a specific enough account to 
replace or to compel theorists to modify the mainstream understanding of objectivity. A 
compelling alternative that would bring about change in dominant conceptions of 
objectivity, in my opinion, is one that can communicate with the dominant view, 
challenge its very principles, and shake its consistency.37 In doing so, a compelling 
alternative could change the dominant view from within. I emphasize change here, as 
changing the way science is conceived and the ways in which it works in favour of 
feminist causes is my primary principle in assessing feminist critiques of science and 
philosophy of science. Establishing a dialog with the dominant view requires some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Elizabeth Potter’s work on Boyle’s law of gases might be an exception to this general 
outlook.  
37 The importance of maintaining a dialog with mainstream philosophers of science is 
also stressed by Hundleby (2012). 
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common ground to achieve communication.38 This means that a compelling alternative 
might not be as radical (whatever that means) as one wishes. It might require using the 
tools of the oppressors to dismantle their power. I think this would be justified as long as 
it makes a positive difference in matters of epistemic justice and injustice. Moreover, a 
compelling alternative should not only provide criticisms but should also set out a 
normative account. Although Harding prescribes starting research from marginalized 
lives, this is too broad a prescription to constitute an alternative epistemology or 
philosophy of science. I believe Helen Longino’s account of objectivity addresses these 
concerns better than FST. Having said this, I do not claim that FST has no explanatory 
power or that it is unimportant. In the next chapter I argue that certain FST views could 
strengthen Longino’s conceptualization of objectivity.  My point here is that a critique of 
the “received view” that could transform its understanding of objectivity should attack 
specific assumptions of empiricism. Any transformation must also compel the community 
that adheres to the “received view” to reorganize the questions asked and reconsider 
priorities within the philosophy of science. That is exactly what Longino does.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This point is also emphasized by Nelson: “The point of feminist science criticism must, 
in the end, be to change science, and changing science requires changing the practices of 
scientists. Hence, scientists must be brought into the dialogue. Since scientists are 
empiricists, that dialogue will have to make room, at least in the beginning, for 
empiricists and for, at least as a topic of discussion, empiricism.” (Nelson 1990, 6–7)  
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Chapter Four 
Feminist Empiricism and Objectivity 
 
In this chapter I focus on Helen Longino’s understanding of objectivity, which stems from 
her contextual empiricism. I will argue that Longino’s approach to objectivity constitutes 
a better conceptualization than the mainstream approaches to objectivity in the philosophy 
of science, if it is complemented by some aspects of the “strong objectivity” I have 
discussed in Chapter Three. To begin with I will briefly re-examine the empiricist 
tradition in feminism and then will turn my attention to contextual empiricism and the 
form of objectivity it yields. In the last section I will examine some of the criticisms 
brought against Longino and will defend her contextual empiricism. 
 
4.1    Feminist Empiricisms 
The main tenet of empiricism is that knowledge is grounded in experience. Yet, 
historically there have been various empiricist theories characterized by different 
empirical projects, such as British empiricism, logical positivism/empiricism and 
naturalized epistemology among others. Similarly, there have been various articulations of 
feminist empiricism, which address different concerns and problems.  Yet it is somewhat 
misleading to talk about “feminist empiricism” as a distinctive feminist position. This is 
because, I believe, to the extent that feminists emphasize concrete and particular 
experiences they are all empiricists in one way or another. 
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Practicing female scientists in areas such as biology and psychology were among 
the first to generate feminist science criticism.1 They specifically attacked theories about 
women and gender differences that legitimize and naturalize the sexist practices both in 
scientific practice and in society.  However, their critique of the ways science was 
conceived and practiced was a rather weak critique because these women were trained 
within the same tradition as their male colleagues. Their criticisms did not extend to the 
main tenets and ideals of science. Briefly, the women scientists were engaged in and 
supported the attempts at eliminating biased practices, which were not believed to be 
internal features of science itself. In other words, their concern was to distinguish “bad 
science” from “good science”. According to this distinction, biased theories are the results 
of misconceptions, misapplications of ideals, individual prejudices, and the recklessness 
of individual scientists. This situation led some scientists such as Rae Carlson (1960), 
Sandra Harris (1971), and Florence Denmark (1988) to advocate for greater inclusion of 
women in sciences both as practitioners and as objects of study. However, these solutions 
by themselves were weak solutions. Some more critical feminists argued that the source 
of androcentric bias within science was due to the intellectual structure and cognitive 
goals of science, which are expressions of male characteristics. Since the pedagogy that 
licences scientists prescribes androcentric intellectual structures and cognitive goals, 
unless there are some structural changes, those women scientists who are brought up 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Harding dubs the writings produced in the early 70s and 80s by these scientists 
“spontaneous feminist empiricist epistemology” because it reflects the “‘spontaneous 
consciousness’ of feminist researchers in biology and social sciences who were trying to 
explain what was and what wasn’t different about their research process.” (Harding 1993, 
51) 
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within the same tradition as men would inevitably and inadvertently contribute to the 
reproduction of male biases.  
Among those who advocate for structural change in scientific practice, Nancy 
Chodorow (1999) and Evelyn Fox Keller (1985) argue that dominant scientific norms and 
practices reflect the psychological and cognitive traits of white, Western, educated men in 
ways that serve the interests of this particular group. Against androcentrism, Keller and 
Chodorow defend female-defined communities in science. Central to their view is the 
belief that women and men in western societies have different psychological traits, which 
result in different cognitive styles and goals. According to them, scientific ideals such as 
universality, objectivity as complete detachment, autonomy, and impersonality all reflect 
male characteristics. In so far as science pursues these ideals it will always be vulnerable 
to androcentrism, and will benefit male privilege. In contrast, female characteristics 
buttress different values in research. For instance, male approaches to relationships (both 
to one another and to the object of their research) rest on competition and distancing 
whereas female approaches to such relationships are more collaborative and based on 
respect and trust. Such an approach, according to Keller, is exemplified in the works of 
Barbara McClintock. As I have mentioned in Chapter Three, McClintock defends having 
“a feeling for the organism” she works on rather than trying to distance herself from the 
object of her research. For Keller this feminine style would benefit science and could 
yield a kind of objectivity, namely “dynamic objectivity”, where observers approach the 
observed with empathy, in order to understand the world around them. In arguing for the 
superiority of seeking “dynamic objectivity” Keller contrasts it with “static objectivity”. 
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Underlying  “static objectivity” is the presumption that in order to understand the world 
we need to conquer and dominate it. This domination is possible via distancing/placing 
oneself from/above the object of study. The traditional conception of objectivity as the 
“view from nowhere” is a typical exemplar of “static objectivity”.2 Yet, many feminists 
question the intelligibility of a “view from nowhere”. Among the problems with this 
conceptualization is that it rests on a problematic ontology and methodology. This 
conception presumes that science aims at uncovering the nature of things as they really 
are independent of knowers. According to this understanding, grasping things as they 
really are is possible thorough complete self-extrication. Whether it is possible to attain 
knowledge of or even intelligible to talk of things as they really are or whether complete 
detachment from one’s subjective conditions is possible are lingering questions in 
philosophy. It is important to realize, however, that at the base of these problems is a tacit 
belief in a sharp distinction between subjects and objects of scientific inquiry. This belief 
is problematic because it deems research unscientific where the objects of inquiry include 
or related to the inquirers themselves. Furthermore, contrary to experimental findings, this 
belief assumes that the subjective condition of the experimenter has no effect on the 
objects of the study.3 In contrast to “static objectivity” where emotional distancing from 
the world/object of inquiry is required, “dynamic objectivity” prescribes connectivity with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Keller correlates the difference between adopting “dynamic” and “static” objectivity 
with the psychological development of two different senses of autonomy, namely 
“dynamic autonomy” and “static autonomy”. Her differentiations and conceptualizations 
rest on the Object Relations Theory, the details of which I will not examine here.	  	  3	  In Keller’s psychoanalytical account ideal of “static objectivity” is distorted because it 
is an outcome of a distorted psychological development of boys which generates an 
exaggerated separateness (from the mother and the world), i.e. static autonomy. 
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the world/object of inquiry. Such connectivity, according to Keller, is maintained by a 
sense of union with the observed while the independent integrity of the world is preserved 
(Keller 1995, 117). Keller draws a parallel with this attitude towards the world with the 
practice of “empathy”. She notes, empathy is “a form of knowledge of other persons that 
draws explicitly on the commonality of feelings and experience in order to enrich one’s 
understanding of another in his or her own right.” (Keller 1985, 117) According to those 
who adhere to “static objectivity,” active engagement of the self with the object of study 
could lead to distortions in the pursuit of the things as they really are. Yet in an empathic 
approach, the integrity of the object of study is preserved because here what is prescribed 
is not that inquirers impose or project their concepts, categories or interests on to the 
objects of inquiry, but that they receive these objects into their self and “see and feel with 
the other”.4 In McClintock terms, you had to have the patience “to hear what [the corn] 
has to say to you” and “to let it come to you.” (Keller 1983, 198)  
As inspiring as it sounds, this line of thought, which seems to rest on rigid 
differences between male and female characteristics, faces a few problems. First, even if 
we accept the existence of such differences, it is questionable whether female-defined 
research programmes could be applicable to or benefit all sciences.5 To be fair, I do not 
think Keller prescribes female-defined science as a universal rule. If she had, she would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The difference between dynamic objectivity and static objectivity is closely related to 
the distinction between separate and connected knowings discussed in Belenky, Clinchy, 
Goldberger, and Tarule (1986, 100-129). 
5 Here there is also the question of how different ideals “benefit” science. Can we have a 
definite statement of what counts as benefiting science regardless of making clear what 
science is and what/who it is for? 
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have fallen into the same error as adherents to the androcentric convention that there is a 
universal method for all sciences. I have mentioned the problems with commitment to a 
universal scientific method with fixed standards, in the previous chapters. Many feminists, 
such as Longino and Harding, deny that there is a unique methodology that is applicable 
to all sciences. This is because which method to adopt is a function of the questions asked 
and the kind of knowledge that is sought.6 Hence, although certain kinds of knowledge 
might require a “female-defined methodology” as Keller formulates, it may not be 
applicable to other kinds of knowledge. That is why general claims about the epistemic 
superiority of a female-defined science are problematic. Longino writes, “[h]owever much 
dynamic objectivity might appeal to us, there isn’t a general argument to the truth of 
interactionism or to the epistemological superiority of dynamic objectivity.” (1993, 108) 
The adoption of methodological (and theoretical) pluralism, however, leaves feminists 
with the problem of explaining how specific research programmes ought to adopt certain 
standards, and how subscribing to “local standards” does not undermine science. I will 
explore these questions when discussing Longino’s defence of “local epistemologies”.  
Another problem that female-defined science faces, namely, emphasis on the 
differences between male and female characteristics, could be construed as endorsing 
essentialism. Those who adopt Object Relations Theory such as Chodorow and Keller 
typically argue that differences occur during male and female development (through 
childhood and adolescence), and these differences result in different gender-related styles 
of reasoning. If the psyche has biological origins, that is, if each sex goes through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Harding (1987); Longino (1993a). 
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biologically fixed psychological and radically different developments, then the charge of 
essentialism holds. However, Object Relations Theory is essentially about how one’s 
relation to one’s environment and other people is shaped by one’s experiences in infancy, 
specifically those relating to primary caregivers. What follows from this theory is not that 
male and female modes of thought are intrinsically different, but that intellectual 
differences between men and women are due to differences in their upbringing which 
reflect and perpetuate a social division of gender roles. This implies, then, that the styles 
different sexes adopt are also a contingent matter. That is, men could, in principle, adopt 
female cognitive styles and vice versa.  
For many feminists the idea that social relations affect cognitive processes and 
goals is key to arguing against androcentric bias in science. For instance, according to 
biologist Ruth Hubbard, science is part of a social process and it reflects the concerns, 
biases and presuppositions of the wider society. That is to say, insofar as the wider society 
is a patriarchal society and science is a white Western male dominated practice, the 
assumptions and practices of science inevitably reflect and benefit male privilege. For 
Hubbard, for instance, the practice of simplification (reductionism) in science is an 
extension of a combination of factors such as a masculine interest in controlling and 
managing the world, and a capitalist interest in exploiting nature.  Specifically, she 
criticizes the way in which phenomena are defined in genetics where simplification is a 
standard practice. Yet, according to her, very few phenomena can actually be captured by 
simplification. In contrast, simplification often distorts biological evidence. For example, 
she argues that the samples chosen in modelling how “genes” work, e.g., fruitflies “which 
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have large giant chromosomes where you can actually see variations” or the bacterium 
E.coli “which doesn’t have a nucleus but only has a single circular chromosome and 
where genes do seem to be continuous pieces of DNA”, led to the misconception that 
“genes” are fixed in the DNA, and that there is a direct correspondence between traits and 
genes. (Aqueno 1997) And this misconception has fed misleading single factor causal 
explanations. In contrast, Hubbard argues that “DNA is an inert, sticky glop. It takes 
organisms or, at least, the enzyme systems extracted from them, along with other essential 
molecules, to perform the synthetic processes within which DNA specifies either the 
composition of its own copies or the composition of proteins.” (Aqueno 1997, 5) What 
this means is that even a simple trait like eye color cannot be “caused” by a single gene 
because it involves the “participation of several proteins, the composition of each of 
which is specified by a different DNA sequence (or “gene").” One of the main reasons 
behind the misconception about genes, according to Hubbard is the reduction of DNA to a 
“code” that needs to be deciphered. With the announcement of the double helix model of 
DNA, which shows the way genes can get copied, scientists began to be engrossed in 
cracking the “genetic code” of life, and “the biological and chemical complexities of 
living organisms were reduced to abstractions about how to translate the linear “code” of 
DNA into the linear array of the amino acids that make up proteins.”7 This conception 
conveniently overlooked the essential characteristic of DNA that it is a part of living cells 
of organisms that have complex relationships with their environment. Avoiding 
complexities had important ideological and economical benefits such as finding the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Hubbard (n.d.) “The Mismeasure of the Gene.” 	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“homosexuality gene” and unwinding it, finding a “cure” for cancer, a multi-million 
industry, or advocating for predictive medicine so that the larger social problems with the 
public health sector can be swept away.  
Hubbard explains how the metaphor of “code breaking” has served the interest of 
certain people and industries. Likewise, she argues that the way “reproductive success” is 
explained in terms of a metaphor where eggs and sperms are considered as investments is 
tainted by male bias and it contributes to reproducing an unequal social order.8 Similarly, 
Emily Martin discusses how explanations of conception are tainted with androcentric 
language in insisting on attributing “activity” to the sperm and “passivity” to the egg in 
spite of the evidence for the dynamic role the egg plays at the time of conception. (Martin, 
1996).  
Another feminist who finds explanatory value in examining the metaphors used in 
prevailing scientific explanations is Donna Haraway. Her extensive work on primatology 
shows how social interests affect scientific practice. According to her, social needs not 
only determine what problems scientists tend to pursue but also the conclusions they 
reach. That is to say, both the context of discovery and the context of justification are 
prone to the effects of social needs and interests. What drives the process of science 
according to Haraway is the created need for certain kinds of evidence: When there is 
need, evidence begins to appear. This is a highly controversial claim for classical 
empiricists who believe that evidence provides “objective” (i.e. disinterested) support for 
a theory. However, Haraway’s claim should not be construed as stating that social needs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For more discussion of this see Hubbard and Wald (1993); Hubbard (1990, 5). 
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are the only factors that determine evidence. She emphasizes the intricate and complex 
structure of evidential relations that are situated in a social setting. I will elaborate the 
social character of evidential relations in the next section when discussing Longino’s 
position. But for now, let’s note that in Haraway’s picture social needs are not extrinsic to 
the practice of evidence gathering, organizing and assessment. Here we see a departure 
from the early feminist empiricists’ project of distinguishing good science from bad 
science. Haraway argues that sexist assumptions in science are not merely bad examples, 
but are a result of how science itself is structured. Hence, she concludes that in order to 
eliminate sexism we first need thoroughly to examine the characteristics of and the ways 
in which science usually works.  
It is fair to claim that Haraway’s naturalistic approach influenced both feminist 
standpoint theorists and later feminist empiricists.9 However, Haraway’s account also 
attracted many criticisms. One of the most important criticisms is Miranda Fricker’s, who 
points out that if social needs determine evidence, then empiricism becomes implausible. 
(Fricker, 1994) Very broadly, if we define empiricism as the view that all non-analytic 
knowledge rests on the evidence acquired from experience, then accepting the impacts of 
social needs on evidence means that there is something beyond experience that knowledge 
rests on. This view undermines empiricism, because theory choice and observation 
assessments become contingent upon social needs. Fricker claims that without some sort 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Among those feminist empiricists who pursued naturalistic programmes Nelson and 
Longino stand out. According to Nelson, Quineian naturalized epistemology provides 
useful conceptual tools that are compatible with the feminist cause. For the purpose of 
this thesis I confine my examination of later feminist empiricists to Longino.  
	   163	  
of empiricism there is a risk of an “anything goes” approach. Haraway, however, strongly 
objects to “anything goes”, as it amounts to being everywhere at once and nowhere in 
particular, which is what the God’s eye point of view (or the view from nowhere) purports 
to accomplish. According to her, both “anything goes” and “the view from nowhere” 
conflict with the situatedness of knowledge. (Haraway 1988) Yet there is still the question 
of how “anything goes” can be decisively refuted, and Harding does not seem to have a 
sufficiently elaborate explanation for this important question. 
How to preserve the plausibility of empiricism while admitting the effects of 
social impact on evidence is a compelling problem. A promising theory that aims to 
prevent “anything goes” while arguing for the relevance of social values to evidence is 
Longino’s contextual empiricism.  
 
4.2    Helen Longino’s Philosophy of Science 
Helen Longino’s philosophy of science rests on the idea that science and knowledge are 
primarily social enterprises. However, the social character of science may manifest itself 
in different aspects of science such as in laboratory work, divisions of intellectual labour, 
theory constructions, theory-laden observations, and scientific assessments. That is why 
we need to examine what Longino has in mind when arguing for the sociality of science 
In Science as Social Knowledge (SSK) she writes “the social character of scientific 
knowledge is made especially apparent by the organization of later 20th century science, in 
which the production of knowledge is crucially determined by the gate keeping of peer 
review. Peer review determines what research gets funded and what research gets 
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published in the journals i.e. what gets to count as knowledge.” 10 (68) Here Longino 
identifies the scientific community as the main agent in producing scientific knowledge, 
and she grounds the sociality of knowledge in the collective practices of the members of 
the community. However, the mere fact that scientific findings are assessed and controlled 
by members of a scientific community working in the same field of inquiry does not by 
itself show that social values affect those findings. In fact, if there are universal standards 
that a scientific community subscribes to in evaluating scientific findings, then it does not 
matter whether the findings are assessed by one person or by the whole group. Recall that 
in the received view there was a sharp distinction between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification. According to this view, external factors such as social and 
political values are confined to the context of discovery and do not operate in the context 
of justification where scientific reasoning proceeds. In other words, scientific 
argumentation through which scientific knowledge is produced has its internal rules and is 
not susceptible to external factors. Accordingly, the specific practices of peer review are 
not relevant in the context of justification and therefore do not prove that scientific 
knowledge is social. However, as I have argued in Chapter Two, this approach is very 
narrow in its understanding of science and its workings, because it reduces science to 
scientific knowledge. Moreover, scientific knowledge is reduced to propositional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Recall that Daston argues that changes in the organization of scientific practice in the 
twentieth century led to a shift in the understanding of objectivity. Objectivity came to be 
viewed as aperspectivity. According to Daston, as science became more and more 
international (and the scientific population increased) “communicability” became 
necessary to attain “aperspectivity”. The emphasis on “communicability” is important 
because this notion resurfaces both in Popper and Longino, and it finds an important (yet 
different) place in their accounts of objectivity. I will elaborate on this issue below.  
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knowledge with its problematic assumptions about such matters as dislocated abstract 
subjects and universal standards. This narrow approach also disregards practical 
knowledge (i.e. know-how) which is an essential part of the scientific enterprise. Longino 
takes issue with this narrow understanding and emphasizes the sociality of knowledge. 
Underlying her insistence on social knowledge is the assumption that epistemic standards 
are not universally fixed. In arguing for the social character of science she attacks the 
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, and claims 
that the context of justification is not immune from external factors.  For Longino, the 
terminology of internal factors and external factors transforms into constitutive values 
(such as simplicity, truth, accuracy, and fruitfulness) and contextual values (personal, 
social, political and cultural values) respectively. She opposes the received view in its 
treatment of contextual values as randomizing factors, but argues that they have a bearing 
on “beliefs or attitudes that are systematically related to culture, social structure, or 
socioeconomic interests of the context within which an individual scientist works.”11 (64) 
Hence, in SSK and in her later works she puts considerable effort into demonstrating the 
relevance of contextual values in scientific argumentation. The framework of social 
knowledge and contextual empiricism is intrinsically related to Longino’s understanding 
of objectivity. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Italics mine. I emphasize this point because in so far as beliefs systematically relate to 
social structure and so forth, it is possible to track them down, thus providing explanatory 
power to a naturalized inquiry. 
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4.2.1    Contextual Empiricism 
In SSK Longino focuses on evidential relations, as according to her the essential 
dimensions of science, such as inference, and assessments of the relevance or 
acceptability of data for hypotheses, all are based on evidence. (38) Longino argues that 
her contextual empiricism constitutes a positive alternative to the inadequate take on the 
relationship between data and hypotheses found both in logical positivists such as Carl 
Hempel and wholists such as Thomas Kuhn. Let me briefly explain the problems Longino 
finds in each school of thought. 
  In her discussion of the logical empiricists' approach to evidential relations 
Longino concentrates on the confirmation relation. Recall that the logical empiricists’ 
goal was to find a logical formula that would disclose whether or not a confirmation 
relation holds between a hypothesis sentence and evidence sentence(s), just as a valid 
logical formula shows that an inference relation holds between premise(s) and a 
conclusion. In this picture the specific content of hypothesis sentences and evidence 
sentences has no bearing on possibilities of confirmation. That is to say “the inference to a 
hypothesis is not mediated by possibly value-laden assumptions.” (Longino 1990, 48) 
Nevertheless, according to Longino, this view runs into the following problem: The 
inference relation requires that the same predicates be used both in the hypothesis 
sentence and the observation sentences. In moving from observations to a hypothesis 
regarding unobservable entities, however, the inference relation cannot hold since the 
predicates about unobservables in the hypothesis sentence are not contained in the 
observation sentences. Similarly for the confirmation relation to hold, observation 
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sentences, which confirm a hypothesis, should have the same predicates as the hypothesis 
sentence. Yet in cases of unobservables the confirmation relation does not hold since 
observation sentences referring to a class of observable entities do not entail a hypothesis 
sentence regarding unobservables. Thus, Logino concludes, “the sentences describing 
evidence for hypotheses and those expressing hypotheses are typically not related in 
appropriate ways.” (49) This positivist approach, where theories are treated as sets of 
sentences, and formal relations between sentences are sought, is too restrictive and fails to 
account for the relationships between data and theory.  
  Wholism, characterized by such historically-oriented philosophers of science as 
Norwood Russell Hanson, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, on the other hand, has 
also failed to account adequately for the evidential relation between data and theory, in 
Longino's view. As I discussed in Chapter Two, wholists challenge the scientific 
methodology defended by logical positivists and empiricists. Their observation that there 
are cases in the history of science where inconsistent theories are supported by more or 
less same data has led wholists to deny the cumulative model of scientific progress 
advocated by the logical empiricists. Wholists have undermined the empiricists’ 
fundamental assumption that observation is independent of theory. According to them, 
science operates within large-scale frameworks or paradigms. Observations, experiences, 
and the terms used in the theories are all theory-laden. (Longino 1990, 26) Consequently, 
observations that constitute the supporting data for confirming a theory are not 
independent of the framework within which the theory operates. This means that there is 
no neutral set of data against which to compare or evaluate theories. Since the meanings 
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of the terms used in a theory are also theory-laden, theories are mutually untranslatable as 
well as incommensurable. However, Longino thinks that the wholist account is 
paradoxical in claiming that two theories can be both mutually incommensurable and 
mutually inconsistent. If the meanings of the terms change depending on the framework, 
then we cannot claim that two seemingly inconsistent theories, which have common terms 
but operate in different frameworks, are indeed inconsistent given that the terms will refer 
to different things in each theory. Furthermore, the idea that both observations and 
hypotheses are products of the same paradigm destroys “the concept of evidence as 
something to which one can appeal in defending a hypothesis.” (57) Here evidence 
becomes redundant. Contextualizing evidence to background assumptions, according to 
Longino, overcomes this problem. For one thing, contextualization does not make 
evidence theory-dependent. She agrees with the logical positivists that there is a common 
language with which we reason and describe phenomena. She writes, “[o]nce it is 
accepted that the evidential relation is always determined by background assumptions, 
then it is easy to see that there could be a neutral description of a given state of affairs, 
that is, one agreed to by both parties to a dispute, and no agreement on the hypotheses for 
which it is taken as evidence.” (60) Accordingly, although background assumptions are 
usually hidden, they can be articulated through the common language that is used, and 
such articulations make disagreements among parties possible. Consequently, Longino 
argues that a contextual analysis can reveal how an inference from data to hypothesis is 
mediated by background assumptions without falling into the trap of incommensurability.  
For Longino the problems and paradoxes faced by logical positivists and wholists 
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occur because each system of thought “produces an individualist logic of scientific 
method that fails adequately to reflect the social nature of scientific discourse.” (81) She 
argues that a contextual analysis of evidential relations would make the social character of 
science apparent. Before elaborating her contextualism, let me clarify what Longino’s 
empiricism consists in. Longino states that her position is empiricist “in treating 
experience as the basis of knowledge claims in the sciences.” (219) This modest 
empiricism rejects logical positivists’ verification theory as well as their project of 
founding knowledge on immediate sense data (foundationalism). It also rejects finding 
formulas for reducing all scientific statements to statements composed of terms referring 
to immediate sense data (reductionism), as I have discussed in Chapter Two. In fact, in 
arguing for social knowledge, Longino aims to disentangle empiricism from its 
individualism, foundationalism, universalism, and internalism. Yet, her insistence on the 
importance of evidential relations is a manifestation of her version of empiricism, which 
is essentially a theory of evidence. The contextualist aspect of her position, on the other 
hand, is more complicated and requires further deliberation. 
“Context” for Longino refers primarily to the background assumptions against 
which data are assessed and evidential relevance is determined. Unlike the logical 
positivists, Longino is not concerned with finding a single formal criterion for evidence. 
She is interested in evidential relations between objects, events or states of affairs and the 
hypotheses they support. For Longino a hypothesis is not merely a collection of sentences, 
it can be expressed in different ways, for example by using maps or models. Accordingly, 
there can be different ways of describing the same states of affairs, and this difference is a 
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result of the endorsed background assumptions. For Longino, the assessment of what 
constitutes good evidence requires first an understanding of mechanisms behind how 
evidential relevance is in fact determined. (40) In other words, we need to inquire into 
how background assumptions operate. These two different projects—one prescriptive and 
the other descriptive—have sometimes been conflated by philosophers in examining 
science. On the one hand, those who focus merely on the prescriptive project end up with 
inadequate accounts, as there are no satisfactory a priori grounds for formulating norms 
for good evidence. On the other hand, those who focus merely on the descriptive account 
dismiss the normative task of philosophy of science. Hence, Longino argues that a good 
epistemology and philosophy of science should consist in naturalized inquiry about 
science as well as normative considerations, which are essential for distinguishing opinion 
from knowledge.  
  Longino’s naturalized inquiry, i.e. explaining how data transform into evidence in 
actual scientific practice, rests primarily on Quine’s views on the under-determination of 
theories by evidence. The main lesson of under-determination is that states of affairs do 
not carry evidential relations by themselves, and there is no unique evidential relation 
between a state of affairs and a hypothesis. That is, whether a state of affairs is to be taken 
as evidence for some hypothesis is mediated by other assumptions concerning the 
evidential relation between the state of affairs and the hypothesis. (41) Longino explains 
this idea using an example where she comes to believe that an eight-year old child has the 
measles because of the fact that her stomach is covered with red spots. Longino's belief 
about the relationship between having a red spotted stomach and having measles enables 
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her to take the child's red spotted stomach as evidence that the child has the measles. 
However, Longino could instead have come to believe that the child has the measles 
because a crystal ball reader had told her that if the child’s stomach is red spotted, she has 
a disease called measles. In this case, Longino's belief that the child has the measles 
depends on what the crystal ball teller has told her, and on her belief that crystal ball teller 
is a reliable source. In both cases the observed state of affairs is the same: red spots on the 
child's stomach. However, why it is taken as evidence for the hypothesis that the child has 
measles is different in each case. (41)  
An actual scientific example that Longino discusses in showing how background 
assumptions operate in the collection of data and evidence assessments is from 
evolutionary studies. Here we again see that the same state of affairs can be taken as 
evidence for different hypotheses. There are two rival hypotheses explaining human 
descent from primates. The “man the hunter” hypothesis focuses on the changing 
behavior of males, and the development of tool usage is explained by the evolution of 
hunting males. The “woman the gatherer” hypothesis, on the other hand, focuses on the 
changing behavior of females, and explains the development of tools used by females by 
appealing to the changes in nutritional needs as well as changes in the conditions of 
reproduction as a response to changes in the flora. In other words, it is hypothesized that 
the shift in environmental conditions throughout history, such as abandoning the forest for 
the savanna, was accompanied by changes in the modes of food acquisition. (107-8) On 
the “man the hunter” hypothesis, which is informed by androcentric values, objects 
identified as tools are accepted as evidence for the hypothesis about “men developing 
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stone tools and spears, and developing smaller canines, larger brains, co-operative 
behavior, and language.” Whereas, on the “woman the gatherer” hypothesis, which is 
informed by gynocentric values, the same objects are accepted as evidence for “softening 
hard fibers or crushing seed pods, and developing larger brains, co-operative behavior, 
and language.”12 Here objects such as fossil bones and stones do not by themselves 
explain the behavior of our evolutionary ancestors. Background assumptions in each 
hypothesis ascribe different evidential value to them. Hence, the inference from data to 
hypothesis is mediated by the background assumptions.13 
 
4.2.2    Longino’s Conception of Objectivity  
The idea that theories are underdetermined by data has been taken by some to mean that 
theory choice is arbitrary and irrational since there is no control over the impact of social 
and political values in theory assessments and preferences. That is to say, the objectivity 
of science is in jeopardy.  In fact, if there is no unique relation between data and evidence, 
whether or not a specific observation supports a hypothesis becomes a contingent matter. 
For Longino it is true that epistemic relevance is determined by context. Yet 
contextualizing evidence to background assumptions makes theory choice neither 
arbitrary nor irrational. She writes, “[it] is rational to take some state of affairs as evidence 
for a hypothesis in light of background assumptions one accepts. It would be irrational to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Quotations in this example are taken from Potter (2006, 100-101). 
13 Another excellent example Longino discusses extensively on this point comes from 
behavioral endocrinology where the hormonal causes of sex differences are considered. 
For a clear summary of Longino’s take on in this field, see Potter (2006, 101-108). 
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assess evidential relations in a manner inconsistent with such background assumptions 
and antirational or nonrational to accept or reject hypotheses with no regard for evidence.” 
(60) Moreover, theory choice is not arbitrary, because theories are and should be assessed 
and controlled by appropriate mechanisms. It is primarily at this point that Longino’s 
epistemology becomes normative. Shortly I will discuss the specific norms that she sets 
out for controlling contextual values, but let me now elaborate in general terms the 
processes by which background assumptions are controlled, according to Longino.  
First and foremost such control depends on the kind of background assumptions 
operating in theory construction and assessment. Background assumptions operating in 
scientific reasoning could be personal and/or institutional preferences and beliefs, 
conceptual commitments one has come to adopt as a result of their formal education, 
norms and methodological rules a scientific community endorses according to the aims, 
goals and interests of their research project; and social, cultural and political values that 
are predominant in society in general.14 It is reasonable, then, to claim that background 
assumptions operate at three basic levels: individual, communal (local) and general 
(global).15 Through these channels contextual values seep into scientific reasoning in 
various ways, from determining the questions asked and ignored (for instance why certain 
regions or species are investigated rather than others) to the descriptions, categorizations 
and selections of data (as in the case of evolutionary studies mentioned above). The 
problem with contextual values operating at the individual level is that it risks falling into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Military and economic concerns could also be included in this list. 
15 It is important to keep in mind that these levels interact with and are affected by one 
another in complex ways. 
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subjectivism. In subjectivism, there is no way of distinguishing personal opinion from 
knowledge.  If there are no determined standards to judge the merits of different sets of 
assumptions, then justification becomes redundant.  However, this criticism rests on an 
individualistic understanding of justification. In this understanding, the justification of a 
subject’s belief is assessed in terms of the support that the subject’s other beliefs and 
assumptions yield for the belief in question. According to Longino, though, “subjectivism 
can be avoided by incorporating critical interaction into one’s notion of justification.” At 
the heart of her argument is the view that knowledge is primarily a social practice. She 
writes, 
Knowledge is the outcome not just of the cognitive agent’s encounter with the 
world, but of cognitive agents’ encounters with one another. The latter encounters 
bring assumptions to the surface for criticism and then endorsement, rejection, or 
modification. A recalcitrant agent will not defend or modify her beliefs in 
response to criticism. Such recalcitrance amounts to opting out of membership in 
an epistemic community. (Longino 1999, 342)  
 
In short, whether a belief qualifies as knowledge or not is a communal matter, and 
individual idiosyncrasies are controlled by interactions among individuals. Of course, one 
could claim that critical interaction does not guarantee the elimination of damaging 
contextual values. There could be biases that permeate the whole community where 
knowledge assessments are performed, and as a result they would pass unexamined. This 
brings us to the second level of background assumptions.  
At the second, communal level, context is composed of shared assumptions 
through which members of a community pursue inquiries and engage in interactions. It is 
important to note that background assumptions shared by society in general and by the 
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scientific community in particular tend to become largely invisible. If there are biases in 
the shared background assumptions they are also likely to become invisible and be 
immune to critical interaction in controlling idiosyncrasies. Because of this invisibility it 
is crucial to regulate the conditions under which such interactions should occur. Longino 
sets out four norms for making visible and controlling shared background assumptions 
that are also the features an ideal epistemic community should display. Insofar as these 
norms are required to accomplish genuine critical interactions through which contextual 
values are made apparent by the social production of knowledge, they also have a 
significant bearing on objectivity.16 
(1) The first norm Longino sets out concerns the venues through which scientific 
inquiry is assessed. Longino writes, “[t]here must be publicly recognized forums 
for the criticism of evidence, of methods, and of assumptions and reasoning. This 
means that criticism of research ought to be articulated in the same standard and 
public venues in which ‘original research’ is presented: journals, conferences, and 
so on.” Furthermore, this norm prescribes a positive role to negative criticism in 
scientific inquiry. Critical discourse should by no means be obstructed.  
(2) The second norm is about the uptake of criticism where it is emphasized that 
genuine criticism must be transformative. According to this norm, “the community 
must not merely tolerate dissent, but its beliefs and theories must change over time 
in response to the critical discourse taking place within it.” Here by change 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Longino presents these norms in various articles, but the following quotations are taken 
from Longino (2002, 129-134). 
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Longino means “the acceptance of different beliefs, the modification of beliefs, 
the development of new data, reasons, and arguments.” 
(3) The third norm concerns public standards. This norm is very important for 
maintaining a dialog between critics and advocates of a position. Longino writes, 
“[t]here must be publicly recognized standards by reference to which theories, 
hypotheses, and observational practices are evaluated and by appeal to which 
criticism is made relevant to the goals of the inquiring community.” These 
standards and their applications must be transparent, and they must be modified in 
light of appropriate criticism. The success of the inquiry should be evaluated by 
appealing to the shared values and standards. She writes, “[p]articipants in a 
dialogue must share some referring terms, some principles of inference and some 
values or aims to be served by the shared activity of discursive interaction. Thus, 
shared elements are necessary for the identification of points of agreement, points 
of disagreement, and what would count as resolving the former or destabilizing the 
former.” Longino also stresses that these standards “are not a static set but may 
themselves be criticized and transformed, in reference to other standards, goals or 
values held temporarily constant”. 
(4) The norm of tempered equality requires communities characterized by equality 
of intellectual authority, and it prescribes an inclusive scientific practice. Longino 
claims that an epistemically effective critical discourse requires a diversity of 
perspectives. This requirement ensures the broadest range of criticism for a 
hypothesis. According to her, “the exclusion of women and members of certain 
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racial minorities from scientific education and the scientific professions constitutes 
not only a social injustice but a cognitive failing.” Yet Longino also admits that 
members of a community differ in intellectual capacity. “The difficulty is that 
some may differ because of innate endowment...And some may differ because of 
schooling and other opportunities.” Hence she concludes that equality must be 
qualified or tempered.  In sum, “[w]hile the criterion imposes duties of inclusion 
and attention, it does not require that each individual, no matter what their past 
record or state of training should be granted equal authority on every matter.” 
 
The consistency and adequacy of these norms have been criticized both by feminist 
philosophers and by non-feminist philosophers. Specifically, the context-sensitivity of 
standards as well as the possibility of tempered equality have generated interesting and 
informative discussions. I discuss these criticisms and suggest ways to overcome some of 
the problems faced by Longino’s account later in this chapter. But for now let me note 
that these norms are not presented as criteria of truth but as conditions of legitimate 
consensus. The aim of social interaction that Longino praises is not the correction of 
individual error caused by a “biasing factor.” It matters not whether individuals change 
their beliefs as a result of criticisms but whether the community responds to the criticisms 
or not.17 Hence, in keeping with her commitment to the sociality of knowledge, Longino 
notes that these criteria are for assessing the objectivity of communities but not of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Longino emphasizes this point in her response to Miriam Solomon’s misrepresentation 
of her position in Longino (2008). 
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individuals. (1990, 79) Recall that for her, the primary bearers of knowledge are 
communities rather than individuals.18 Yet, this does not deny that individuals can know. 
Rather it means that opinions are transformed into knowledge through social interaction. 
In other words, individuals can be ascribed knowledge if they conform to the norms set 
out by the epistemic community where—ideally—genuine interaction is possible.19 
In short then, objectivity becomes a product of intersubjective criticism. 
According to Longino, “[e]ffective critical interactions transform the subjective into the 
objective, not by canonizing one subjectivity over others, but by assuring that what is 
ratified as knowledge has survived criticism from multiple points of view.” (2002, 129) 
That is to say, Longino’s norms set out the conditions that distinguish subjective opinion 
from objective knowledge. Here objective knowledge primarily reflects the critically 
achieved consensus of a scientific community.20 (1990, 79) In this account interaction 
requires diversity among the members of a community because some assumptions, if they 
are common to all members of a community, become invisible, and thereby hinder 
criticism. Diverse subjectivities generate criticisms that in turn reveal background 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 It is worth noting that there is no consensus on the nature of epistemic subjects among 
feminists. Despite the differences in their views Nelson (1990) and Longino (1990) both 
argue that communities are/should be the primary subjects of knowledge. For Louise 
Anthony (1995) and Lorraine Code (1991), on the other hand, it is important that 
individuals retain some autonomy as knowers. Heidi E. Grasswick (2004) advocates for 
an understanding where knowing subjects are “individuals-in-communities”. This 
understanding incorporates some aspects of individualistic epistemologies and some 
aspects of views that praise communities as subjects of knowledge. I will return to this 
point later in this chapter.  
19 Sometimes this means that knowledge ascriptions are introspective. 
20 I will discuss the ways in which objective knowledge achieved through critical 
exchange relates to the outside world when I examine the relationship between 
epistemological objectivity and ontological objectivity in the next chapter.   
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assumptions that may carry specific interests and biases. Longino writes “[shared 
background assumptions] do not become visible until individuals who do not share the 
community’s assumptions provide alternative explanations of the phenomena without 
those assumptions…the greater the number of different points of view included in a given 
community, the more likely it is that its scientific practice will be objective.” (1990, 80) 
As a consequence, scientific objectivity—both in its practice and what it produces—
always comes in degrees.  
Now it can be said that by these norms Longino aims to block the influence of 
(individual or group) idiosyncrasies operating in the background assumptions that lead to 
distorted accounts. Hence, her understanding of objectivity shares with traditional 
understandings the controlling of social values in scientific accounts. Yet it departs from 
the project of value-free science by paying due respect to certain social values through 
which such control is possible. In short, for Longino while certain values compromise 
objectivity, certain other values help to achieve objectivity. The question is which social 
values promote objectivity. When we look at her proposed norms, they are about 
openness to criticism and revisions, transparency of standards in assessing scientific 
practice, and the equality of inclusion and access to the practice of science—all of which 
secure diversity in the scientific community. These norms are typical liberal democratic 
ideals. Hence, a good scientific practice becomes one that is democratic. According to 
Longino, advancing democratic ideals lead to greater objectivity and truer accounts. An 
objectivist epistemology that is committed to value-neutrality cannot accommodate the 
democratic control of social values that Longino defends. Hence she argues for a new 
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epistemology and a new philosophy of science. 
 
4.2.3    Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology 
Longino’s objectivity requires contextual values in detecting biases. Taking different 
subjectivities into account in knowledge production is not a distortion but a necessity. 
However, the presence of different subjectivities in knowledge production demands a 
politically and ethically informed epistemology. What this implies is that those 
cognitive/epistemic values traditionally picked out by epistemic projects committed to 
dislocated, abstract cognitive agents to prevent so-called arbitrariness in theory choice are 
insufficient in certain contexts. In their efforts to reveal and prevent gender biases in 
scientific enterprise many feminists have offered new theoretical values, which convey 
democratic ideals. Longino collates and identifies these feminist values as empirical 
adequacy, novelty, ontological heterogeneity, mutuality of interaction, applicability to 
current human needs, and diffusions of power.21 It is important to note that these values 
are not offered to replace the old set of epistemic values nor can they all be used in every 
case.22 But they are intended for cases where scientific activity is susceptible to biases.23 
Moreover, just as a theory cannot satisfy all the traditional epistemic values, neither can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Longino notes that this is not a complete set. For her detailed discussions of 
feminist theoretical values see Longino (1994); Longino (1995); Longino (1997).  
22 It should be noted, however, that among these values “empirical adequacy” has a 
speacial status because it is an essential criterion for an activity to be called scientific.	  	  
23 Longino notes that accountability to political feminist commitments “does not demand 
a radical break with the science one has learned and practiced. The development of a 
“new” science involves a more dialectical evolution and more continuity with established 
science than the familiar language of scientific revolutions implies.” (Longino 1996) 
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one theory satisfy all feminist values. Which values will be taken into account in 
assessing a theory depends on the content, aim and the context of the inquiry. Hence 
standards and values are locally endorsed. According to Longino, although values guide 
inquiries, “they are always subject to revision in light of information generated by their 
application or of other criteria or values made salient by changed circumstances.” 
(Longino 1994) Thus, no value—whether traditional (simplicity, scope and so forth) or 
feminist—is universally fixed and permanent. Since there is no set of values that would 
apply always and in every situation, and some background assumptions might always be 
hidden no matter how rigorous the critical interaction is in a community, knowledge 
achieved through scientific consensus should always be accepted provisionally. As such, 
it might change as new data is generated, new values are accepted and background 
assumptions reassessed. (Longino 2002, 135) Hence, it can be argued that the ideal of 
objectivity that serves to eliminate distorting biases in a community will also be 
provisional. 
A comparison between Longino’s account and the traditional understandings of 
objectivity characteristics set out in the Chapter Two will help to summarize her 
understanding of objectivity. Longino shares the received view’s contention that 
objectivity is an ineliminable regulative norm of science that distinguishes subjective 
opinion from objective knowledge. As such, practices of objectivity, i.e. methods and 
norms through which objectivity is sought, prevent arbitrary subjective preferences. 
However, since knowledge is a result of social interaction, for Longino objectivity 
becomes primarily a monitoring of the social norms that affect communities rather than 
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individuals. Moreover, her contextualism does away with the absolutist understanding of 
objectivity adopted by the objectivist view.  Longino contends that objectivity secured by 
intersubjective criticism becomes a provisional achievement. Another important 
difference between the received view and Longino’s account is her rejection of the 
traditional treatment of social values as causes of biased beliefs. According to Longino, 
although social values may lead to biases, it is also through social values that the impacts 
of those values are detected.  
Advocating for local epistemologies where methods, norms or strategies for a 
given inquiry are contextualized contrasts both with the mainstream project of setting 
universal criteria for knowledge and earlier feminist insistence on an exclusively feminist 
science. The emphasis on an understanding of science as a social activity, where practices 
within science are underlined, paves the way to arguing for “doing science as a 
feminist”.24 It is worth noting that, for many feminists, Longino among them, the notion 
of doing science that addresses feminist concerns does not present an alternative science 
that replaces tradional Western science. But it suggests better ways of approaching certain 
areas of inquiry, where pervasive sexism is likely to affect results, than those of 
mainstream epistemology. Hence, although “doing science as a feminist” requires that we 
reconsider and revise the main tenets of mainstream empiricism, it is not as radical as 
arguing for a distinctively feminine science. Yet, it still faces a fair amount of criticism, 
both from feminists and non-feminists, some of which I will address in the next section.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For more on “feminist science” versus “doing science as a feminist” see Hundleby 
(2012). 
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4.3    Criticisms of Longino’s Account 
So far my discussion of the impacts of background assumptions on evidential relations 
has been restricted to the individual and communal levels. This is because Longino’s 
account deals mostly with the impacts of contextual values at these two levels. Individual 
idiosyncrasies are blocked by communal interactions, and persistent biases throughout a 
community are blocked by strict regulation of critical discourse. But what about globally 
diffused biases that are entrenched in our modes of thinking? Are Longino’s norms 
sufficient to overcome biases at the global level? Certainly such cases require more than 
the regulation of critical interaction but also a very careful investigation of society in 
general. This investigation demands an interdisciplinary inquiry with a vast genealogical, 
historical and social analysis in order to reveal the biases embedded in social life. 
Longino’s account, however, falls short of providing tools for such a general 
investigation. I suggest Harding’s “strong reflexivity” assisted with hermeneutical 
analyses can compensate for this gap in Longino’s account. Insofar as science reflects 
values and prejudices of the society in general, it is crucial to have a systematic 
examination of society. Moreover, for the reasons I have discussed in the previous 
chapter, such an examination should include marginalized views. Before elaborating on 
this point, I would like to explore some difficulties surrounding the idea of inclusive 
science, because such difficulties also apply to feminist standpoint theories which aim to 
democratize scientific practices. 
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4.3.1    Intellectual Authority and the Publicity of Science 
The problem of globally endorsed prejudices threatens the project of inclusive science: if 
certain groups of people and their viewpoints are structurally excluded from the 
intellectual domain, then having a formal rule about inclusiveness will fail to accomplish 
the diversity sought. One feminist who questions the adequacy of Longino’s norms on 
inclusiveness is Sharon Crasnow. In her article “Can Science Be Objective? Feminism, 
Relativism, and Objectivity” (2003) Crasnow points out that the intellectual authority that 
Longino mentions itself legitimates the exclusion of some voices. She continues by asking 
how in such cases the voices of the excluded can even begin to be heard. This is primarily 
a question about the rules that legitimize participation in scientific practice. (Crasnow 
2003, 136) If the standards and rules are not universally fixed, how are they to be 
determined and by whom? We have seen that for Longino standards are established 
within a context where intellectual as well as historical, social and political norms 
interact. Longino defends not only the publicity of assessing hypotheses with respect to 
communally endorsed standards but also the publicity of the processes in which these 
communal standards themselves are determined. Yet Crasnow thinks that the question of 
who engages in the processes of assessing and determining standards is very important 
because, for her, we can assess the rules only from within our own culture. Here the 
pressing questions are: how can we tell that when we refuse a criticism we are not 
dogmatically holding on to our own standards for evaluating the evidence no matter what? 
And, how can disagreements about the standards of assessment be resolved? (136) These 
are indeed important challenges. However, a response first requires clarification of what it 
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means to say that we can assess the rules only from within our own culture. If this is 
merely a result of our situatedness “we” will inevitably fail to see the prejudices that are 
invisible in “our” culture. Longino could then respond by insisting that the assessment of 
rules and standards could not and should not be limited to “us” and the viewpoint of “our” 
culture. Her suggestion to include diverse viewpoints embraces different viewpoints from 
other cultures. The view that explains the failure of agreement or disagreement across 
different cultures by appealing to the idea that they endorse different norms rests on the 
assumption that there is no common ground for different cultures to communicate. 
However, contextualism does not entail this view.   
In her objection I believe Crasnow is wrongly construing contextualism as leading 
to conceptual framework relativism, and claiming that different cultures operate within 
different conceptual frameworks. However, unlike working within two or more different 
conceptual frameworks, one can operate within multiple contexts.25 Contexts are not 
conceptual frameworks: different background assumptions may constitute different 
contexts, yet some background assumptions are often shared across different contexts. For 
example, in a worldview where androcentrism prevails, analytical thinking as a “positive” 
value is generally attributed to men. This situation is often explained by appealing to the 
neurological structure of a male brain. On the other hand, in a gynocentric worldview, 
attentiveness as a “positive” value can also be explained by appealing to the neurological 
structure of a female brain. In these cases, although different background assumptions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25For the sake of the argument I am assuming that one cannot adopt more than one 
conceptual framework simultaneously. Yet it is open to question whether one can hold 
multiple conceptual frameworks consistently.  
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operate within each worldview, they also share a considerable number of assumptions. 
For example, they share their belief in biological determinism, and most of their 
knowledge of anatomy. Perhaps more importantly, according to Longino, the diverse 
background assumptions of different worldviews can be simultaneously articulated.26 
Hence, different cultures can assess and criticize other cultures’ rules and standards (even 
if they do not agree with them). Moreover, in suggesting that our assessments are limited 
to our own culture, Crasnow appeals to a very narrow understanding of culture. She 
makes it sound as if culture is a homogenous bloc, and ignores its dynamic diversity and 
mutability. Although shared values are necessary for a culture to be viewed as a culture, 
there are also subgroups, minorities, and marginalized people within every culture. These 
groups might depart from commonly shared values, yet they nonetheless inform and 
sometimes transform those values in various ways. Accordingly, although there might be 
a dominant way of assessing “our” rules, it is never a monolithic enterprise. Hence even if 
“we” can assess “our” rules only within “our” culture, the content of those assessments 
varies. Similarly, in her criticism Crasnow seems to assume a fixed “we” which goes 
against the feminist contention on the situatedness of subjects. Even among the privileged 
groups who are included in the scientific practice there is heterogeneity to some extent due 
to their situatedness. For example, no scientist has exactly the same background as 
another. Even a small variation in their background could provide different conceptual 
tools that could spark a critical stance toward shared assumptions. Of course this line of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 For a similar point see Rolin (2011). 	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reasoning is meaningful only if we attribute some autonomy to particular subjects, i.e. 
individual scientists can help us transform “our” understanding to a certain extent. 
However, deeming communities the appropriate subjects of knowledge seems to overlook 
the moderate yet significant contributions that individuals could make in knowledge 
production. It is open to discussion whether Longino’s account denies any autonomy to 
individual knowers. If it does, then Crasnow’s criticism is a real challenge for Longino. 
Yet, it could be argued that  although Longino claims that the primary bearers of 
knowledge are communities rather than individuals, her account allows for (even requires) 
individual contribution to transforming the ways knowledge is produced. I will discuss 
this issue further in the next section.  
To be fair, for Crasnow the issue is not about who could assess epistemic 
standards, but whose assessments count and make a real difference. In other words, it is 
about who could convey intellectual authority. Hence Crasnow’s challenge is mostly 
directed at Longino’s norm of tempered equality. Recall that Longino states “while the 
criterion imposes duties of inclusion and attention, it does not require that each individual, 
no matter what their past record or state of training should be granted equal authority on 
every matter.” The important question remains on what grounds certain viewpoints will 
be excluded. This indeed is an important and a difficult question, consideration of which 
requires an analysis of different factors that are intertwined in various ways. Hence a 
single-factor response, which takes into account one factor and overlooks others, cannot 
provide a decisive or satisfactory explanation. In mainstream philosophy of science the 
question of which viewpoints to exclude from science is mainly discussed within the 
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literature written on the demarcation problem, i.e. the problem of distinguishing science 
from pseudoscience. This problem was dealt with in “purely” epistemic terms. Feminists, 
on the other hand, reject this approach. They argue that the social location of subjects is 
epistemologically significant. This is because i) the way we are socially situated has a 
bearing on what we know and how we know it; ii) our social location highly influences 
the degree of epistemic credibility ascribed to us, which in turn, legitimates or 
delegitimates us as knowers. That is why, according to feminists, the question of which 
viewpoints should be included or excluded in scientific practice cannot be answered 
purely in epistemic terms. Social and political factors often (if not always) have a bearing 
on whom to include or exclude in the knowledge production. Hence, feminists ask for 
detailed analyses of the ways the social and the political factors come into play in 
scientific practice. Yet I believe a satisfactory answer to the question of the grounds on 
which viewpoints will be included/excluded in science should also involve a conceptual 
analysis of science among other things. Such analysis is especially important if we want 
to dismantle the myth of science as the paradigm of knowledge. I think mapping out 
conceptual limits for science fosters the feminist contention that there are different ways 
of knowing (science being one of them) better than blurring distinctions by questioning 
the “scientific” status of arguably non-scientific practices such as paranormal 
experiences.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In talking of conceptual limits, I do not assume that there are fixed conceptual	  limits 
for science. See note below. 
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Accordingly, the question of inclusion/exclusion can “in part” be seen as an 
extension of the demarcation problem. It is true that formulating clear-cut conditions for 
what constitutes science has been a compelling problem.28 Yet there are some historically 
well-established features that are fundamental for an activity to be called scientific (as it is 
practiced today). From the way Crasnow proceeds I think she overlooks one of the most 
important features of science, and this failure renders Longino’s norm of tempered 
equality redundant.  
In her discussion, Crasnow cites Longino's views of how mystical experiences are 
excluded from science because they are not publicly shared. Crasnow's objection runs as 
follows: such an exclusion might be right within “our” (Western) culture where “public” 
is understood in a certain way. But, there may be other historical/social societies where 
mystical experiences can be shared publicly, and where “public” is defined in a different 
way than ours.29 Hence, publicity as a way of including diverse viewpoints fails, for “our” 
understanding of publicity excludes some viewpoints.  
I do not think Crasnow's example of mystical experiences holds, however. If 
Longino's suggestion were to take into consideration whatever anyone has to say 
regarding a certain phenomenon, then Crasnow's objection that intellectual authority 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28It is important to note that we do not have to be committed to the belief that there are a 
priori criteria for science in order to recognize the demarcation problem as a genuine 
problem. Concepts and activities evolve and change as a result of historical and social 
occurrences. Yet we can still inquire into the discerning features of a concept or activity 
in its historical contingency. But because of this contingency the discerned characteristics 
will likely be fluid.  
29 Unfortunately Crasnow does not elaborate on the ways in which ‘individualistic’ 
mystical experiences can be ‘shared’. 
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excludes some viewpoints might have been a real challenge. The issue at hand, however, 
is to include different and “relevant” viewpoints in science. Although we can disagree on 
what is unique about science and how it should be understood and practiced, what we 
cannot deny is that scientific knowledge is empirical knowledge. Conceptually, 
dependence on systematic observation, experience and experiments are necessary 
conditions for an activity to be called scientific. To question why it is so would be similar 
to questioning why this electronic device I am writing on is called a computer.30 
Regardless of the fact that science as it is understood and practiced today is historically a 
product of Western culture, the bottom line is that results of scientific activity, i.e. 
predictions, experiments, explanations, should everything else being equal be understood, 
communicated and tested by any other person at any other time. Let us call this “in-
principle reproducibility” requirement.31 In a very important sense, then, shared public 
knowledge is reproducible knowledge. Denying this “publicity” by claiming that it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 To take the analogy further, different standards, materials or software can be used in 
building computers, yet each will still be called computer as long as it stores and 
processes data in certain ways and so forth.   
31 I admit that it is reasonable to have some reservations about the extent of this 
reproducibility criterion. It might be the case that some phenomena simply cannot be 
reproduced—or can be reproduced in a limited way. It is open to debate whether there 
can be a scientific explanation of these phenomena. For instance, if we want to explain 
women’s oppression and apply the reproducibility criterion strictly, then we might have 
to accept that there cannot be a scientific explanation for women’s oppression because it 
is shared, hence can be reproduced, only by a certain group of people (a further claim 
would be, no experience of oppression can be shared because of the particular way an 
oppressed is situated). This discussion invites further complex questions such as whether 
a private experience can be shared on the bases of commonalities between experiences, or 
whether one, who does not share another’s experience, can come to understand it by 
studying the features of the context or situation that generated that particular experience. 
How we respond to these questions would affect the applicability of the reproducibility 
criterion.     
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defined only by “our” western standards is tantamount to denying science altogether. The 
reason why the mystical experiences that Crasnow mentions are excluded from science is 
not that they represent a different cultural point of view, but that they do not comply with 
this basic reproducibility criterion. This does not mean mystical experiences can never be 
objects of scientific inquiry. In fact, there are some research programmes that try to 
account for, say, paranormal occurrences such as seeing a white light in near-death 
experiences. Nor does it mean that they would never be reproduced as required by 
science. In fact, there might come a time when those experiences could be observed and 
reproduced with the aid of technological innovations. Yet, given today's technology, if in 
a culture it is believed that these mystical experiences are somehow public, although they 
are not observed and reproducible, then their understanding of public sharing is different 
from the public sharing as reproducibility that is required by scientific activity. This does 
not, however, suggest that mystical experiences have no worth, epistemic or otherwise. I 
think an instructive discussion of mystical experiences should not focus on whether they 
are scientific or not, but whether they can be used as resources for producing some form 
of knowledge.  
Similarly, it might be argued that the stress on communicability as a condition for 
publicity conflicts with the value of midwives’ knowledge, which is not “communicable”, 
that I discussed in the first chapter. But that discussion was not about the “scientific” 
status of midwives practice, it was about disdain for midwives’ traditional knowledge.  
We do not need to argue that midwifery is intrinsically scientific in order to value and 
legitimate the knowledge gained from midwives’ experiences. (In fact, doing so would 
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foster the idea that a practice produces knowledge only if it is scientific.) Although the 
practice of midwifery does not perfectly conform to testability and communicability 
criteria of science, the pieces of information obtained from midwives are still 
epistemically valuable. Furthermore, this value is not restricted to their practical 
knowledge of how to deliver babies or resolve complications, but extends to their 
contribution to scientific knowledge as well. One of the reasons for this is that different 
forms of knowledge are/can be significant resources for scientists in developing 
explanations and/or building models.32 In sum, I think the main problem lies not in 
claiming that some experiences are not appropriate objects of science, but in devaluing 
and/or undervaluing the forms of knowledge gained from them.  
One point we need to examine here, however, is whether the understanding of 
publicity that rests on communicability and testability necessitates interchangeable 
abstract subjects. If it does, then the consistency of Longino’s position is in question. 
After all, as I have discussed in the first chapter, according to Daston, aperspectival 
objectivity, which is the prevailing notion today, is tied to communicability that is secured 
by ideals of detachment, impersonality and disinterestedness. Daston contends that the 
aperspectivity ideal was developed in the moral and aesthetic philosophy of the eighteenth 
century as a response to problems of perspective. For instance, Adam Smith argued that 
self-interest is the worst and most common perspective that leads to distortions (Daston 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For a good example of how traditional knowledge informs scientific inquiry see 
Grasswick’s (2004). Here, she explains how scientists are trying to incorporate the local 
knowledge of First Nations communities with their inquiry on environmental 
management strategies. 
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1992, 605). Shared public knowledge was pursued to erase such distortions; and ideals of 
disinterestedness and self-effacement by means of complete detachment were endorsed in 
the service of public knowledge. Daston maintains that because of the vast changes in the 
organization of science in the mid-nineteenth century this ideal of aperspectivity was 
imported into the natural sciences. (Daston 1992, 597) As the scientific community grew 
both in numbers and across nations, communicability became an important ideal. 
According to Daston, in the new democracy of scientific observers the interchangeable, 
impersonal observer replaced the skilled, known and trusted observer. (608-9) Individual 
idiosyncrasies were eliminated  “through the prolonged ‘averaging’ of viewpoints by 
communication.” (607) As a result, the communicability ideal came to be linked with the 
disinterestedness ideal to buttress aperspectival objectivity. Genuine knowledge thus 
became public knowledge. A significant aspect of this historical account for Longino’s 
position is that it shows how praising the democratic ideal of public knowledge has 
actually led to pursuing aperspectivity in science, which is tied to disinterestedness and 
communicability. If this historical account is true, then we can claim that the ideal of 
public knowledge does not entail the involvement of situated subjects in knowledge 
production. However, Jennifer Tannoch-Bland has an important observation that 
challenges Daston’s account, and which is crucial for the consistency of Longino’s 
account. In her article “From Aperspectival Objectivity to Strong Objectivity: The Quest 
for Moral Objectivity” (1997) Tannoch-Bland claims that communicability has been an 
important issue in science since the time of Bacon. Hence the import of aperspectivity 
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from moral and aesthetic philosophy to natural sciences that Daston talks about needs to 
be reworked.  
Tannoch-Bland’s concern is to locate Harding’s “Strong Objectivity” within 
Daston’s historical account of objectivity. She claims that if the notion of objectivity is an 
evolving notion, as Daston argues, then Harding’s objectivity can be seen as a part of this 
evolution. (Tannoch-Bland 1997, 164) This situation is also true for Longino’s account. In 
her article Tannoch-Bland tries to find ways to escape aperspectivity while retaining the 
ideal of communicability, which is very important for emancipatory feminist projects. She 
argues that although the disinterestedness ideal, which involves enlisting impartiality, 
detachment and self-effacement, is associated with communicability, they are historically 
separate. In contrast to Daston, Tannoch-Bland maintains that what was imported from 
moral and aesthetic philosophy to the natural sciences was the disinterestedness ideal but 
not the communicability ideal. Since the communicability ideal was pursued in Bacon’s 
time, and since there was already a notion of objectivity with no reference to 
disinterestedness at that time, it is an indication that aperspectivity is not the only way to 
achieve communicability. (1997, 165) According to Tannoch-Bland the prolonged 
averaging of viewpoints by communication is not the only possible response to the moral 
problem of perspective. Harding’s notion of a cross-fertilized, enriched, responsible 
systematized perspective could also sustain the democratic communicability ideal. (165) 
Tannoch-Bland’s views on this topic are significant for Longino’s position too, as it paves 
the way to affirming the possibility of public knowledge through partial perspectives. 
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According to the above discussion, then, we can claim that the publicity of science 
does not require interchangeable abstract subjects. To support this claim let me turn to 
Longino and compare her position to Popper’s position on intersubjectivity. As I have 
discussed in Chapter Two, Popper has also discussed the relationship between objectivity 
and public knowledge. According to Popper any scientific statement could, in principle, 
be tested and understood by anybody. He calls this process intersubjective testing. Here 
we find the same conviction as in the idea of reproducibility in defining science. In fact, I 
think Popper’s influence on Longino is undeniable.33 Longino’s insistence on a critical 
community, and on the importance of a transformative critique of different viewpoints in 
important ways follow the legacy of Popper’s falsification method, which also requires a 
critical discourse as a function of communal inquiry. However, as I have argued earlier, 
this communal exercise, according to Popper, is carried out within the set of rational (and 
universal) standards. In adopting the context of discovery and the context of justification 
dichotomy, Popper believes that social values do not have an impact on rational standards. 
For Longino, by contrast, not only are epistemic standards contextual but no 
rational/social dichotomy is tenable.34 Although Longino’s conviction about the social 
production of knowledge seems to be compatible with Popper’s rejection of subjective 
experiences or feelings of conviction as unsuitable candidates for justifying statements, 
Popper’s insistence on eliminating all that is subjective from scientific argumentation sets 
these two philosophers apart. As I have argued, for Longino subjective convictions, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 John Stuart Mill’s pluralism also has a great influence on Longino.    
34 Longino tries to unravel this rational/social dichotomy in The Fate of Knowledge. I will 
discuss her arguments in Chapter Five.  
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contextual values, might contribute to the transformative criticism that is required for 
achieving objectivity. To accept the effects of subjective convictions, however, is not to 
reaffirm individualism. Rather, it buttresses publicity since it serves transformative 
criticism, which is, or should be, a feature of (ideal) epistemic communities. In short, we 
can claim that the link between abstract subjects and intersubjective testing that yields 
publicity is predicated on an assumption that epistemic standards are fixed. However, in a 
contextualist account no such association is needed.  
 
4.3.2    Individualism 
The question of epistemic agency has been a central issue in developing a feminist 
epistemology and a feminist philosophy of science.35 As I discussed earlier many 
feminists have found the individualism embedded in mainstream epistemology 
problematic. In contesting the individualistic approach to knowledge, some feminists, 
among them Harding, Longino and Nelson, emphasized the communal character of 
knowledge production. Yet, according to some other feminists, such as Louise Antony, 
epistemological individualism serves feminist epistemology better than the communal 
view. Antony focuses on methodological individualism which, contra Longino, takes 
individuals as the primary cognitive agents. There are three arguments Antony puts 
forward for methodological individualism against the socialism that Longino defends. Her 
first argument questions the necessity of communal interaction in achieving objectivity. 
She claims that although objectivity requires critical interaction, “an individual can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Hundleby (2004). 
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achieve some degree of objectivity by being reflective about her beliefs, assumptions, etc. 
i.e. the critical interaction can be internal to the individual, so the individual can to some 
extent meet the criterion of objectivity without social interaction.” (Longino 1999, 345) 
This understanding is similar to the method of objectivity suggested by Nagel in The View 
From Nowhere, which I discussed in Chapter One. Here he basically claims that in order 
to achieve an objective understanding of the world we need to step back from our initial 
point of view and form a new conception within which the old one and its relation to the 
world are examined. This procedure could be repeated with each new conception, to 
acquire better objectivity. Such a method rests primarily on individual self-reflection. 
However, as I have argued earlier, the reliability of self-reflection for attaining objectivity 
is highly questionable. The success of self-reflection in detecting biases is limited to the 
assumptions that individuals are aware of. Moreover, achieving objectivity by self-
reflection does not refute the importance of the social.  As Longino rightly points out, 
such reflection still reflects an internal rehearsal of a social practice of criticism. Hence it 
depends on “those patterns of interaction through which the individual learns to reason.” 
(Longino 1999, 345) 
Antony’s second argument for individualism is about epistemic agency. According 
to her, the social presupposes individual epistemic agency. Individuals are 
epistemologically basic because i) individuals cannot leave their subjective position; and 
ii) epistemic processes involve individualistic judgment and perception. (345) However, 
Longino contends that such individual agency is necessary but not sufficient for 
knowledge. It is true that the social is constituted by individuals in interaction and it is not 
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possible to eliminate the individual. Yet the interaction is as necessary as are the 
individuals. (345) She writes, “In the case of scientific inquiry, what is being claimed is 
that interactive practices (a) make personal, individual beliefs [NB: not private sensations 
or experiences] into knowledge and (b) transform belief in the process of challenge and 
response either because the content changes through that process or because the content 
becomes more firmly anchored in a network of experiential and doxastic states.” (345) 
Hence, in Longino’s account the individual is not completely removed from but accepted 
as an agent within the social production of knowledge.  
Antony’s last argument is about the significance of the sociality thesis. According 
to Antony, sociality is not a real challenge to individualism as it merely states that “human 
beings use each other to enhance their own individual epistemic situations”. For Longino 
this is true if “enhancement” is understood quantitatively. In this sense, we extend each 
other’s cognitive range as telescopes and stethoscopes do. (345-6) Accordingly, although 
our knowledge would be limited, social interaction in this sense is not necessary for 
knowledge. However, there is another qualitative sense of “enhancement” that is a real 
threat to individualism, as it refers to the transformation of belief into knowledge. 
Longino is careful to note that the sociality thesis does not target psychological 
individualism. So she does not claim that we could not have the beliefs we have if we did 
not engage in critical interactions with others. What is being questioned is whether those 
beliefs qualify as knowledge or not. In short, she maintains that social interaction 
functions for assessing the validity of knowledge ascriptions.  
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This dichotomous discussion of individuals versus communities as appropriate 
subjects for knowledge has been criticised by Heidi E. Grasswick. According to her, 
individualism need not entail the atomistic view of knowers adopted by mainstream 
epistemologies where epistemic subjects are characterized as generic and self-sufficient 
individuals. (Grasswick 2004, 87) However, she also admits the social and communal 
elements in knowing. Grasswick argues that beginning with a social understanding of 
knowers fits feminist concerns better than either an atomistic understanding of individuals 
or a view that identifies epistemic subjects with the whole community. Accordingly, she 
defends a conception of knowers as “individuals-in-communities”, which accommodates 
both the situatedness and the interdependence of knowers on the one hand, and active and 
reflective agents who can transform and improve knowledge-seeking practices on the 
other hand. (87) Grasswick argues mainly against Nelson’s model of whole communities 
where communities are identified “with those very same communal standards and 
practices.” (110) This view according to Grasswick is problematic because it cannot 
account for how communal practices can improve and transform knowledge practices. 
The main reason for this shortcoming is that, a wholistic communal view fails to 
recognize that individuals “engage in multiple communities and communal practices.” 
(110) In other words, individuals often have membership in multiple communities and no 
community is made out of individuals who subscribe to the exact same standards in their 
knowledge practices. Grasswick writes, “[improvement and transformation] sometimes 
come from either individuals or subcommunities dissenting from the current communal 
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practices, and challenging the norms of the practice.”36 (106) According to Grasswick, 
Longino’s account does not face this problem because she emphasises the importance of 
critical interaction among individuals in knowledge production. As I discussed earlier, for 
Longino genuine transformative criticism requires diversity among members (Longino 
2002, 148). In a sense then the differences in individuals are the force building critical 
communities that produce knowledge. This view can accommodate the capacity of 
individuals to challenge and improve knowledge systems. But as Grasswick rightly 
argues, “since critical interaction is so crucial to answering normative questions Longino 
is interested in, she spends more time detailing this interactive nature of the knowers than 
their situatedness.” (Grasswick 2004, 111) I will discuss in the next section that this 
negligence leads Longino to focus on regulative standards for only a certain group of 
people.  
Although discerning the appropriate characteristics of epistemic subjects is 
important for developing a consistent feminist epistemology, I think it is futile to argue 
which comes first (individuals or communities?). Rather than dealing with a chicken and 
egg sort of dilemma, feminists need to focus on elucidating appropriate characteristics for 
different epistemic subjects whose characteristics vary in accordance with the social 
locations they occupy, details of which I will discuss in the following.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 A good example for this situation is feminist scientists who have used “the tools and 
perspectives of both the scientific community and the feminist community, critically 
engaging with these resources” come to “recognize the presence of gender bias and 
androcentrism in science.” (Grasswick 2004, 109)
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4.3.3    The Adequacy of Longino’s Norms  
The transformation of belief into knowledge through social interaction is at the heart of 
Longino’s sociality thesis. This thesis, however, puts immense pressure on objectivity. If 
social interaction fails to detect and erase prejudices, then, biased accounts will be 
accepted as “knowledge”. That is why it is crucial to monitor social interaction. 
According to Longino, the more different points of view are included in social interaction, 
the better our chances of detecting biases. The norms that she sets out aim to maintain 
diversity in science.37 Are they adequate, though, to accomplish this important task in real 
life situations?  
  As I have mentioned, there is a tension between Longino’s norms that aim to 
maintain diverse viewpoints in scientific practice, and intellectual authority that excludes 
certain viewpoints from science. I have argued that Crasnow’s example of mystical 
experiences does not hold, yet her concern is still noteworthy. On what grounds do we 
accept the intellectual authority of certain viewpoints and dismiss others? I have argued 
that “relevance” to science is one good reason. However, there might be certain groups of 
viewpoints that conform to the reproducibility criterion that I discuss above and yet would 
still be excluded from the scientific enterprise. Such cases typically occur when prejudices 
are diffused in our collective modes of thinking and social imagery. These prejudices 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 These norms according to Longino are criteria for objectivity. For her, “Scientific 
communities will be objective to the degree that they satisfy four criteria for achieving 
the transformative dimension of critical discourse.” (1990, 76) She also writes, “As such 
they constitute norms applying to the social practices and processes of cognition … 
Satisfaction of these norms assures that theories and hypotheses accepted in the 
community will not incorporate the idiosyncratic biases (heuristic or social) of an 
individual or subgroup.” (2002, 134) 
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degrade the cognitive capacity and epistemic credibility of those who are notably different 
from the dominant group. Thus, viewpoints of the marginalized may be dismissed as 
illogical, unreasonable, too sentimental, irrelevant, untrustworthy and so forth. As I have 
argued, when prejudices are globally endorsed, these exclusions pass unnoticed. 
Specifically, when the degradations I mention are internalized by the marginalized 
themselves, it further complicates ways of exposing and fighting against biases. In these 
complex cases, having formal rules that prescribe the inclusion of different viewpoints in 
science seems to be insufficient to achieve genuine diversity.  
Many feminists have argued for responsible knowing practices in order to prevent 
biases and maintain epistemic justice. However, there seems to be something missing in 
this literature. The talk of responsible knowing practices among feminists is typically 
directed to those who are already (or potentially will be, with no obstruction) in the 
epistemic circle. Longino’s norms for an ideal epistemic community present an example 
of this case. Her prescription to include different viewpoints is mainly directed at 
scientists and philosophers of science. It is as if this group of people are the sole actors 
who could allow for different viewpoints to be heard. They are the ones who are required 
to pursue virtues such as open-mindedness, attentiveness and empathy in order to reinstall 
the epistemic credibility of the marginalized.38 According to Longino’s prescription, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For instance Harding writes, “[an inclusive science project] requires learning to listen 
attentively to marginalized people; it requires educating oneself about their histories, 
achievements, preferred social relations, and hopes for the future; it requires putting one’s 
body on the line for “their” cause until they feel like “our” causes; it requires critical 
examination of the dominant institutional beliefs and practices that systematically 
	   203	  
being attentive and open-minded, these philosophers and scientists will become aware of 
their biases and be willing to modify their own biased beliefs and accounts. That is, 
transformative criticism will be accomplished. The fact that Longino does not say 
anything about what the marginalized themselves could do for the ideal of inclusive 
science seems to support my contention that her norms are directed at the dominant group. 
The lack of any norms for the marginalized weakens the adequacy of Longino’s overall 
prescription about inclusive science. It is reasonable to claim, then, that Longino’s norms 
are necessary conditions for maintaining an ideal epistemic community, but sufficiency 
requires considering what the marginalized could and should do too. Nonetheless, I think 
Harding’s FST points in the right direction in taking into consideration the active role the 
marginalized play in producing more objective accounts. Hence Longino’s account should 
align with Harding’s FST in this respect.  
  Harding’s methodology suggests starting thought from marginalized viewpoints. 
Since this methodology could and should be applied by anyone (whether marginalized or 
not) one could question where the active role of the marginalized resides in FST. I think 
the active role of the marginalized is embedded not in starting thought from marginalized 
viewpoints, but in Harding’s emphasis on “strong reflexivity” and in FST’s revolutionary 
spirit reflected in its Marxian roots. 
No doubt active engagement of the marginalized in projects of inclusive science 
demands self-awareness of their social (and epistemic) disadvantage. As I have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
disadvantage them; it requires critical self-examination to discover how one unwittingly 
participates in generating disadvantage to them... and more.” (1993, 68) 
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mentioned, consciousness-raising activities have proved quite useful in acquiring such 
awareness. I think the notion of “strong reflexivity” is an important part of this 
consciousness-raising. Recall that “strong reflexivity” requires that “the subject of 
knowledge be placed on the same critical, causal plane as the objects of knowledge.” 
(Harding 1993, 69) This means that subjects, their relations to the world (including social 
phenomena), their self-conceptions and assumptions, and the value systems they are 
operating in should be subjected to meticulous analyses, just as objects of knowledge are.  
It is important to emphasize again that “strong reflexivity” is not mere self-reflexivity 
when it is confined in an individualistic practice. It is primarily a social activity. I have 
discussed the limitations of self-reflexivity: it is restricted to those assumptions that one is 
already aware of.  Longino’s defence of the sociality of knowledge also applies here: 
Although one could in principle reflect and become aware of one’s biases, the tools for 
such reflection are socially delivered. More importantly, “strong reflexivity” is not merely 
a cognitive capacity but also a social practice which generates political force. 
Harding proposes that “strong reflexivity” should be embraced by everyone (both 
the marginalized and those who already have intellectual authority). However, its 
adoption and practice have a special significance for the marginalized. As the 
marginalized become more aware of the injustices done to them, they may start to voice 
their concerns more loudly, become more visible, make themselves harder to ignore, 
hence potentially form a political force for maintaining inclusive science. Since the 
marginalized do not possess the actual power to directly control and shape discursive 
norms, as Bar On warns us, this political force as a result of strong reflexivity becomes 
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even more crucial to putting pressure on those who regulate the norms. This political 
pressure is as important as the social and epistemic norms themselves because it will act 
as a constant reminder of the importance of and motivation for pursuing the social and 
epistemic norms set out for an inclusive science which leads to more objective accounts 
than a non-inclusive science.  
In sum, the ideal of inclusive science is not only an ethical and political but also an 
epistemological ideal. The inclusion of diverse viewpoints results in more accurate and 
adequate accounts, as it helps to reveal and abolish the invisible biases permeating 
society. In order to maintain inclusion in science, social norms should be managed and 
monitored. This monitoring is possible by regulating the epistemic community. Here the 
question of who the regulators are and should be is very important. Yet, in so far as the 
monitoring of social norms itself is a process that is open to communal critical evaluation, 
the risk of regulations and regulators becoming totalitarian is minimized.  Democratic 
regulation of the epistemic community demands norms for the dominant groups (i.e. those 
who are already in the epistemic circle and who have direct power over epistemic 
regulations) and for the marginalized (i.e. those who are excluded from the epistemic 
circle although they comply with the reproducibility criterion). Longino sets out criteria 
for the scientific community, which is likely to comprise mostly members of dominant 
groups, for inclusion of diverse viewpoints and achieving transformative criticism. 
Nevertheless, we need additional norms that could apply to the marginalized, who could 
and should have an active role in the maintenance of inclusive science. I argue that 
“strong reflexivity” is one such norm because it generates collective awareness, which 
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paves the way for a political struggle to be heard and make a real difference. Accordingly, 
there is a responsibility on the part of the marginalized too, to be included in knowledge 
producing activities. This process would help remove existing biases and prevent 
prejudices taking root. One implication of this line of thinking for philosophers is that 
when we talk of responsible knowing practices we need to distinguish the responsibilities 
of knowing subjects according to their social locations. While members of dominant 
groups should possess virtues such as attentive listening, open-mindedness, empathy and 
so forth, the marginalized need be self-aware, insistent, persistent, resistant and without 
fear of reprisal.  
 
4.4   Conclusion 
Longino’s criticisms of the received view are important. She not only undermines the 
main assumptions upon which a mainstream understanding of objectivity lies, but also 
proposes a promising conceptualization of objectivity that could replace the former. Her 
account of objectivity is compelling because it preserves the core of “objectivity”, i.e. 
control and maintenance of values, yet does not rest on an illusion of detachment and 
universality. By sharing this core and the assumption that there is a common language 
with which we can describe phenomena, she can maintain a dialogue with mainstream 
philosophers, practising scientists and members of the general public who are attuned to 
empiricist terminology. This dialogue is important for transforming some of the mistaken 
core beliefs that lead to biased accounts. 
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  Longino contends that the social monitoring of values in science demands strict 
regulation of epistemic communities. She provides an elaborate account of the features of 
an idealized epistemic community. Yet her norms, while they are very important, are 
incomplete. I have argued that her norms are directed towards people who already have 
(privileged) access to the epistemic terrain. However, norms are standards of social 
behaviour expected from actual or potential actors (knowers). There is an undesired 
consequence of overlooking the responsibilities that the marginalized have (or should 
have) in knowledge practices: that is, the unintended undermining of the marginalized as 
potential knowers. I have argued that norms that are directed to the marginalized should 
be included in Longino’s ideal epistemic community in order to reduce this risk. I think 
“strong reflexivity” is potentially a promising norm that the marginalized could utilize. 
In this chapter I have not dealt with what is perhaps the most common criticism 
against situating knowledge, that is, the charge of relativism. For instance Crasnow claims 
that “a feminist philosophy of science should improve our understanding of traditional 
concepts without falling into relativism.” Accordingly, she argues that since Longino's 
feminist account admits cultural and epistemic relativism, it cannot be a genuine 
alternative to a mainstream philosophy of science. I will examine this criticism in the next 
chapter where I explore the relationship between ontological objectivity and 
epistemological objectivity.
	   208	  
Chapter Five  
 
Feminism and Relativism 
 
One of the charges that most often occurs in the literature opposed to feminist philosophy 
of science is that it leads to relativism. In this chapter I will address two versions of this 
charge. The first criticism I will discuss is the general claim that feminists endorse the/a 
gender specificity of knowledge which leads to a form of relativism that undermines 
knowledge. I will examine in what ways the gender specificity of knowledge could be 
understood and the forms of relativism that would follow from them. I will argue that 
feminists need not endorse a universal claim about the gender specificity of knowledge. 
The second criticism I will discuss is Sharon Crasnow’s criticism brought specifically 
against Longino’s account of objectivity. Briefly, she claims that Longino’s position does 
not go any further than affirming intersubjectivity, and hence does not provide a firm 
ground from which to constrain our beliefs. My response to this criticism involves 
denying the clear-cut distinction between ontological and epistemological objectivity 
which Crasnow presupposes. I will argue that although distinguishing things that are 
represented, which fall under ontological objectivity, and the processes used to represent 
them, which fall under epistemological objectivity, may be conceptually helpful, in 
practicing science it is unintelligible to talk of the things that are represented apart from 
the representation process itself. 
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5.1    Gender Specificity of Knowledge 
Feminists are charged with defending the idea that knowledge is in some ways gender-
specific. (Niiniluoto 1997) This claim has been interpreted and objected to in various 
ways. It is often seen as a relativization of knowledge to gender. However, views differ in 
respect to what component(s) of knowledge gender has a bearing on.  Since each 
interpretation conveys different ontological and epistemological commitments, 
identification and clarification of these interpretations are important in inquiring into the 
relationship between feminism and relativism.  
 In straw arguments against feminism the relativization of knowledge to gender is 
presented as a universal claim. Is all knowledge gender specific? If so, in what ways is it 
so? One way of making sense of this universal claim is to maintain that men and women 
live in totally different worlds. According to this line of thought, since the objects of their 
knowledge belong to gender-specific worlds their knowledge is inevitably shaped by 
gender. Putting aside the questions about the accuracy of the claim about different worlds 
for now, this form of universal gender-specificity is no more interesting than claiming that 
knowledge is species-specific. That is, since, say, bees perceive a world drastically 
different from the world we human beings perceive, we could say that they live in a 
different world, and hence their “knowledge” of the world would be shaped by their 
species. The claim that knowledge is species-relative is not troublesome for many (except 
perhaps for those who are strongly committed to the idea that knowledge is a cognitive 
process, and the only cognitive beings are human beings) since the objects of knowledge 
for each species are different. Similarly, if men and women indeed live in different 
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worlds, then the claim that knowledge is gender-specific is not troublesome. However, the 
claim about different worlds is a controversial one. Although it may be true that women 
and men experience certain aspects of the world in different ways, it is implausible to 
jump from this claim to the idea of their living in two drastically different worlds. If it 
were so, it would be extremely difficult to account for the many cases (in different aspects 
of the world) that women and men agree upon. Moreover, it would be futile to make any 
judgment about the desirability of adopting the knowledge (or ways of knowing) of one 
sex over the other since each form of knowledge would be a function of different worlds. 
In what other ways can we talk about the gender-specificity of knowledge then?  
 
5.1.1    Gender Specificity and Fact-Constructivism 
A more troublesome discourse of the gender specificity of knowledge is closely tied to 
arguments about the social construction of knowledge. This is because, unlike the claim 
that differences in knowledge are grounded on natural/necessary disparities between men 
and women, social construction implies that contingent factors come into play in 
knowledge acquisition. One line of argument would ground the social construction of 
knowledge on the social construction of facts, i.e. objects of knowledge. A proponent of 
the universal gender-specificity of knowledge, then, could argue that since gender is an 
indispensable actor in social power relations which has a bearing on all facts, it inevitably 
plays a role in the social construction of all knowledge. The plausibility of such a claim 
obviously rests on the plausibility of the argument for the social construction of all facts. 
Yet, the idea of the social construction of facts is a highly controversial topic in 
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philosophy, and I do not intend to propose a solution for it. But I would like to question 
whether feminists indeed need to subscribe to such a view in adopting an emancipatory 
project and defending gender equality in the cognitive domain.  
 There are different ways of discussing the social construction of facts. I will 
restrict my discussion to Paul Boghossian’s formulation. In rejecting fact constructivism 
he makes the following distinctions: For fact constructivism “it is a necessary truth about 
any fact that it obtains only because we humans have constructed it in a way that reflects 
our contingent needs and interests. This view stands opposed to fact-objectivism, 
according to which many facts about the world obtain entirely independently of human 
beings.” (Boghossian 2006, 25) According to Boghossian, for a fact objectivist, facts 
about mountains, dinosaurs or electrons could obtain independently of humans because 
humans do not have any role in their existence. A striking point in his view is that a fact-
objectivist “is not committed to any particular catalogue of mind-independent facts,” but 
committed to the idea that some facts obtain independent of humans without having to 
state or know which facts are mind-independent. (25-26) Fact-constructivists, on the other 
hand, do not deny that the world contains facts about mountains, electrons, etc. but 
dispute the nature of those facts. As Boghossian puts it, for a fact-constructivist “no fact 
can obtain independent of societies and their contingent needs and interests.” (26)  
 Here I would like to insert a parenthesis to point out the element of arbitrariness 
in the literature in labelling certain (perhaps most) philosophical positions. In 
Boghossian’s formulation, fact constructivism is a universal claim. That is, according to 
fact constructivists all facts are necessarily socially constructed (in a way that satisfies our 
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needs and benefits our interests). Opponents of this position view it as relativising 
knowledge to our contingent needs and interests. Since needs and benefits are contingent 
upon circumstances, and upon whose needs are taken into account, different groups of 
people in different situations could construct different facts when faced with the same 
objects and/or relations. This situation opens up the possibility of ascribing two different 
truth-values to a knowledge claim about the object/relation at hand (depending on who the 
attributors are, and the facts they endorse). Since there seems to be no “neutral” point 
such as a “mind- independent world” to assess which set of facts is the “correct” one, 
knowledge becomes relative to the contingently constructed facts. Accordingly social 
constructivism construed as such is in direct contrast with the conventional coupling 
between objectivity and mind-independent facts which inhibit relativism.  Here the 
assumption is that facts that obtain independently are absolute. According to this 
understanding since objective statements express mind-independent facts they do not 
change across people, cultures or communities. However, the talk of mind-independence 
is ambiguous and could refer to different positions which I will discuss in the second 
section of this chapter. Now, let me continue by pointing out that in Boghossian’s view 
fact constructivism presents a universal claim, and fact-objectivism presents an existential 
claim. That is, according to a fact-objectivist although some facts are socially constructed, 
some other facts obtain independently of human minds. For instance, facts about money 
or presidential systems are socially constructed, because their existence requires human 
existence and classifications. However, the scope of this formulation is questionable. 
There could be some philosophers who identify themselves as fact-constructivists without 
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adopting a universal claim. For instance, a philosopher could emphasize the social 
construction of certain facts (including facts commonly attributed mind-independent 
existence, i.e. existence without any human intervention) yet refrain from making any 
judgment about certain other facts whose status is debatable, or adopt a sceptical attitude 
towards any statement regarding a mind-independent world.  According to Boghossian’s 
classification these people do not fully belong to either of the two groups.  Although 
Boghossian’s formulation is in harmony with the common-sense distinction between the 
natural and the social that we appeal to in “our” everyday life, it fails to encompass all 
possible positions that one could adopt regarding the status of facts.  
 More importantly, Boghossian’s favouring of fact-objectivism is apparent in its 
formulation as an existential claim coupled with the disclaimer regarding the knowledge 
of the specific facts that are mind-independent. In other words, formulated as a universal 
claim, fact-constructivism is far more susceptible to falsification than fact-objectivism. On 
the other hand, when you claim that some facts are socially constructed and some facts are 
mind-independent, and you also claim that you do not need to know which facts are mind-
independent in order to be an objectivist (or a realist), you protect yourself with a pretty 
strong position, falsification of which is hardly possible. This is because, you can dismiss 
any counter argument that presents examples in favour of social constructivism by 
claiming that the examples at hand belong to the class of socially constructed facts, and 
that they do not undermine the existence of mind-independent facts, without having to 
state which facts are mind-independent. However, what you actually gain by adopting 
such a position is debatable. In rejecting fact-constructivism Boghossian appeals to facts 
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about concrete objects. For instance he claims that since there were mountains before 
humans, many facts about mountains should have obtained before humans constructed 
them. Obviously, Boghossian would not want to accept antecedence to human beings as 
the only marker for independent existence. After all, he would want to claim that there are 
independent facts, say, about human beings that are not constructed. He seems to adopt 
some form of social kind-natural kind distinction as the examples that he puts forward for 
mind-independent facts fall under natural phenomena while his examples for socially 
constructed facts fall under social phenomena. Yet even then there are many cases the 
kind of which is debatable (and probably not resolvable because they might belong to 
both categories in certain aspects). Not all facts are as easily distinguishable as the 
existence of mountains (an independent fact about a natural kind) and the existence of 
money (a constructed fact about a social kind). How could a fact-objectivist position, with 
its disclaimer, guide one in dealing with complex cases such as facts about women and 
men or about stupidity and intelligence?1 For example, an ultimate classification of  
“womanhood” in terms of the natural or the social is nearly impossible. This is because, 
first, even if we come up with biological conditions for being a “woman” these would not 
necessarily correspond to one’s feeling like (or not feeling like) a woman. Such 
discrepancies occur because “womanhood” encompasses a complex web of physical, 
psychological and social elements.  Furthermore, characteristics attributed to womanhood 
change from time to time and/or culture to culture. These changes also imply that there is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Another complicated example involves the status of epistemic facts which I discuss 
below.  
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not a fixed object that ‘womanhood’ in its totality refers to. The problem with the 
objectivist position is that if we need not know which facts are constructed and which are 
not, then it is not easy to see the point in making the distinction. What does such a 
distinction serve other than conceptual comfort? I believe such comfort is not justifiable 
especially when social policies are based on so-called natural kinds because they are 
believed to express absolute facts. A likely danger of an objectivist insight is that it could 
easily make us blind to the elements of the social in certain established facts. Objectivism 
as formulated by Boghossian does not provide any theoretical means to alert us to the 
effects of the social in adopting a dogmatic line between constructed and mind-
independent facts. 
 Another confusion about Boghossian’s classification has to do with the extent to 
which knowledge-relativity is acceptable. I have mentioned that Boghossian does not 
deny the existence of constructed facts. I have also mentioned how the social construction 
of facts is seen as relativizing knowledge to our contingent needs. Hence if fact-
objectivists agree that some facts are socially constructed, they should be comfortable 
with the relativity of some knowledge claims since, say, some other culture could in 
principle have constructed different facts about a given phenomenon than “our” facts 
about the same phenomenon. Nevertheless, in the literature, the defenders of objectivism 
(or realism) do not emphasize this situation enough, and they argue that no knowledge 
claim is/should be relative.  The reason why this point is important is that the literature on 
realism versus relativism is presented as an all or nothing issue. This attitude dismisses 
those positions which embrace both views in different ways. That is, arguing for the 
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relativity of certain knowledge claims while not making a universal claim about all 
knowledge claims is not allowed. 
 In criticising Boghossian’s formulation I do not intend to deny that there are no 
independent facts. However, I think adopting fact-objectivism without having a good 
sense of which facts are mind-independent and which are not merely provides  theoretical 
satisfaction with no practical applicability to real life situations. I think the urgent 
question that needs to be answered is which of the following attitudes is “just” (in all 
senses of the term) for our epistemic practices, specifically those pertaining to science: i) 
thinking that we obtain independent unchangeable facts about the world, and base our 
lives and policies on this belief while there is a chance that we might be wrong; or ii) 
thinking that since we cannot “know” whether we obtain independent facts or not, we 
should treat all facts as if they are socially constructed (even if they are not) and always be 
wary of any undesirable consequences of accepted facts that benefit our interests. 
Feminists often suggest adopting something similar to the second attitude. 
 In the epistemology literature, feminists are generally presented as adopting a 
belief in the social construction of facts, although they mostly do not (or need not) appeal 
to a universal claim about the social construction of facts. After all, emphasizing the 
situation that certain facts about men and women are socially constructed in a way that 
serves male interests is not equivalent to denying there can be facts that obtain 
independently. For instance, Longino’s commitment to the publicity of science indicates 
her agreement about the existence of mind independent facts. She identifies two 
conditions for the publicity of science: i) that we have a common language which we use 
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to describe our experience and within which we reason; ii) that the objects of experience 
which we describe and about which we reason are purported to exist independently of our 
seeing and thinking about them. (Longino 1990, 70) These conditions express a 
commitment to a minimal realism which opposes an idealistic view that restricts existence 
(including the existence of objects of experience) to the contents our minds. This 
commitment, however, does not automatically entail the view that there is one true 
description of the object of our experience. It is compatible with the idea that there can be 
multiple correct descriptions of a phenomenon. In fact, it can be argued that Longino’s 
position is akin to the position that Boghossian dubs the social relativism of descriptions. 
According to this view “which scheme we adopt to describe the world will depend on 
which scheme we find it useful to adopt; and which scheme we find it useful to adopt will 
depend on our contingent needs and interests as social beings” (29) In Longino’s view 
which scheme we adopt to describe the world depends on our background assumptions 
(which may reflect our interests and needs). As Boghossian admits, such a position does 
not entail fact-constructivism. 
 In Boghossian’s terms then, feminism is not necessarily incompatible with fact-
objectivism. However, many feminists would maintain that committing to the existence of 
mind-independent facts without a sceptical approach to claims about mind-independency 
or without providing any means to detect which facts are in fact mind-independent is not 
sufficient for achieving “just” epistemic practices. This is apparent in the importance 
feminists give to rigorous analysis and identification of which facts are socially 
constructed and how. Hence, these feminists often adopt a stronger position than fact-
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objectivism. This is the intended aim of both the ideal of strong objectivity presented by 
Harding, and the transformative criticism made possible by the intersubjective exchange 
defended by Longino. The ultimate argument of feminist studies of science is that in the 
absence of a thorough examination of the context within which science is practised, some 
facts will be accepted as natural (hence fixed and unchangeable) although they are shaped 
by social and political interests.  According to Harding and Longino, these misidentified 
facts are not merely a result of the failures of individual scientists but a consequence of 
structural vulnerabilities embedded in the scientific enterprise. Nothing in these claims 
requires feminists to adopt a universal claim about the social construction of facts. 
 Where does the gender specificity of knowledge reside in these feminist positions 
then? For many feminists, the gender specificity of knowledge resides primarily in 
methodology rather than ontology. Recall from the third chapter that for Harding 
knowledge is gender specific in cases where one’s gender helps to reveal biases in 
accepted views. In the current Western androcentric worldview, for instance, women are 
in a more epistemologically advantageous position than men in gender related matters. 
Due to their oppressed positions women are more open to detect sex biases than men who 
do not have any interest in the exposure of such biases. Accordingly, the social 
(contingent) character of facts that are accepted as absolute is made visible. Here, 
however, the scope of knowledge that is gender specific is limited to matters about, 
related to and affected by gender relations. Hence it does not invoke gender specificity for 
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all knowledge.2  It is important to note, however, that elaborate feminist works on various 
aspects of human life show that the scope of such matters is a lot broader than is 
conventionally thought.3 As I discuss in detail in the previous chapter, Longino also 
agrees that one’s gender could help reveal sexist biases prevailing in the scientific 
community during transformative criticism. For instance, it is more likely for a female 
scientist to notice and criticize the andocentric assumptions prevailing in models of 
reproduction where an active role is attributed to sperm and a passive role to eggs in the 
process of fertilizations.  But for Longino, gender specificity goes further than a privilege 
in detecting biases. She defends the effectiveness of adopting feminist ideals in assessing 
certain subject matters. It is important to note that the form of relativism that this view 
implies is different from the one Harding’s position implies. Here it is maintained that 
assessment of a knowledge claim (including its processes of justification) is relative to the 
adopted ideals which are appropriate to the goals or concerns of the inquiry at hand. In 
other words, while the former view relativizes achieving (some) knowledge to subjects’ 
identities (such as gender), the latter view relativizes justification to background 
assumptions where power relations pertaining to gender could operate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 So it can be said that feminist philosophy of science endorses a kind of relativism 
pertaining to methodology. According to this view our epistemic interaction with the 
world, that is, how we perceive the world and form beliefs about certain aspects of it is 
relative to various factors such as gender, race, class, age and social position. Yet, still, it 
can be argued that this position does not (need not) maintain that all knowledge is relative 
to the above variables. 
3 See Harding and O’Barr (1987); Fonow and Cook (1991); Crowley and Himmelweit 
(1994); Garry and Pearsall (1996). 
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 Admittedly, introducing feminist ideals in assessing certain knowledge claims 
goes against the contention about the fixity of epistemic standards. If the epistemic 
principles and ideals we adopt in assessing knowledge claims vary depending on, say, the 
subject matter and the intended goal of the inquiry and so forth, then it will be implausible 
to talk of the existence of absolute epistemic facts. One line of argument suggests that by 
virtue of introducing contingent elements in epistemic assessments, this view undermines 
the rationality of our epistemic practices and makes room for epistemic relativism. Here 
the underlying assumption seems to be that relativism is irrational. This assumption rests 
on the belief that reasoning rests on fixed principles. However, the nature of these 
principles, that is, whether they are universally fixed or contextually fixed is of crucial 
importance for the claim that relativism is irrational. If they are universally fixed, then we 
have to accept that relativism is in fact irrational. If, on the other hand, principles of 
reasoning are contextually fixed, i.e. if contextual factors have a role in determining 
which principles to follow in our reasoning, then we can argue that not all forms of 
relativism are irrational. In the next section, I will discuss Boghossian’s arguments against 
epistemic relativism and consider how they affect the forms of relativism that I identified 
as adopted by Longino.   
 
5.1.2    Epistemic Relativism: The Social Construction of Epistemic Standards 
Boghossian writes "the world out there is what it is largely independent of us and our 
beliefs about it. There are many facts that we did not have a hand in shaping. If we want 
to make a true conception of the way the world is, our beliefs need to accurately reflect 
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those mind-independent facts. Of course, the world does not just inscribe itself onto our 
minds. In trying to get at the truth, what we do is to figure out what's true from the 
evidence available to us. We try to form the belief that it would be most rational to have, 
given the evidence.” (2006, 58) He proceeds with questioning whether there is only one 
way of forming rational beliefs given the evidence. According to Boghossian epistemic 
relativism is the view that “there are no universal epistemic facts, that facts about what 
belief is justified by a given item of evidence can vary from community to 
community…different people may rationally arrive at opposed conclusions, even as they 
acknowledge all the same data." (59) He claims that epistemic relativists adopt a) 
epistemic non-absolutism: there are no absolute facts about what belief a particular item 
of information justifies, b) epistemic relationism: according to the epistemic system C, 
that I, S, accept, information E justifies belief B, and c) epistemic pluralism: there are 
many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, but no facts by 
virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others. (84-85) 
Boghossian opposes each of these formulations. I will not discuss the specifics of 
his arguments but I would like to make some general remarks about his objections. Just as 
he formulates fact-constructivism in a specific way, Boghossian presents epistemic 
relativism as the view that no (rational) distinctions between different epistemic systems 
can be made.4 However, epistemic non-absolutism does not immediately entail that there 
are no facts that help us distinguish between epistemic systems. Before delving into this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 An epistemic system, according to Boghossian, “consists of a set of general normative 
propositions—epistemic principles—which specify under which conditions a particular 
type of belief is justified.” (85) 
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issue let me note that in his discussion of epistemic facts Boghossian mostly focuses on 
instances of justification. In other words, he is interested in whether a piece of information 
E justifies the belief B or not. However, justification is not the sole component of 
knowledge, and therefore the scope of epistemic facts could surpass instances of 
justification. For instance, we can argue that instances of belief formation are closely 
related to matters of epistemic fact. Since the way we form beliefs is a function of 
complex interactions between cognitive, psychological and social processes, different 
people could form different beliefs about the same phenomenon.5 Perhaps it is not 
controversial to claim that a belief is relative to an individual or a group of people with 
their specific circumstances. There is no doubt that a belief is relative to a cognitive 
subject by virtue of being a psychological entity. Yet it is also very important to 
emphasize the specificity of circumstances in which a belief is formed, because situating 
belief formation helps us better understand why two individuals form different beliefs 
about the same phenomena and why certain phenomena are missing in certain people’s 
fields of belief formation altogether. It could be argued that this form of relativism is quite 
mild, and some might want to reserve the term “epistemic relativism” for cases of truth 
and/or rationality. However, it is often neglected that beliefs are the starting point 
knowledge claims. Even if we accept that beliefs are transformed into knowledge through 
justification, a justified belief would still be confined to the initial belief which was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In claiming this I do not assert that belief forming is merely an individualistic practice. I 
accept that epistemic agents are not isolated and that they are dependent on one another 
in various ways. Perhaps the basic form of this dependency is expressed in Longino’s 
view that individuals learn to reason through their interaction with other people. (Longino 
1999, 345) 
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shaped by certain circumstances. For instance, if a belief about, say, a human disease is 
formed within a worldview where the male body constitutes the paradigm of human 
beings, and is “justified”, it will at best produce incomplete “knowledge”. Hence the 
relativity of beliefs to individuals in concrete circumstances has important consequences 
for our knowledge claims and should not be overlooked. 
Nevertheless for the sake of the argument, let's grant Boghossian that epistemic 
relativism is primarily about justification. According to this conception of relativism, 
epistemic facts are constructed. However, since both an objectivist and a fact-
constructivist agree that there are some facts that are constructed, we need to discuss why 
objectivists deny that epistemic facts are constructed. One of the ways to deny that 
epistemic facts are constructed is to endorse the view that the epistemic standards and 
principles we operate with are all fixed. So let's distinguish between those who hold that 
epistemic standards and principles are absolutely (or universally) fixed and those who 
hold that they are not fixed, or fixed only according to our contingent needs and goals. In 
the literature on epistemic contextualism the former are called invariantalists while the 
latter are called contextualists.6 Although Boghossian does not use this terminology, we 
can call him an invariantalist as he defends the claim that “facts about what belief would 
be justified by a given piece of evidence are facts that must be thought of as absolute, and 
not as varying from social context to social context." (2006, 111) It is within this 
understanding that endorsing epistemic non-absolutism is seen as a barrier to a rational 
choice between two different epistemic systems. According to this view, rejecting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Among others Keith De Rose and Jason Stanley use this terminology.	  	  
	   224	  
absolute epistemic facts invites the influence of our contingent needs and interests on 
epistemic principles, which in turn deprives us of rational (universal) criteria in deciding 
on epistemic systems. Nevertheless the universality of epistemic principles is not 
indubitable. We can, for instance, question whether all epistemic principles are fixed and 
whether there are any epistemic principles that reflect our contingent needs and goals.7 If 
there are some epistemic principles that apply universally, we can question whether they 
can provide sufficient guidance in all epistemic circumstances or whether we can have 
knowledge of these principles so that we can follow them in making decisions between 
different epistemic systems. These questions are worth investigating because if so-called 
fixed principles are not sufficient to guide our decisions in all circumstances, and 
contextual features indeed have a bearing on all or some epistemic principles, then we are 
compelled to modify our epistemological investigations. Rather than clinging to search for 
universal principles, for instance, we should try to understand the interplay between 
contextual values and epistemic facts. We should question to what extent the influence of 
contextual values should be tolerated, and in what ways we should guard our epistemic 
practices against the negative effects of contextual values. It is only after providing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is worth noting that in epistemology and the philosophy science literature there isn’t a 
determinate set of epistemic principles that is unanimously accepted. Empirical adequacy, 
simplicity, scope, fruitfulness, and so forth have been endorsed as rational principles in 
theory choice in the philosophy of science. On the other hand, some feminists have 
adopted ontological heterogeneity, mutuality of interaction, trustworthiness and empathy 
as epistemic ideals. More broadly, in epistemology the conditions for 
justification/knowledge such as certainty (absolute or to a certain extent), a causal link 
between a belief and what makes the belief true, reliability of belief formation processes, 
and non-existence of relative alternatives constitute some of the epistemic standards that 
have been put forward by various philosophers.  
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satisfactory answers to these questions that we can have a meaningful and informative 
discussion about comparing different epistemic systems. In the absence of a commitment 
to universally fixed epistemic principles, we must give up the search universal criteria that 
will guide our decisions and allow us to deem “rational” only those choices that 
presumably rest on such criteria. Instead we must investigat and compare in detail the 
contextual features of rival epistemic systems against a given (local) goal. It is through 
this process that we achieve a “reasonable” choice.  
Turning back to the question of why we should accept the universality of 
epistemic facts, I propose following Boghossian’s reasoning. Recall that he suggests “in 
trying to get at the truth, what we do is to figure out what's true from the evidence 
available to us. We try to form the belief that it would be most rational to have, given the 
evidence.”8 (59) So, in trying to get at “the truth” about the nature of epistemic facts, we 
need to figure out what it is rational to believe given the evidence. Now the question is, 
what evidence does an invariantalist have to have in order to claim that epistemic 
principles are fixed?  
One way to argue for the absolute fixity of epistemic principles is to claim that 
they are mind-independent. The argument could proceed as follows: since epistemic 
standards exist outside the mind they are immune to human intervention, hence would not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Boghossian’s concern in this passage is to achieve an accurate representation of the way 
the world is. But he identifies the way the world is with mind-independent facts, as if 
those facts he identified as mind-dependent are not a part of the world. In other words, his 
“world” is a pretty “small” world. It could even be argued that because he does not apply 
this reasoning in his discussion of epistemic facts, he might think that these facts do not 
belong to the way the world is. 
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vary from social context to social context. However, there are a few obvious problems 
with this line of reasoning. Whether this immunity is sufficient to preserve absolute fixity 
is questionable. After all, mind-independent facts, such as facts about mountains, do 
change without human intervention, as a result of natural forces. Furthermore, there are 
also mind-independent facts that are changed by human intervention. For instance, facts 
about a river would change as a result of human manipulation of the riverbed. Hence 
mind-independence does not guarantee that there will be no human intervention. Perhaps 
a specific meaning is attributed to the claim that epistemic facts are mind-independent. 
For instance, it might refer to the non-arbitrariness of epistemic standards. Yet this 
meaning does not necessarily convey universality. In other words, epistemic standards can 
be fixed depending on specific circumstances. In this view, because epistemic standards 
are a function of determinate circumstances they are not arbitrary. Yet, such contextual 
fixity would not yield (absolute) universality. 
 Another attempt to preserve the universality of epistemic principles could be to 
ground it in reason, and claim that epistemic principles are a priori. However this 
approach contradicts the contention about the mind-independence of epistemic standards 
since reason is a faculty of the mind. But more importantly, it fails to provide a sufficient 
answer to our question regarding the evidence that the invariantalist possesses in order to 
believe in the universality of epistemic standards. In fact, does not the call for evidence 
require an examination of actual cases where our beliefs are deemed justified, and 
detecting the features that have or could have any bearing on the justification processes of 
these beliefs? Admittedly such an examination is a difficult task. Boghossian agrees: “it is 
	   227	  
hard to say, even as a purely descriptive matter, precisely which epistemic principles we 
operate with. In their full detail, these principles are enormously complicated and even 
philosophers who have worked on the topic for years would be hard-pressed to formulate 
them in a way that is free of counterexamples.” (65) Although the current absence of a 
consensus on a complete list of epistemic principles may not indicate an eternal failure to 
achieve such a list or that it does not exist, it surely undermines the evidence we seek for 
arriving at a rational belief about the absolute fixity of epistemic principles.  
 So far, my examination of the universality of epistemic facts has focused on the 
premise that epistemic principles, which determine whether an item of information E 
justifies a belief B, are absolutely fixed. However, there is another premise that the 
universality of epistemic facts rests on: there are no factors other than epistemic principles 
that have a bearing on an epistemic fact. Yet Longino convincingly argues that social 
values intervene within epistemic facts. In fact, she argues that epistemic principles 
themselves are influenced by social values. If she is right, then the belief in the 
universality of epistemic facts is undermined. Let’s have a close look at the so-called 
universal epistemic principles.  
 Boghossian identifies observation, deduction and induction as the fundamental 
principles which specify a significant portion of our ordinary “post-Galilean” epistemic 
system. Other debated candidates for such principles that he mentions are inference to the 
best explanation, simplicity, degrees of belief, probability and so forth. (67) However, 
there still is an unanswered question: are these epistemic principles the sole actors in 
determining epistemic facts? Extensive studies by feminist scholars on concrete cases 
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show that there is always more to justification than the epistemic principles that 
Boghossian identifies. One possible explanation for the invariantalist contention that 
epistemic principles are fixed is a tacit assumption about a rigid dichotomy between the 
cognitive (epistemic and/or rational) and the social. Rationality is typically coupled with 
universality. That is, if a belief, a thought or an action is rational, then it is necessarily 
rational for everyone. The social, on the other hand, entails contingency. But what if it is 
shown that the social affects the cognitive? That is, what if what is accepted as the 
cognitive (epistemic) is not purely cognitive (epistemic) in the first place? Would it mean 
that the cognitive is not purely rational and hence is not absolutely fixed? In her book The 
Fate of Knowledge (2002) Longino has an extensive discussion of these questions which I 
will not examine here. Yet, it is fair to claim that her rejection of the dichotomy between 
the cognitive and the social reflects her commitment to the social character of science. Her 
reformulation of objectivity aims to accommodate the impact of the social on scientific 
practice and its principles. In the next section I will discuss Longino’s account of 
objectivity in detail and defend it against Sharon Crasnow’s criticisms.  
 In sum, charges of epistemic relativism often rest on an ungrounded assumption 
that epistemic standards are universally fixed. However, as I have discussed, we do not 
have sufficient evidence to rationally believe that they are so. In the absence of such 
evidence it is reasonable to assume that there are contextual elements that influence the 
principles we follow when we engage in epistemic practices. Acceptance of this 
assumption is often seen as opening room for “anything goes”. Yet this presumption is 
mistaken. I will elaborate this point in the next section.  
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5.2    Crasnow’s Critique of Longino’s Objectivity 
In her article “Can Science Be Objective?” (2003) Sharon Crasnow examines whether 
Longino’s account of objectivity is compatible with a philosophy of science that rejects 
relativism. Her inquiry is guided by Ron Giere’s contention that a feminist philosophy is 
valid only if it improves our understanding of traditional concepts without falling into 
relativism. (130) Crasnow’s examination leads to the conclusion that Longino's account of 
objectivity is not compatible with a philosophy of science. This is because although it 
prevents a form of relativism called subjectivism, where truth is relative to individuals' 
beliefs, it still accommodates cultural and epistemic relativisms that undermine science. I 
have a few objections to Crasnow’s arguments. My main criticism is that the guiding 
contention that she follows is problematic because it assumes, first, that it is possible to 
deny relativism altogether, and second that the only plausible philosophy of science is a 
nonrelativistic one. Hence my discussion in this chapter is not meant to oppose Crasnow’s 
claim that Longino’s account leads to epistemic relativism. I will argue that some form of 
epistemic relativism is inevitable, and that the form of relativism Longino’s account 
conveys is not a vicious one. Longino’s account provides a fruitful analysis that enhances 
our understanding of science and its concepts. 
 
5.2.1    Crasnow’s Objections 
Crasnow has a few interrelated objections to Longino’s account of objectivity. I have 
discussed some of them in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I will focus on her 
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concerns about epistemic relativism as it affects objectivity, and her suggestion to adopt a 
form of scientific realism to restore a traditional understanding of objectivity. (2003, 140) 
 Recall from the previous chapter that according to Longino, evidence is context 
dependent. That is, whether an item of information E is accepted as evidence for a 
hypothesis H is determined by the context, which consists of background beliefs and 
assumptions. Through these background assumptions contextual values enter into 
scientific inquiry. In order for scientific inquiry to provide knowledge “there must be 
some way of minimizing the influence of subjective preferences and controlling the role 
of background assumptions.” (Longino 1990, 216). Such control, Longino argues, is 
maintained by the social character of scientific activity. Public scrutiny among people 
from different perspectives helps make visible the operating background beliefs such as 
idiosyncrasies and ideologies that individuals (consciously or not) adopt.  According to 
this understanding, the primary bearers of knowledge and objectivity are communities. 
That is, what is agreed to be knowledge or not is ultimately a function of an epistemic 
community, not of individual knowers.  
 Longino defines relativism as the view that “there are no legitimate constraints on 
what counts as reasonable to believe apart from an individual’s own beliefs.” (Longino 
1993, 113) She contends that the social understanding of scientific knowledge escapes the 
relativism that individualistic epistemologies face. In the social understanding of science, 
an epistemic community and its standards have an important role in constraining 
individuals’ beliefs. According to Crasnow, however, avoiding this kind of relativism, 
which she identifies as subjectivism, is not sufficient to save the legitimacy of Longino’s 
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feminist account. Following Larry Laudan's understanding of relativism, where “the 
natural world and such evidence as we have about that world do little or nothing to 
constrain our beliefs”, Crasnow claims that Longino’s account fails, because it does not 
show how the natural world constrains our beliefs. An important passage, which 
summarizes Crasnow’s critique, is the following:  
Underlying recent feminist philosophy of science is the idea that we must take 
seriously the role that social, political, and cultural factors play in the 
development of science. When method is described as influenced by these 
contingent factors and no account is given of how some features of the 
independently existing world are nonetheless captured through this method, it is 
difficult to avoid the charge of relativism without completely reconceiving the 
traditional notion of objectivity. If we ignore issues of truth or the way that nature 
constrains our beliefs, then we are forced to find objectivity in some constant 
feature of good method, something that does not vary with cultural or social 
factors. (2003, 139-140) 
 
This insight suggests that a legitimate constraint on what counts as reasonable to believe 
should involve the natural world. This claim can be interpreted in at least two ways. The 
stronger interpretation suggests that the natural world and only the natural world can 
legitimately constrain our beliefs. The weaker interpretation, on the other hand, suggests 
that the natural world is one of the elements among others that legitimately constrain our 
beliefs.9 The stronger interpretation runs into the following problem. If the natural world 
is the sole actor in determining what it is rational to believe, seeking justification for our 
beliefs becomes futile. As Boghossian admits “the world doesn’t just inscribe itself onto 
our minds. In trying to get at the truth, what we do is to figure out what is true from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It should be noted that these interpretations rest on different ontologies. For instance, if 
one is committed to the idea that “the natural world” includes everything that is, then one 
will deny the plausibility of the weaker interpretation altogether.  
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evidence available to us: we try to form the belief that it would be most rational to have, 
given the evidence. (Boghossian 2006, 58) That is to say, the natural world is often not 
immediately available and accessible to us. Between the natural world and our beliefs 
there is the whole process of evidence gathering and assessment. Claiming that the natural 
world is the only legitimate constraint on our beliefs is to bypass this process and wrongly 
assume that the natural world is directly accessible to us. Even if we grant that some 
phenomena are directly accessible to us, then the aforementioned claim would restrict our 
knowledge of the world to such phenomena, and hence would drastically limit what we 
can know about the world. If evidence were imposed merely by the natural world, the 
very act of seeking and assessing evidence would become redundant. An important thing 
that Boghossian and many other thinkers ignore is that we try to figure out what is true 
from the evidence available to us. The availability of evidence is often a function of 
physical, biological, technological as well as social and economic factors. Furthermore, 
the “we” who is trying to figure out what is true from the available evidence is never 
uniform. Hence, the evidence that is supposed to lead us to rational beliefs is always an 
outcome of a complex relationship between “us” and the natural world. In sum, it is fair to 
claim that the constraint of the natural world is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for the legitimacy and rationality of a belief. This claim is compatible with the weaker 
interpretation I mention above. It is also compatible with the context-dependency of 
evidence. To argue for the context-dependency of evidence is not to deny that the natural 
world has any constraint on our beliefs, but to emphasize that there is more to evidence 
than the impacts of the natural world, and that the other factors that affect evidence 
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assessment should be subjected to appropriate controls if we are to achieve legitimate 
beliefs. 
Crasnow’s objection to Longino’s account rests on her conviction that Longino 
detaches objectivity from its referential roots. In other words, her account of objectivity 
does not refer to the natural world. Because of this separation, Crasnow argues that 
Longino’s account fails to provide any means to judge, affirm or deny the objectivity of a 
viewpoint. Consequently, it falls short of adjudicating between competing viewpoints. 
However, the conviction that Longino’s formulation of objectivity has no reference to the 
ways in which the world (nature) constrains our beliefs is mistaken. I think ignoring the 
compatibility of context-dependency with the weaker interpretation of the ways natural 
world constrains our beliefs leads to this misunderstanding.  
 
5.2.2    Two Senses of Objectivity 
Crasnow’s criticism relates mainly to Longino’s discussion about two senses of scientific 
objectivity. Longino claims that, conventionally, the first sense of objectivity “is bound up 
with questions about the truth and referential character of scientific theories, that is with 
issues of scientific realism.” (1990, 62) Here, when we claim that science is objective we 
mean that the (accepted) scientific theories provide correct descriptions of the world as it 
is. That is, the facts about objects or the relations among them that theories depict are 
mind-independent. I shall call this sense the ontological sense of objectivity as it is tied to 
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the question of what there is.10  The second sense of scientific objectivity that Longino 
identifies has to do with modes of inquiry. In this sense science is objective if the products 
of scientific practice are obtained through a method which involves nonarbitrary and 
nonsubjective criteria in developing and assessing scientific theories. (62) I shall call this 
sense, epistemological objectivity.  
Epistemological objectivity for Longino, also has two different senses. Objectivity 
in scientific method can refer to the objectivity of data, as well as the objectivity of 
assessments of hypotheses and theories. While the first sense has to do with whether data 
are obtained through reliable means, that is whether experiments and calculations have 
been properly performed, the second sense has to do with whether assessments have been 
made in an unbiased and unprejudiced manner. (63) 
There are many interesting questions that could be raised about the two senses of 
epistemological objectivity. For instance, if observation is theory-laden can we still speak 
of the objectivity of data? Perhaps we can think of a sense of objectivity which would 
allow us to talk about the objectivity of data even if observations are theory-laden.  This 
sense has to do with what Allan Megill calls “procedural objectivity”.  Procedural 
objectivity is achieved by setting rules to limit the exercise of personal judgment. (Megill 
1994, 11) This sense of objectivity goes hand in hand with standardization in sciences: 
“For example, rules of statistical inference and rigid interview protocols are alike 
designed to make knowledge as independent as possible of the people involved in making 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I should note that in so far as ontological objectivity has to do with “what there is”, it 
can be formulated without adopting scientific realist commitments where “what there is” 
is identified with “the world as it is in itself”. I will discuss this issue further below.  
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it.” (11) As such the aim of procedural objectivity is akin to Dalston’s mechanical 
objectivity: nonintervention by human beings. However, as I discuss in chapter one, talk 
of the complete absence of human impact is problematic. Megill notes that procedures are 
set within a discipline. They are “a matter of conventions arrived at within a particular 
sphere of research (as, for example, when statisticians and others talk about “statistically 
significant” results).” (11) Hence, it is important to underline that procedures do not 
guarantee the truth of findings. It is within this particular sense of objectivity that we can 
ascribe objectivity to data even if observation is theory-laden, if the data are collected 
according to the established principles and protocols. However, it would be wrong to 
jump to the conclusion that objective data yield bias-free accounts.  
Let me clarify by an analogy. There are different ways to talk about the objectivity 
of a photograph.11 There is a certain sense in which a photo is objective, and this sense 
has to do with the working of a camera when it processes and records what it is directed 
at. The working of a camera is subject to mechanical principles and procedures. These 
principles indicate that there is no human intervention in the recording of the object that 
the camera is directed at in the world.12 It is not to say, however, that there is no human 
intervention in what is being depicted, because, in order to depict something, the 
mechanical device needs to be directed at certain objects. The choice of what objects to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Recall from Chapter One that photography is a symbol of mechanical objectivity.  
12 It can be argued that even the working of a camera is not free from human intervention 
since it is ultimately an artifact. However, once the mechanism of how to record images 
is invented, the process of recording is pretty mechanical (except the cases of 
manipulations for artistic or political reasons). Similarly, although the rules and protocols 
that guide experiments are set by human beings, once they are set we can examine 
whether they are being objectively followed or not.  
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direct your camera at will affect what is being depicted. In other words, this whole 
process involves decisions. Hence, questioning the objectivity of a photograph goes 
further than considering the objectivity of what a camera does but also involves 
examining decisions about where to direct the camera and how to read what it says. The 
location of the camera reflects what the photographer (consciously and unconsciously) 
intends to do (show, represent or explain). How to read a photo, on the other hand, has to 
do with the audience and the social meaning they attribute to certain objects and 
relations.13 These meanings reflect their values and prejudices.14 Hence a comprehensive 
response to the question of the objectivity of a photograph should include assessments of 
what a photographer intends to show as well as what an actual or potential audience does 
with it and why. In other words, the objectivity of a photograph has also to do with how it 
is viewed and received/read. In Longino’s discussion, I think the objectivity of what the 
camera does corresponds to the objectivity of data. Hence, even if observation is theory 
laden, data is objective in the sense that the collection and processing of data are subject 
to certain rules (just as the workings of a camera are subject to mechanical rules).  Why 
certain things are observed rather than others has to do with the decisions or preferences 
of scientists, which might include unconscious inclinations. These decisions are primarily 
made in the course of the research. However, they are also often accompanied by social, 
economic and sometimes personal considerations. The examination of these elements is 
part of the assessment of theories. Furthermore, similar to the photography case, how the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 My contention is that for whatever purpose, a photograph is taken for an audience. This 
audience could consist of a group or a single person such as the photographer herself. 
14 For an interesting discussion on the limitations of visual evidence see Code (2014).  
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theories are received, what use they are put to, what other theories (or sometimes 
ideologies) they serve are also important aspects of theory assessments in thinking about 
objectivity.  
Accordingly, we can claim that although objective assessments of theories require 
objective data, the objectivity of data does not entail fair assessments. This is because data 
collection and processing are one part of the scientific enterprise among others. For 
instance, apart from the impacts of social and political considerations, there are “internal” 
elements that prevent achieving absolute objectivity in theory assessments. I have 
discussed in the second chapter that so-called constitutive values such as simplicity, 
accuracy, fruitfulness and so forth do not always co-operate in assessing theories. In fact, 
in certain cases these ideals contradict one another. Scientists are often compelled to 
follow certain ideals rather than others depending on their subject matters as well as on 
the broader social context and the worldview of their era.  In such cases, although data are 
objectively obtained, assessments often convey the biases that reflect the reasons for 
choosing to follow one ideal over others.15 Hence objective data do not fully guarantee 
epistemic objectivity with respect to assessments. This is to say, in seeking epistemic 
objectivity we need both the objectivity of data and the objectivity of assessments. 
Longino’s main issue is to set the conditions for achieving the latter.  
Now the question that needs to be considered is whether epistemic objectivity 
guarantees ontological objectivity or not. Longino notes that according to common 
wisdom, if science is ontologically objective, it is because it is epistemologically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For a discussion on this issue see Longino (1995).  
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objective. (1990, 63) That is, epistemic objectivity is a prerequisite for ontological 
objectivity. Yet, even though we can claim that epistemic objectivity is a necessary 
condition for achieving ontological objectivity, it would be too strong to claim that the 
former guarantees the latter. After all, we have claimed that epistemic objectivity is 
related to the issues of justification and ontological objectivity is related to issues of truth. 
Since justification is fallible (i.e. we can be justified in believing false propositions) we 
cannot claim that it guarantees ontological objectivity. What is the relationship between 
the two senses of objectivity then? 
 Longino says very little about ontological objectivity and states that her focus is 
on epistemic objectivity. For Crasnow, however, an exclusive focus on epistemic 
objectivity is problematic because for her, the question of whether relativism can be 
avoided by socializing scientific knowledge “is tied to the question of whether a complete 
account of objectivity requires examining both justification and truth.” (134) However, 
this criticism itself rests on the assumption that epistemological objectivity and 
ontological objectivity can be obtained or examined separately from one another. I will 
argue that although the two senses of objectivity differ categorically, they are intrinsically 
related.16 Longino’s avoidance of an elaborate discussion of ontological objectivity might 
be interpreted as indicating her tacit assent to the idea that that the two senses of 
objectivity are distinct. But some features of Longino’s account, specifically those 
pertaining to conditions for the publicity of scientific activity give support to my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 It is similar to the relation between notions such as “teacher” and “student”. Although 
we can talk of teachers and students separately, the concept of “teacher” does not make 
sense without the concept of “student”. 
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contention that the mutual dependency of two senses of objectivity is implicit in her 
account. If this claim of dependency is true, Crasnow’s critique of Longino’s account is 
undermined. That is why it is important to dwell on the relationship between the two 
senses of objectivity.  
 
5.2.3    The Relationship between Ontological Objectivity and Epistemological  
 Objectivity 
 
Many thinkers such as Longino, Lorraine Daston, Allen Megill and R.W. Newell 
distinguish an ontological and an epistemological sense of objectivity. However the 
relationship between these two senses is often left obscure. This confusion I believe is the 
ultimate reason behind the charges of relativism levelled against feminist accounts of 
objectivity.  
 In Rethinking Objectivity (1994) Megill distinguishes a philosophical or absolute 
sense of objectivity that is concerned with discussions of 'representing things as 
themselves'. He argues that in this sense the role of objectivity could differ depending on 
whether the emphasis is on the things that are being represented or on the representation 
process itself. Hence, there is an ontological and a methodological dimension to absolute 
objectivity. While ontological objectivity focuses on the nature or the composition of 
things that are represented, epistemological objectivity focuses on the standards for 
assessing the claims to represent things as they really are. (1994, 2) 
In his book Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth (1986) Newel, on the other hand, 
argues that in the philosophical sense objectivity is either assigned to 'objects', i.e. 
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particular bodies, entities and states of affairs that exist independent of perception and 
have space-time continuity, or it is attributed to beliefs, judgments, propositions about 
what really is the case. (16) 
 In general, then, ontological objectivity is identified with the correct description 
of the world as it is. Such a description represents the facts about objects and/or states of 
affairs that obtain independently. A theory is objective if the view it presents corresponds 
to, mirrors or represents mind-independent facts. However, there are problems with this 
understanding. For one thing, the notion of ‘mind-independency’ is vague. Does it refer to 
an existence independent of perception? Or does it refer to anything that is not 
produced/constructed by human beings (or any cognitive being for that matter)? Different 
senses of mind-independency have different consequences for our understandings of 
objectivity. For instance, as I discuss above, mind-independent facts are compared with 
socially constructed facts. When objectivity is defined in terms of correspondence to the 
mind-independent world and mind-independency is used as opposed to human products, 
any talk of the objectivity of social phenomena goes down the drain. For instance, we 
cannot talk about the objectivity of the “fact” that in patriarchal societies transgendered 
people face oppression or about the “fact” that today is the first day of May, as calendars 
just like patriarchal societies and oppression are human products. Of course human 
products are not limited to the social sphere. The status of many entities in the natural 
sciences is also debatable. For instance, what is the nature of theoretical entities? If we 
accept, say, that atoms are human constructs, then in this understanding there will not be 
any talk of the objectivity of theories about atoms.  In fact we can take this view even 
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further and claim that we cannot objectively talk about anything. This is because, in order 
to control and make sense of our surroundings we categorize and conceptualize the world. 
Hence, our descriptions of the world always involve human categorizations, i.e. products 
of mind.  
 Perhaps a way of escaping the problems I mention above is to identify mind-
independence with the ultimate structure of the world. A strict realist, such as the 
scientific realist that Hilary Putnam discusses in Many Faces of Realism (1987), would 
claim that the commonsense world is a mere “projection” and that “what there really is is 
what ‘finished science’ will say there is” (Putnam 1987, 4) The statements of “finished 
science” will typically consist of statements regarding the so-called primary qualities of 
objects, that is, qualities that obtain without the perception of a sentient being. 
Accordingly the only things that we can objectively talk of will be the underlying 
structure of the world. In addition to the controversy over the very distinction between 
secondary and primary qualities, this understanding will considerably narrow the scope of 
ontological objectivity.  
 Connected to the last point, it can be argued that ontological objectivity becomes 
redundant when it is identified with representations of facts about mind-independent 
objects. According to Newell, ontological objectivity is often used to explain “the 
coherence, uniformity and identity of perceptions and of the difference between what is 
appearance and what is not”. In other words, it marks “what is really out there”. However, 
for Newell this understanding leaves no distinctive role for objectivity “beyond the job 
already performed by the notion of independent particulars” (Newell 1986, 18-19). It is 
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circular to explain objective particulars by appealing to their mind-independent status 
while mind-independence is explained by a particular's possession of objective properties. 
(19) In Newell’s terms, “to explain ‘things as they really are’ by calling them 'objective' 
accomplishes nothing without a prior grasp of the difference between 'real things' and 
representations, and if we already have a sense of that distinction then there is no need to 
invoke the notion of objectivity to provide it.” (19) 
  Another problem that is connected to the previous point has to do with identifying 
objectivity with the correct description of the world as it is without considering the ways 
in which we can achieve such a description. If we were to sincerely consider the scope of 
our methods in trying to reach such a description, we would realize that they are not 
sufficient to yield such descriptions, and hence we would acknowledge that we could not 
achieve such a description. In other words, given the evidence that we are limited beings, 
and that our methods fail to fully capture the world as it is, it is most rational to suspend 
judgment about (if not deny) correct descriptions of the world as it is. Insisting on talking 
about the world as it is rests on the delusion that we possess what Richard Rorty calls “a 
God’s eye view”.  
In bringing up the problems surrounding the identification of ontological 
objectivity with correspondence to a mind-independent world, I do not mean to dismiss 
the notion of ontological objectivity all together. On the contrary, I claim that ontological 
objectivity is essential for the intelligibility of epistemic objectivity. Nevertheless, I 
believe ontological objectivity, as referring to depicting “what there is” should be 
reformulated in a way which removes its association with the true description of the world 
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as it is in itself. Here, needless to say, I distinguish between identifying ontological 
objectivity with the true description of the world as it is in itself and identifying it with 
correct descriptions of the way(s) the world is. This is an important difference, because, as 
I have discussed above, the former view considerably narrows the scope of objectivity, 
and it also assumes a God’s eye view. Moreover, in contrast to the latter view which could 
accommodate the plurality of the world, the former view presupposes a monolithic world. 
Acceptance of a monolithic world would diminish the range of possible objects for 
epistemic inquiry. This limitation in turn would result in a misapprehension of phenomena 
and in partial accounts that might have negative physical/psychological/moral/social 
effects on certain people’s lives.  
In talking about the world in itself, it is often assumed that the independent 
existence of facts entails that there is and can be only one true description of the world. 
However, this assumption is debatable. As I argue above, even facts about so-called mind-
independent objects such as mountains could change as a result of natural and/or social 
occurrences. In such cases, true descriptions of the past become false. This situation 
implies at least two things: a) that reality (nature, world) is not monolithic, i.e. it changes; 
b) that whether a description is a correct description of the world or not is relative to the 
time it is assessed. Obviously, this relativity is not troublesome since what make 
descriptions true or false are still the changes in the world. The point is this: our 
confidence in believing that we avoid falling into a dangerous form of relativism in the 
former time-indexed cases rests on our knowledge of the changes in the world. I have 
been arguing, as many feminists do, that appealing to examples about concrete 
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(perceptual) objects, which are clearly observable, in discussions of relativism gives us 
false clarity and confidence about the issue.17 Taking the independent world as the only 
means of evaluating the correctness of our descriptions runs into the following problem: 
in cases where we have to assess descriptions regarding parts of the world that are not 
immediately accessible to us, or parts of the world we have an impact on shaping, we will 
lack any means to arrive at a conclusion. Given that scientific explanations or theories are 
mostly about phenomena that are not immediately observable, it is more plausible to seek 
attainable criteria in assessing our accounts of such cases. If we cannot merely appeal to 
the world in assessing whether our descriptions capture the way the world is, where else 
other than to features of a method could we appeal for such assessments? In the absence 
of a direct check from the world we have to focus on method. We have to examine the 
meticulousness and diligence as well as the “impartiality” of the inquiry. In other words, 
we have to consider whether our method achieves epistemic objectivity. This task requires 
an inspection of all the factors that could affect our descriptions of the world. It is true that 
this is a highly demanding task, perhaps one that is unachievable. There is always the risk 
of leaving out certain factors that affect our descriptions, yet are disregarded for various 
reasons such as ignorance (structural or not) or lack of appropriate conceptual and/or 
technological tools.  As a result “our” acceptance of the way the world is will be relative 
to the factors that “we” take into account.18 An important thing to notice is that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For an elaborate explanation of the problems with appealing to simple perceptual 
objects as paradigmatic objects of knowledge see Code (1993).  
18 One might object and claim that our acceptance of the way world is different than the 
way world is. This distinction might be useful in accounting for our false beliefs about 
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acceptance of such relativity does not entail that the natural world has nothing to do with 
our claims. What it implies is that in certain cases appealing to the natural world by itself 
is not sufficient to assess the correctness of our descriptions. It also implies that because 
considering all factors would be burdensome (if not impossible), and would hinder the 
course of inquiry, we have to narrow down the context by focusing on the relevant factors 
that affect our descriptions. Although the issue of determining the relevant factors is 
complicated, these will ultimately be a function of the topic of the inquiry at hand and our 
intentions behind describing that subject (i.e. goal of the inquiry). Longino does not deny 
that the natural world has a role in this process. She maintains that one of the conditions 
for the publicity of science, which is a prerequisite for achieving objectivity, is that the 
objects of experience which we describe and about which we reason are purported to exist 
independently of our seeing and thinking about them. (Longino 1990, 70) This condition 
implies that we cannot describe the objects as we wish because they have independent 
existence, i.e. their features are shaped by the way the world is. Because there are various 
ways (different point of views) of approaching the world, the way(s) the world is 
accommodates diverse correct descriptions of the same phenomenon. What Longino 
emphasizes is that the process of deciding which phenomenon to describe, from which 
point of view and how to approach that phenomenon, and how to assess our descriptions 
of the phenomenon is carried out within an epistemic community by appealing to its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the way world is. Yet it is important to emphasize that we can remark about our false 
beliefs only after “we” become aware of them.  In practice, it is not intelligible to talk 
about the way world is apart from our acceptance of it. In other words, the distinction 
presupposes a God’s eye view which is not attainable by us humans.  
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established standards.  
For many thinkers, if we deny that the natural world imposes a single true account 
of the world itself, and that it is the only constraining factor for our beliefs, then anything 
goes. Nevertheless, a plurality of accounts does not mean that one can construe 
phenomena just as one wishes. This is because these accounts are usually constrained by 
the way world is as well as by the standards operating within an epistemic community. 
Thus it is not the case that anything goes. It might be argued that since epistemic 
communities themselves are contingent, our assessments would still not guarantee 
achieving correct (“true”) accounts of the world. I think Crasnow’s criticism that 
Longino’s account of objectivity does not take us beyond intersubjectivity is an extension 
of this objection.  But the objection itself rests on the problematic assumptions that the 
correct account of the world corresponds to the world as it is, and that we have direct 
access to it. Moreover, the contingency of epistemic communities does not mean that their 
worldviews are arbitrary. A worldview is (often) a coherent set of beliefs. Yet it may not 
be static. It is a complex web of beliefs which evolves through time in a dialectical 
fashion. It is a function of the interactions between a community and its surroundings—
both social and natural. A discursively dangerous relativism, I think, would be the claim 
that everything being equal there can be multiple and incompatible true accounts of the 
same phenomenon. However, in the diversity of worldviews, things are never equal. The 
question then should be which account to take into consideration rather than which 
account is the “true” account. The answer to this question will inevitably be a function of 
epistemic as well as ethical, social and political negotiations. Hence, the decision as to 
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which description of the world to accept and work with is never arbitrary. Since the 
epistemic and the social values embedded in our decisions are in principle traceable 
(given enough effort and commitment) “we” can detect biases and idiosyncrasies that 
prevail in what “we” accept as the way the world is. According to Longino the more 
diverse points of view are included in this “we” the better chance for “us” to arrive at 
more “objective” accounts.   
In sum, we cannot assess whether an account achieves ontological objectivity (that 
is, captures the way the world is) apart from considering whether it achieves 
epistemological objectivity. This however, is not to claim that ontological objectivity is 
redundant. 
 
5.2.3.1    Ontological Objectivity is Significant 
So far I have focused on how epistemological objectivity is required for ontological 
objectivity. But there is another important aspect to the relationship between the two: 
ontological objectivity is also required for epistemological objectivity. It is fair to claim 
that the talk of a method conceptually entails that there is a goal to be achieved. In the 
case of epistemological objectivity, the aim of pursuing an objective method is to achieve 
a “correct” description of the world. But what does a “correct” description of the world 
amount to? No doubt this is a very complicated question the answer of which would differ 
depending on the endorsed sense of truth, and the relation between correctness and 
impartiality which has connotations of fairness and justness.  For an objectivist view the 
correct description of the world depicts the world as it is, where the world as it is obtains 
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independently of us. In this understanding, the world as it is—problematically—refers to 
the “objective” world. Furthermore, an objectivist epistemology rests on a rigid separation 
between the object of a study and its methodology. As I discuss above, the ultimate 
problem that leads to these mistaken assumptions is the objectivists’ belief in the 
possibility of achieving a God’s eye view. It is because of this illusion that an objectivist 
epistemology fails to notice the mutual dependency of epistemology and ontology, and it 
dismisses any possible epistemic input of discussions of the “fairness” or “justness” of our 
descriptions.  
Nevertheless, once we let go of playing God and start seeking an epistemology 
with a “human face” then we can come to see that epistemology and ontology are 
mutually dependent. And we can reasonably maintain that an objective inquiry aims at 
capturing “what there is” or “the way(s) the world is” accurately without invoking the 
idea of a “world as it is in itself”.   In this understanding, while a scientific method guides 
us to capture correctly (to a greater or a lesser extent) “what there is” and “the way(s) the 
world” is, our commitments and concerns about “what there is” or  “the way(s) the world 
is” outline our methodology. Of course what falls under “what there is” and “the way(s) 
the world is” is debatable. Since our topic is science (i.e. the systematic study of the 
structure and behavior of the physical, natural and/or social world) it no doubt has some 
reference to the world out there. Yet we can still question i) whether it consists of objects 
or states of affairs in the world; ii) whether the nature and/or composition of objects or 
states of affairs have any bearing on “what there is”. These are complex ontological 
questions, answers to which have direct consequences for the endorsed epistemology. An 
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elaborate examination of these long-standing ontological questions would fall outside the 
scope of this dissertation. But I would like to emphasize the fluidity of “what there is” by 
referring back to Daston’s historical analysis of atlas making.  
In the first chapter we saw that Daston defines ontological objectivity as the ideal 
of seeking the ultimate structure of reality. What the ultimate structure of reality consists 
of, however, is far from clear. For instance, in the second chapter I mentioned that for 
scientific realists the ultimate structure of reality refers to the primary qualities of objects, 
and argued that identifying objectivity with accounts of primary qualities will narrow 
down the sense of objectivity considerably.  For Daston the ideal of seeking the ultimate 
structure of reality goes hand in hand with the ideal of being 'true to nature'. Yet, in the 
course of atlas making the task of being true to nature proved to be difficult. Recall from 
the first chapter that in illustrating 'what truly is', atlas makers were compelled to make 
ontological and aesthetic judgments. This task required reducing the variety and 
multiplicity of nature into manageable pieces (specimens). This reduction in turn 
demanded decisions about the selection of which phenomena to observe and from which 
point of view to observe them. Daston mentions two schools of thought for accomplishing 
the ideal of being true to nature: The first school of thought, being committed to the 
existence of ideals, advocated representing ideals in order to be “true to nature”. In turn, 
they sought the “best examples” of one species, and abstracted and illustrated ideal 
features of these examples. The second school of thought, on the other hand, advocated 
representing individuals as they are seen in order to be “true to nature.” They were 
committed to the existence of particulars. Consequently, the illustrations (descriptions) of 
	   250	  
the “same” species drawn by these schools of thought differed drastically. This historical 
case is a good example for showing how ontological commitments affect the ways in 
which phenomena are represented. In other words, commitments about “what there is” 
affect the method of representing what is true to nature. 
 
5.3   Conclusion 
Crasnow claims that Longino separates ontological objectivity and epistemic objectivity, 
and that by not accounting for how ontological objectivity is achieved, her position falls 
into a vicious relativism. I have argued that we cannot talk about epistemic objectivity 
and ontological objectivity apart from one another. Such talk rests on the ungrounded 
assumption that we can achieve a God’s eye view. Longino denies this assumption. 
Moreover, as an empiricist she subscribes to the view that our knowledge depends on our 
experience of the world. Hence there is no doubt that the methodology she puts forward 
ultimately aims to capture how the world is, even though she rejects talk of the world as it 
is in itself. It is true that in a contextualist account it is more complicated to account for 
how the world shapes or constrains our beliefs, as there are other factors that come into 
play in determining the legitimacy of our beliefs. But it is also difficult for a non-
contextualist account to explain how exactly the world constrains our beliefs. After all, 
hasn’t it been the ultimate problem of empiricism since the classical empiricists that the 
very principle that the programme rests on cannot be grounded empirically? In truth, 
whatever we might say about how exactly nature constrains our beliefs would be 
speculative. I think it is not fair to dismiss Longino’s account on the grounds that she 
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does not show how nature constrains our beliefs. Her account is valuable in its elaborate 
attempt to open up new avenues for thinking about the actual workings of science and to 
prescribe principles to achieve more complete and adequate as well as fair and just 
knowledge. Such a systematic analysis improves our understanding of science and its 
concepts.  
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